

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

PERILS OF A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

by

Michael A. Brookes

September 1997

Thesis Advisor:

Bertrand Patenaude

Second Reader:

Terry Johnson

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

19980417 140

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 1997		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE PERILS OF A DEMOCRATIC PEACE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael A. Brookes				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) President Clinton has declared that the promotion of democracy is the key to ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is based upon an international relations theory called the "democratic peace." Expressed simply, it states that democracies are reluctant to engage one another in war; therefore, increasing the number of democracies worldwide will promote peace and, ultimately, America's security. Although it is a seductive theory, the notion of the democratic peace has many pitfalls. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the democratic peace theory is not an appropriate foundation for U.S. national security strategy. First, I establish that "democracy" is not universally desirable. Instead, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism, and economics create imperatives that thwart efforts to develop democracy. Second, I cite the actions of the intelligence services of democratic states against fellow democracies - including espionage, economic espionage, and covert action - to illustrate that peace is not without peril. Ultimately, pursuit of a democratic peace may jeopardize national security because it threatens to entangle the United States in costly foreign interventions. Additionally, the false sense of security it engenders may lull the U.S. into a state of complacency from which it will be unable to recover.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Democracy peace international relations culture ethnic nationalism economic espionage covert action national security Islam Confucianism Singapore Iran Russia Burma Arbenz Guatemala France Israel Pollard intelligence CIA			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 211	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PERILS OF A DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Michael A. Brookes

Lieutenant, United States Navy

B.A., California Polytechnic State University- San Luis Obispo, 1987

**Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


September 1997

Author:



Michael A. Brookes


Approved by:



Bertrand Patenaude, Thesis Advisor



Terry Johnson, Second Reader



Frank C. Petho, Chairman

Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

President Clinton has declared that the promotion of democracy is the key to ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is based upon an international relations theory called the "democratic peace." Expressed simply, it states that democracies are reluctant to engage one another in war; therefore, increasing the number of democracies worldwide will promote peace and, ultimately, America's security. Although it is a seductive theory, the notion of the democratic peace has many pitfalls. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the democratic peace theory is not an appropriate foundation for U.S. national security strategy. First, I establish that "democracy" is not universally desirable. Instead, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism, and economics create imperatives that thwart efforts to develop democracy. Second, I cite the actions of the intelligence services of democratic states against fellow democracies - including espionage, economic espionage, and covert action - to illustrate that peace is not without peril. Ultimately, pursuit of a democratic peace may jeopardize national security because it threatens to entangle the United States in costly foreign interventions. Additionally, the false sense of security it engenders may lull the U.S. into a state of complacency from which it will be unable to recover.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BACKGROUND	7
A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY	7
1. Power Vested in the People	9
2. Exercised Directly or Indirectly	11
3. Free Elections	13
B. DEMOCRATIC PEACE	15
1. Institutional Constraints	18
2. Normative Values	19
3. Economic Interdependence	20
C. REALIST CRITIQUE	21
III. IS DEMOCRACY UNIVERSAL?	27
A. CULTURE	29
1. "Asian Values"	32
a. Case Study: Indonesia's New Order	38
b. Summation	46
2. Russian Traditions of Authoritarianism	47
a. Case Study: Russia's Security Service	53
b. Summation	59

3.	Islam	60
a.	Case Study: Iran's "Ayatollah Gorbachev"	66
b.	Summation	72
4.	Culture vs. Democracy: The Unequivocal Verdict	73
B.	ETHNIC NATIONALISM	79
1.	Case Study: Ethnic Conflict in Burma	84
2.	Democracy: Part Poison, Part Cure	92
C.	ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES	93
1.	Case Study: Cambodia's Democratic Moment	97
2.	Economic Development: Democracy's X-Factor	103
D.	DEMOCRACY IS UNIVERSALLY <i>POSSIBLE</i>	104
IV.	PERILS OF PEACE	107
A.	COVERT ACTION	110
1.	The CIA in Guatemala	114
2.	Summation	120
B.	ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE	122
1.	Case Study: The French Secret Services	132
2.	Summation	136
C.	MORE "FRIENDLY" ESPIONAGE	137
1.	Case Study: Jonathan J. Pollard	143
2.	Summation	147
D.	PEACE AMONG DEMOCRACIES	148

V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN INAPPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ... 151

 A. FOREIGN POLICY: THE VAIN PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY 151

 B. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: STRETCHED TOO THIN 159

 C. U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: FRAGMENTED SUPPORT 168

VI. CONCLUSION 173

LIST OF REFERENCES 179

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 193

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BIA	Burma Independence Army
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DAB	Democratic Alliance of Burma
DGSE	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure
DIO	Defense Intelligence Officer
DOD	Department of Defense
FIS	Foreign Intelligence Service
FSB	Federal Security Service
FUNCINPEC	United Nation Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
GAO	General Accounting Office
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IRI	International Republican Institute
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGB	Committee for State Security
KNU	Karen National Union
MB	Ministry of Security
MPAC	Muslim Public Affairs Council
NCA	National Command Authority
NDF	National Democratic Front
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NIS	Newly Independent States
NLD	National League for Democracy
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference

OMA	Operations and Maintenance Account
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PFIAB	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
ROK	Republic of Korea
SDCE	Service de Documentation Extérieure et Contre-Espionage
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Clinton has declared the promotion of democracy to be one of the keys to ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War era. This assertion is based on the principles of an international relations theory commonly referred to as the "democratic peace." Simply put, this theory states that democracies have demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to go to war with one another; therefore, expanding the rolls of democracies will promote world peace and, thus, America's security. However, the promise of democratic peace is by no means a sure thing. Indeed, it is fraught with potential pitfalls. Indeed, an examination of the tenets of this theory demonstrates that eager adherence to the democratic peace is a precarious and potentially perilous foundation upon which to build U. S. security.

The manner in which U.S. national security strategy adapts democratic peace theory rests on two assumptions. The first is the belief that democracy is welcome across the globe and can therefore be easily exported. This faith in the ready desirability of democracy, however, is unfounded. Global variables, such as divergent cultural values, ethno-nationalist passions, and economic imperatives, while they cannot be said to invalidate this notion, can act to inhibit the spread of democracy and, even where it is embraced, serve to create a variety of systems under the umbrella label of "democracy." The worth ascribed to democracy is of paramount importance. While it may be universally possible, the manner in which democracy is assessed and valued is not necessarily uniform. Therefore, a democratic crusade ensconced in a cloud of rhetoric has the potential to entangle the United States in costly and counterproductive foreign interventions.

The second assumption of U.S. security strategy is that the global spread of democracy - and with it the democratic peace - is sufficient to ensure this nation's security. This is also a

fallacy. Democracies, like all states, pursue objectives that they believe to be in their interests in an attempt to compete and ensure their self-preservation in the international realm. In doing so they engage in many activities, to include covert action, espionage, and economic espionage, that may impinge on the sovereignty and threaten the security of other states, including fellow democracies. And, while these acts hardly produce the havoc and destruction that accompany war, they are nonetheless capable of threatening the relative well-being of another state. That democracies frequently indulge in these less-than-benign acts against other democracies serves to demonstrate that the promise of a democratic peace is hollow: the “peace” that is proffered is not without perils, and indeed it can often be exceptionally menacing.

Thus, contrary to the President’s assurances, democracy is neither a universally desirable commodity nor the key to an inherently peaceful and secure world. This mismatch between U.S. national security strategy and the challenges and menaces that will continue to lurk in the international realm has clear consequences for the tools of national security strategy - that is, U.S. foreign policy, national military strategy, and the efforts of America’s intelligence community. To realize national security, each of these implements must be employed in a coordinated and cogent manner. Currently, they are engaged in a vain pursuit of “democracy” that garners little in exchange for the time, energy, and resources expended. This misguided quest, in an era of decreasing budgets, has potentially grave implications, particularly with regard to the military’s capability to respond to actual threats to U.S. security. U.S. national security strategy can accommodate idealism, but in the end it must be grounded in self-interest. Otherwise, it courts peril.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Lee Schwarz and Mr. J. Lewis Rasmussen for both their contribution of source material and the block of time they generously set aside to discuss and critique this thesis. I would also like to express gratitude to my thesis advisors, Dr. Bertrand Patenaude and LTC Terry Johnson. With expert guidance and frequent encouragement, they skillfully honed my ideas into a finely polished product that I am proud to call my own. Additionally, I owe a special thanks to Dr. Mary Callahan. Not only did the classroom discussions she directed spark many of the ideas contained in this thesis, but her flexibility, forbearance, and enthusiasm were essential to the successful completion of this project. Finally, I must thank my wife and daughter. Without their patient, loving support, this endeavor would not have been possible. Honey, I'm finally done! Wahoo!

I. INTRODUCTION

It is indeed an animating thought, that while we are securing the rights of ourselves and our posterity, we are pointing out the way to struggling nations, who wish like us to emerge from their tyrannies also.¹

President Clinton, in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, declared the promotion of democracy to be one of the keys to ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War world:

Our national security strategy [NSS] is...based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.²

The most recent guidance from the White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, echoes this sentiment, stating that "the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests."³

The ideal of fostering peace and (ultimately) security through democracy is a recurring theme throughout U.S. history. President Reagan, in a June 1982 speech before the British Parliament, urged "a global campaign for democratic development." He considered the "crusade

¹President Thomas Jefferson, correspondence "To Hunter," 1790, in Saul K. Padover, ed., *Democracy* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 42.

²President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1996), 2-3.

³President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1997), 2.

for freedom” to be crucial to the development of world peace.⁴ Indeed, even as early as April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed (somewhat more eloquently than either Reagan or Clinton) that: “Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.”⁵

President Clinton’s assertions, as well as those of his predecessors, are based upon the principles of a proposition of international relations theory commonly referred to as the “democratic peace.” Expressed simply, this theory states that democracies have demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to go to war with one another and that, therefore, expanding the rolls of democracies will promote world peace and thus, ultimately, America’s security.⁶

That democratic states are inherently peaceful, at least in their relations with other democracies, is not a novel observation. More than two centuries ago, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant noted that republics were reluctant to go to war against each other and theorized

⁴President Ronald W. Reagan, *New York Times*, 9 June 1982; quoted in Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 3.

⁵President Woodrow Wilson, War Message of 2 April 1917; in Albert Shaw, ed., *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), 378; quoted in Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” 13.

⁶Although there is substantial overlap between “democratic peace” and “liberal peace” (also expressed as “liberal international theory”), the terms are not synonymous. The difference lies in the mechanics of governance. Strictly defined, a democracy involves government by the people, either directly or through elected representatives, with some provision for civil rights. Liberalism, in contrast, is primarily concerned with guaranteeing individual rights or freedoms from government control and does not necessarily include stipulations for popular government. Liberal rights are civil, religious, and importantly, political in nature. This is where the confusion begins: freedom to actively participate in government is often cited as a protected liberal right. Therefore, “liberalism” is frequently (albeit imprecisely) used interchangeably with “democracy.” Yet, it is quite possible to have a liberal state that is not democratic. The permutations and variegations of the term democracy, in conjunction with liberal rights, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.

that they would, therefore, be likely to enjoy a "perpetual peace" with each other. Competing ideologies have, however, impeded the practical application of this theory. President Wilson's goal of worldwide democratic self-determination and peace was thwarted, in part, by the rise to prominence of fascism. Following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, the specter of communism loomed as an ominous and disruptive force.

In 1983, Michael Doyle, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, resurrected the idea of a "democratic peace" in an article entitled "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." This article, as well as the promise of lasting peace among democracies, languished in relative obscurity until the collapse of communism and the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Prior to these pivotal events, U.S. policymakers were consumed with the rhetoric and animosity of the Cold War. Subsequently, it was unrealistic to even consider the potential for a democratic peace. Doyle's work and democratic peace theory as a whole were dismissed as wishful thinking that was simply not pertinent to the circumstances present in the international realm at that time. But, "To everything there is a season...."⁷ While fascism and communism have been exposed as bankrupt ideologies, democracy is enjoying a resurgence of respectability, and Doyle and the democratic peace have become causes célèbres. According to Francis Fukuyama, former Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department and a resident consultant at the RAND Corporation, democracy is the only viable political ideology remaining:

As Mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potential universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. Two

⁷Ecclesiastes 3:1, Hebrew Bible, in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent.⁸

The resurgence of democracy, viewed through the prism of democratic peace theory, has fueled unbridled enthusiasm about the potential for resolving conflict in a world populated by democratic states. Indeed, Policymakers and pundits alike have embraced the democratic peace as a sure thing: "The absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."⁹ Thus, what was once an irrelevant theory of international relations is now not only accepted as common knowledge, but has been codified in U.S. national security strategy.

As an added bonus, the implementation of democratic peace theory through "Engagement and Enlargement" is a welcome opportunity to abandon realpolitik in favor of the pursuit of a U.S. foreign policy that matches the ideals upon which this country was built. For the American public, the notion of ending wars by promoting democracy is certainly a palatable prescription for national security. According to Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State, it combines just the right mix of ideology, enthusiasm, and optimism:

The American people have never accepted traditional geopolitics or pure balance-of-power calculations as sufficient reason to expend national treasure or to dispatch American soldiers to foreign lands. Throughout this century the U.S. government has explained its decisions to send troops "over there" with some invocation of democracy and its defense.¹⁰

⁸Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 42.

⁹Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 88; quoted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), ix.

¹⁰Strobe Talbot, "Democracy and the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 49.

Not surprisingly, Doyle concurs, adding that:

[I]n the United States, and in other liberal states to a lesser degree, public policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles. Policies not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term [sic] public support.¹¹

Yet, rejoicing over the propriety and promise of a democratic peace is premature.

Although extremely seductive, democratic peace is in fact not a sure thing. Rather, it is fraught with potential pitfalls. Democratic ideals, however appealing they are to the American public, are not assured of unchallenged supremacy. Nor are they guaranteed to bring about a more peaceful world. Therefore, rather than the final step on the path to lasting peace, the crusade to spread and nurture democratic values worldwide is an unproductive drain on resources which obscures realistic and obtainable foreign policy goals. Ultimately, "Engagement and Enlargement" may jeopardize national security because it entangles the United States in "costly and counterproductive foreign interventions."¹² And, the opposite end of the spectrum may be even more dangerous: the false sense of security engendered by a "democratic peace" may lull the U.S. into a state of complacency and unpreparedness from which it will be unable to respond to national security challenges.

The object of this thesis is to demonstrate that democratic peace theory is not an appropriate foundation for crafting U.S. national security strategy. My approach will be two-pronged: first, I will establish that democracy, as the term is understood by Americans, is not a

¹¹Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 49.

¹²Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), xiv.

universally desirable export. Instead, as I will demonstrate, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism, and economics create imperatives that can (alone or in combination) thwart efforts to develop democracy. Second, I will cite the actions taken by the intelligence services of democratic states against fellow democracies - to include espionage, economic espionage, and covert action - to illustrate that peace is not without peril.

The tack I will employ in my examination of democratic peace theory is indirect and somewhat unusual. I do not intend to challenge the primary claim of the democratic peace - namely that democracies do not go to war with each other - for two reasons. First, such an exercise does not appear to lend itself to satisfactorily definitive pronouncements. Indeed, learned academicians have endlessly debated the democratic peace in scholarly journals and books, yet have been unable to derive an unequivocal conclusion regarding its veracity.¹³ Second, it is my contention that whether or not the assertions of a democratic peace can be accepted at face value is irrelevant. Even if democratic peace is a valid phenomenon, it is not sufficient to guarantee U.S. national security as many of the potential perils that exist in the international realm are not mitigated by its principles. Therefore, blind adherence to and application of the tenets of this theory remain problematic. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that democratic peace theory is a perilous foundation upon which to build U.S. security strategy.

¹³A number of important essays that deliberate the possibility of a democratic peace have been collected and compiled by the editors of *International Security* in a volume entitled *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

II. BACKGROUND

A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY

Equality of rights spelled liberalism, equality of votes democracy, equality of goods socialism.¹⁴

An evaluation of the tenets of the democratic peace would be incomplete without first identifying just what "democracy" is. The term, as defined by Webster's, is fairly straightforward and, at first, seems readily acceptable: "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation [usually] involving periodically held free elections."¹⁵ This definition, however, belies the excess baggage in the form of aspirations and expectations that has become attached to democracy. Rather than simply a means to an end (representative government), democracy has been embraced as a cure-all for a variety of ills, to include inequality, inefficiency, injustice, conflict, and limitations on freedom. Indeed, according to Roland N. Stromberg, former professor of history and now prolific author, democracy is everything to everyone:

[In] popular parlance, democracy has become confused or amalgamated or overlaid with other ideas. There is a puzzling conflation of things logically separate or even contradictory in what is commonly called democracy.¹⁶

¹⁴Roland N. Stromberg, *Democracy: A Short Analytical History* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 7. Stromberg is the author of numerous books, including *European Intellectual History since 1789* and *Europe in the Twentieth Century*. He has taught at the University of Maryland and Southern Illinois University, and is now retired from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

¹⁵*Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1985 ed.

¹⁶Stromberg, 7.

Philippe Schmitter, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, dismisses the illusion that democracy is the answer to all political ills: "the mere advent of democracy does not also bring freedom and equality, growth and equity, security and opportunity, efficiency and responsiveness, autonomy and accountability...."¹⁷ Indeed, if the will of the majority reigns supreme, it may impinge upon individual freedoms (such as those guaranteed in the U.S. Bill of Rights). And while equality at the ballot box provides all citizens a voice in government, it does not always ensure equal opportunity with regard to the distribution of economic benefits. Finally, while the consultative nature of democracy aims to allocate resources in a manner which effectively reflects need, the process of compromise itself can be inherently time-consuming and inefficient.

Clearly democracy, at least as it is practiced in the United States, is not a simple phenomenon which lends itself easily to a single-sentence definition. Rather, it is a complicated, delicate, constantly evolving balance between contradictions - rights and responsibilities, limitations and possibilities - that is derived from several centuries of experimentation and adjustment. Despite this intricacy, by revisiting Webster's definition and re-examining it in detail, one can achieve a greater understanding with regard to the characteristics and implications of democracy. This understanding will be crucial to an accurate assessment of the universality of democracy and, ultimately, the overall value of a democratic peace.

¹⁷Philippe C. Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 2 (April 1994): 61-62.

1. Power Vested in the People

A government "of the people, by the people, and for the people"¹⁸ begs the question: Which people? Who is to be considered a legitimate participant in the governance of the state?¹⁹ Historically, philosophers, writers, and leaders have viewed the common man with equal parts suspicion, fear, and loathing. As late as the mid-19th century Ralph Waldo Emerson decried the roiling masses to be "rude, lame, unmade, [and] pernicious in their demands and influence...."²⁰ Henry David Thoreau concurred, concluding that the populace, en masse, "never comes up to the standard of its best member, but on the contrary degrades itself to a level with the lowest."²¹ Until the middle of the 20th century, democracy, particularly near-universal franchise, was viewed as a radical and dangerous idea. Not surprisingly, the privilege of voting was reserved for citizens who owned property (and therefore had a legitimate stake in ensuring sound government) and occasionally for those who were educated enough to exercise the right wisely.

Closely linked to the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the masses was the fear of a "tyranny of the majority." In 1787, James Madison, then a member of the Continental Congress, warned of the potential for measures to be decided "not according to the rules of justice, and the

¹⁸President Abraham Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address," in *The Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, 1991 ed. This speech was presented on November 19, 1863 during the dedication of a cemetery for soldiers at the site of the Battle of Gettysburg.

¹⁹David Held, "Democracy: from City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?," in David Held, ed., *Prospects for Democracy* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993), 20.

²⁰Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Considerations By the Way," *The Conduct of Life*, in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

²¹Henry David Thoreau, *Journals* (entry for March 14, 1838), in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority.”²² French novelist Gustave Flaubert lamented approximately 100 years later that “It will no longer be a despot that oppresses the individual, but the masses.”²³ Clearly measures that mitigated the potential capriciousness of democracy were warranted. The effort to develop such measures - which would protect individual freedoms and guarantee the rights of citizens against the capriciousness of an intolerant faction (whether a majority or a minority of the whole) - was, once again, championed by Madison: “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of populace government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.”²⁴ This desire to forge a compromise between government by the people (democracy) and individual rights and freedom from government control (liberalism) has resulted in the tradition referred to as “liberal democracy.”²⁵ Ultimately, it entails a never-ending balancing act between the rights of the individual and responsibility to the community.

The United States is indisputably a liberal democracy. Yet, while liberalism “gives democracy moral depth by insisting on the inviolability of basic human rights and on the protection of minorities and dissenting individuals,”²⁶ most Americans do not differentiate between the two concepts. They are viewed as one in the same. This fact has interesting and important implications - which will be developed further - for the universal export of democracy.

²²President James Madison, “No. 10,” in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, & James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 77.

²³Gustave Flaubert, quoted in Stromberg, 36.

²⁴Madison, 80.

²⁵This dichotomy is also referred to as the “positive” and “negative” aspects of democracy. The former involves facilitation of popular participation; the latter is a tool to combat tyranny.

²⁶Held, 166.

2. Exercised Directly or Indirectly

Democracy, as developed and practiced by Greek city-states some twenty-four hundred years ago, involved "continuous participation of the people in the direct exercise of power...."²⁷ Society consisted of individuals, equal before the law, who personally exercised rights to protect their interests. Although the demos included only free-born citizens - slaves, and certainly women were excluded - the direct democracy "of antiquity was undoubtedly the closest possible approximation to a literal democracy in which governors and governed stood side by side and dealt with each other face to face."²⁸ Because of its simplicity and seemingly incontrovertible fairness, direct democracy has been lionized as the ideal democracy. Yet, even as practiced by the ancient Greeks, direct democracy was flawed: "there is not the same emphasis as in liberal democracy on protecting the individual against the power of the state, since the will of the majority is paramount and the state exists to execute that will."²⁹ An additional, perhaps more pertinent shortcoming relates to the feasibility of employing participatory democracy to govern the large, diverse, and dispersed polities that exist today. According to Giovanni Sartori, Professor of Humanities at Columbia University:

[D]irect, real self-government cannot be presumed; it requires the actual presence and participation of the people concerned. It is impossible to have direct democracy at a distance and meaningful self-government among absentees.... Thus, when vast territories and entire nations are involved, direct democracy becomes an unusable formula.³⁰

²⁷Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987), 280.

²⁸*Ibid.* Direct democracy is also referred to as monistic, totalitarian, organic, radical, or participatory democracy.

²⁹Robert Pinkney, *Democracy in the Third World*, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 8.

³⁰Sartori, 283.

While vestiges survive in the form of referendums, city councils, and school boards, direct democracy is largely an anachronism in today's world.³¹

If direct democracy is inappropriate and unobtainable for modern states, the only other democratic alternative is modern democracy, where the will of the people is exercised indirectly through elected representatives.³² While direct democracy emphasizes conformity and consensus building, representational democracy consists primarily of confrontation and competition between different interest groups. The state does not exist to execute the will of the majority, but rather serves "as a referee to ensure the representation and protection of [these] diverse interests."³³ While the protection of individual rights and the prevention of the tyranny of the majority is the primary concern of modern democracy, effective representation and protection of interests is a close (and not unrelated) second concern. A third goal is effective management of the process of competition and confrontation between interest groups. The trick is to balance the right for all pertinent voices to be heard against the desire to reach an amenable course of action in a timely manner. This is a difficult task, which, according to Madison, requires considerable calculation and thought:

In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be the representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.³⁴

³¹Pinkney, 8. Stromberg adds that direct democracy continues to be exercised in a few Swiss cantons.

³²Also referred to as indirect, representational, or pluralist democracy.

³³Pinkney, 10.

³⁴Madison, 82.

Proponents must concede that representational democracy is not always able to avoid confusion when weighing the varied interests of the multitude. And outright critics fume that representational democracy is a misnomer: far from being representational, modern democracy is instead an oligarchy of elites that benefits from privileged political connections and an unequal distribution of resources. Although these are valid criticisms, representational democracy remains the most effective way to implement a government of the people, by the people, for the people.

3. Free Elections

Samuel Huntington, Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University, has declared that "Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non."³⁵ Although not inaccurate, this point requires further elaboration. While elections are certainly necessary, they alone are not a sufficient condition of democracy³⁶ This is because elections can be flawed, manipulated, or just plain ignored by the regime currently in power. Therefore, Huntington's distinction of "free" and "fair" elections is significant.

Voting and elections are mechanisms for citizens to register their opinions, to come to a decision regarding candidates specifically, and issues in general. Ideally voters will make informed decisions. But upon what do they base their views? Clearly, the open exchange of

³⁵Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. Huntington is also the Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. For those who, like the author of this thesis, did not have the benefit of an education in classical Latin, sine qua non refers to an essential element or condition.

³⁶Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4. Linz and Stepan refer to the mistaken assumption that a necessary condition of democracy, free elections, is a sufficient condition of democracy as the "electoralist fallacy."

ideas that precedes elections is crucial to the democratic process:

Voting has a prevoting background. While we must not downgrade the importance of elections, we cannot isolate the electoral event from the whole circuit of the opinion-forming process. Electoral power per se is the mechanical guarantee of democracy; but the substantive guarantee is given by the conditions under which the citizen gets information and is exposed to the pressure of opinion makers.³⁷

Therefore, free elections are those in which the “civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns”³⁸ are not constrained. This point is crucial. In essence, you cannot truly have democracy unless it is supported by appropriate liberal rights and freedoms. Ultimately, without an open exchange of ideas, elections are not “free” nor is it likely that they are relevant.

Fairness is the second prerequisite which must be met for elections, and ultimately for democracy, to be considered valid. Fairness implies competing for political power by the rules and abiding by the electoral outcome even though it may not directly serve one’s self-interest. Adam Przeworski, an eminent political scientist, expresses it as the process of institutionalizing uncertainty:

In an authoritarian regime, some groups, typically the armed forces, have the capacity of intervening whenever the result of a conflict is contrary to their program or their interests. In a democracy, no group is able to intervene when outcomes of conflicts violate their self-perceived interests. Democracy means that all groups must subject themselves to uncertainty.³⁹

³⁷Sartori, 86.

³⁸Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 7.

³⁹Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Volume III of IV (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 58.

Uncertainty begins at the ballot box and is repeated at each stage of the decision-making process.

Democratic fair-play demands that self-interests be willingly subjected to such ambiguity.

In summation, the American democratic experience is representational in nature, involving near-universal suffrage that is exercised through regular, free, and fair elections. Additionally, particular emphasis is placed on liberal freedoms to both guarantee the rights of individuals and support the integrity of the process. A discussion of whether this particular brand of democracy is suitable for export will be reserved for Chapter III, however, unless otherwise stated, "democracy" in this thesis will refer to the general definition reached in the preceding pages.

B. DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Virtue and interest are inseparable.⁴⁰

An examination of democratic peace theory should begin with a dissection of the terms of its principle tenet, namely, that sovereign states that have successfully consolidated democracy do not go to war with each other.⁴¹ As the concept of democracy has already been rigorously examined, let us turn to the idea of sovereignty. Bruce Russett, a Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale University, defines sovereign states as those entities which are "internationally recognized as such by other states, including by

⁴⁰President Thomas Jefferson, correspondence "To Logan," 1816, in Saul K. Padover, ed., *Democracy* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 42.

⁴¹As mention briefly in Chapter I, there are similarities between the notions of a democratic peace and a liberal peace (i.e., peace between liberal states). However, as the range of what may be considered a liberal state is quite broad, the latter is a far more difficult proposition to defend than the former. Additionally, U.S. national security strategy (NSS) is specifically concerned with enlarging the number of *democracies*. Accordingly, this thesis will investigate only the implications for NSS with regard to a democratic peace.

major powers whose recognitions of a government typically confers de facto statehood.”⁴² The idea of state sovereignty, in combination with citizens who possess political and economic freedom and exercise their legal rights to choose a representative government, is crucial to democratic peace theory: “Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence.”⁴³ Therefore, out of mutual respect, other democratic states must refrain from intervening in their affairs. This assertion will be pivotal to a later discussion of the malevolent actions taken by democracies against like states.

While theorists argue that democracies do not go to war with democracies, they do not suggest that they are passive by nature. On the contrary, democracies have shown a remarkable propensity and, at times, even an eagerness to go to war with nondemocratic states. As mentioned previously, the key is mutual respect between like states. But recognition must precede respect. If two democracies do not recognize each other as such, they are no less likely to engage in conflict than would a democracy and a nondemocratic state at an impasse over competing national interests. This point is significant with regard to the interaction of culture and democracy. Will the adaption of democratic principles, values, and institutions to the characteristics of one culture be recognized and accepted by another? While a general definition of democracy has been proffered in the preceding section, it remains to be seen if it can and will be applied across cultural lines.

Continuing with the explanation of terms, democratic peace is caveated by the stipulation that the democracies in question must be “consolidated” or “constitutionally secure.”

⁴²Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 71.

⁴³Doyle, “Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 10.

That is, democracy must be "the only game in town."⁴⁴ As explained by political scientists Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, this occurs when:

all the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly.... [W]ith consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success.⁴⁵

War, our final term, is defined by Russett as "large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence."⁴⁶ And what is large-scale? J. David Singer and Melvin Small, social scientists who have compiled an authoritative and exhaustive compendium of statistics from interstate wars for the period of 1816-1965, offer the following guidelines:

Conflict involving at least one member of [the] interstate system [i.e., a sovereign state] on each side of the war, resulting in a total of 1000 or more battle deaths. Thresholds for individual nation's participation are at least 100 battle deaths or at least 1000 troops in active combat.⁴⁷

It is of great significance that war, as defined above, is the only measure that concerns democratic peace theorists in their attempts to gauge the potential for hostility between democracies. Other offenses, such as covert action to overthrow a legitimately elected government, are disregarded, first, because they do not meet the threshold established for war.

⁴⁴Linz, 5.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," 69.

⁴⁷J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 381.

Second, they are not subjected to the public's scrutiny and, therefore, possible disapproval:

This definition...excludes, on theoretical grounds, covert actions in which one government secretly undertakes activities, including the use of lethal violence and the support of violent actors within the other government's territory, either to coerce or to overthrow that government.... [T]hese activities [and others relating to intelligence], precisely because they are [secretive and] denied at the time by the government that undertakes them, imply very different political processes than does a war publicly and officially undertaken.⁴⁸

This is a myopic viewpoint: it ignores the fact that publicly-elected representatives provide oversight for such acts, and it underestimates the impact of such actions on the stability and security of the target nation. A incisive question from a learned colleague reinforces this point:

Does it really make a difference to a country whether it loses its sovereignty through war or covert action? In the end, it still relinquishes sovereignty.⁴⁹

The dangers to national security - short of war - that are perpetually present in the international realm, even during peacetime, will receive further elaboration in Chapter IV of this thesis.

1. Institutional Constraints

With our terminology now in order, it is possible to examine the unique characteristics of democracies that purportedly constrain them from engaging in war with one another. There are three commonly-accepted explanations for the special relationship attributed to democratic states. The first, the structural or institutional constraints model, is summarized by Christopher Layne, a faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey:

[D]emocratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their citizens. Citizens pay the price for war in blood and treasure; if

⁴⁸Russett, "The Fact of a Democratic Peace," 71.

⁴⁹David McAllister, classroom discussion, Research Colloquium, Monterey, 6 June 1997.

the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to electoral retribution. Moreover, in democratic states, foreign policy decisions carrying the risk of war are debated openly and not made behind closed doors, which means that both the public and policymakers are sensitized to costs of fighting.⁵⁰

A second postulate of the international constraints argument focuses on the checks and balances that are a common characteristic of democracies. Of particular importance are institutional constraints which may restrict the primary decision-maker's ability to act:

When the authority and power to decide for war rests in the hands of a single person and that leader opts for war, the state is committed to fight. If institutions or individuals other than the executive must also approve such a decision, less belligerent elements of society have a greater chance of moderating policy.⁵¹

Ultimately, the citizens of a democracy, through public opinion and the voice of their electoral representatives, control when they will engage in armed conflict. If they are to brave the calamities and devastation of war, it will not be in response to the whims of an authoritarian ruler, but rather an exceptional cause of their own choosing.

2. Normative Values

Enter the second factor which constrains democracies from warring against each other: normative values. Because democracies share common values, specifically a pacific means for resolving conflict and a predisposition to cooperate, their citizens are unlikely to view a fellow

⁵⁰Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 160-1. Layne is summarizing the arguments of Michael Doyle, who, in turn, elaborates upon the writings of the 18th century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant.

⁵¹T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 191.

democracy as a threat, particularly one so exceptional as to warrant risking the ravages of war.⁵² Russett concurs: "the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries."⁵³ The end result is a fraternal relationship characterized by mutual respect and appreciation that is resistant to the urge to settle differences with force. As one might expect, democratic states do not have nearly so inherently amicable relationships with non-democratic states. According to Russett, suspicion, rather than respect, is the initial response:

According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on the proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly represent the will of their peoples - if they did, they would not need to rule through undemocratic, authoritarian institutions. Rulers who control their own people by such means, who do not behave in a just way that respects their own people's rights to self-determination, cannot be expected to behave better toward peoples outside their states.⁵⁴

3. Economic Interdependence

The third and final constraint upon warlike behavior between democracies is economic interdependence. According to Doyle, economic incentives serve as a self-perpetuating boost to normative values: "When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and

⁵²In an authoritarian government, leadership decisions are the prerogative of a select few. Democratic leadership, in contrast, is shaped by the will of the majority. Therefore, in an effort to forge this majority, decisions are products of concessions, compromises, and cooperation.

⁵³Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 31.

⁵⁴Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 93.

commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect.”⁵⁵ As this “web” of advantages and commitments becomes larger and more intricate, states will become increasingly reluctant to act in a manner which jeopardizes this valuable interaction.

C. REALIST CRITIQUE

First and foremost we are to make the world safe for ourselves.⁵⁶

Where democratic peace theorists believe that common institutions and values encourage cooperation, realists declare that competition is king. This is because international politics is anarchic by nature, governed only by the law of self-preservation:

[T]here is no central authority capable of making and enforcing rules of behavior on the international system’s units (states). The absence of a rule-making and enforcing authority means that each unit in the system is responsible for ensuring its own survival and also free to define its own interests and to employ means of its own choice in pursuing them.⁵⁷

Pursuit of self-interest as a means to ensure self-preservation includes, but is not limited to, engaging in preemptive wars. Trust and cooperation, meanwhile, become unaffordable luxuries. Survival as a state is predicated solely on the ability to compete successfully in the international realm. Failure has grave consequences: “In international politics, states that come

⁵⁵Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 10.

⁵⁶President Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 264; quoted in Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 19. This was Roosevelt’s response to Wilson’s idealistic rhetoric about entering World War I to make the world safe for democracy.

⁵⁷Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 163.

out on the short end of political competition face potentially...extreme outcomes, ranging from constraints on autonomy to occupation to extinction.”⁵⁸

Not surprisingly, realists quickly dismiss the causal logic that forms the basis for democratic peace theory. The emphasis on institutional constraints as a means to prevent wars between democracies is viewed as inadequate. Christopher Layne explains:

If democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same.⁵⁹

Democratic norms and culture are also found to be flawed. Respect and appreciation for similar perceptions, values, institutions, and culture are believed to prevent democratic states from going to war with each other. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the more uniform these common characteristics are, the less likely conflict is to occur. The U.S. Civil War, however, casts serious doubts upon this assertion: “if democratic norms and culture fail to prevent the outbreak of civil war within democracies, what reason is there to believe that they will prevent the outbreak of interstate wars between democracies?”⁶⁰

Finally, with regard to the imperatives of economic interdependence, realists acknowledge that it is difficult to relinquish the considerable advantages of international trade: “States are surely concerned about prosperity, and thus economic calculations are hardly trivial

⁵⁸Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 163. Layne adds that international competition “differs crucially from domestic politics in liberal societies, where the losers can accept an adverse outcome because they live to fight another day.”

⁵⁹Ibid., 164.

⁶⁰Ibid., 193.

for them.”⁶¹ However, realists are also quick to reiterate that states exist in an anarchical system where survival is the primary goal. Therefore, “when push comes to shove, international political considerations [rather than economic concerns] will be paramount in the minds of decision-makers.”⁶²

Despite this assertion, there is considerable empirical evidence that suggests that democracies have not in fact gone to war with each other. Realists dismiss this body of work for several reasons. First, they argue that definitions of “democracy” and “war” are moving targets which are routinely skewed to accommodate what otherwise would have been exceptions to the democratic peace. Second, they point out that not only are wars an infrequent occurrence, but that there have been, until recently, few democracies and even fewer cases where they were in a position to fight:

Until 1871, liberal democracies did not account for more than five percent of the total number of nation-state dyads, and the figure did not top ten percent until this century. Democracies were rare, but so were wars. During 44 of the years between 1816 and 1899 there were no wars at all, and there was only one dyad at war during 21 of the years. While the number and percentage of liberal dyads grew during the nineteenth century, war remained infrequent.... [P]eace was too common an occurrence to require explanation by variation in the number of liberal democracies.⁶³

Lastly, any correlation between democracy and peace in the past does not ensure its projection into the future. As the composition of the international system of states changes, and as

⁶¹John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 180.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³David E. Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 220.

democracies become more prevalent, the very characteristics which are alleged to prevent democracies from engaging in fratricide may be replaced by seeds of discontent:

In the absence of a communist or fascist block of enemies, there will be less need for democracies to huddle together for survival....And, almost inevitably, as more liberal states crowd into the world, the more they will quarrel over things states always quarrel over: territorial ambitions, economic interests, spheres of influence, feuding allies, arms build-ups, irredentist minorities, nationalist grievances and so on.⁶⁴

Clearly, with regard to the dynamics of international relations, there is a fundamental disagreement between democratic peace theorists and realists. After one has endured dizzying salvos of point and counter-point from learned academicians, there still does not appear to be a decisive answer as to whether democracies do or do not go to war with each other. The exclusive focus on this question, however, may be clouding our understanding of the relationships between democracies. War is a violent, costly, and definitive act; yet it is only one reference point by which to measure the relationship between states. Unfortunately, democratic peace theorists are preoccupied with this single (usually calamitous) intersection between states and have disregarded less dramatic forms of inter-state relations which, while they do not meet the threshold of "war," are still significant indicators of how all states, including democratic ones, interact with each other. Thus, while democratic peace may actually accurately account for the absence of war (as defined by Singer and Small) between democracies, it is not able to explain why these same states demonstrate little compunction about engaging in lesser acts of aggression against their brethren. Many of these lesser acts, to include espionage and covert action, fall under the purview of a state's intelligence services. Their existence contradicts the claim that relationships between democracies are characterized

⁶⁴"Democracies and War: The Politics of Peace," *The Economist*, 1 April 1995, p. 18.

by mutual respect, cooperation, and non-interference. As will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, the activities of secret services are part enigma and part anathema to democratic peace theorists.

III. IS DEMOCRACY UNIVERSAL?

One thing at Moscow, one at Rome
A third in Sudan and a fourth at home.⁶⁵

U.S. national security strategy blithely advocates a messianic mission to promote democracy throughout the world: "Our responsibility is to build the world of tomorrow by embarking on a period of construction - one based on current realities but [also] enduring American values and interests."⁶⁶ Global commitment to the values of freedom and respect for human rights are heralded as "not only just, but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions benefit the U.S. and the world."⁶⁷ This certainly plays well in Peoria, but is it applicable to the rest of the world? Is democracy a universal truth? It should be noted that democracy in the United States has received the benefit of two centuries of development, and is now institutionalized and ingrained in the American psyche. Yet, as indicated by Stromberg, it is assumed that it can be exported with ease:

Other societies, which have not undergone the peculiar centuries-long experience of Western Europe, Great Britain, and the United States, are expected to absorb this [concept of democracy] overnight, taking, as it were, a prescription filled out in Washington and bought at the World Bank pharmacy and that was supposed to act immediately.⁶⁸

The intricate theoretical implications of democracy are extremely difficult to grasp conceptually.

⁶⁵Christopher Hollis, quoted in Stromberg, 4.

⁶⁶President William Clinton, "Preface," *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1997), i.

⁶⁷Ibid., 19.

⁶⁸Stromberg, 136.

To practice them effectively, however, often becomes a herculean task. Indeed, despite considerable practical experience, democracy does not appear to “work particularly well even for us.”⁶⁹ Elections in the United States are commonly perceived to be exercises in futility. Candidates would rather sling mud than discuss issues, special interest groups exercise overwhelming influence, choices are often limited to the lesser of two evils, and, even if one does utilize the right to vote, there is a perception that nothing ever changes. As Gore Vidal observed, democracy “is a place where numerous elections are held at great cost without issues and with interchangeable candidates.”⁷⁰ Consequently, voter apathy is a common malaise: less than half of America’s eligible American voters participated in the last presidential election.⁷¹ According to J.P. Monroe, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, this does not bode well for democracy:

Here you have half the eligible voters electing the most important political official in the country. That carries tremendous implications. When more and more people don’t participate, you cease to be a democracy.⁷²

To make matters worse, many believe the democratic balance between civil liberties and the good of the community has been irrevocably altered in favor of rampant individualism.

⁶⁹Stromberg, 136.

⁷⁰Gore Vidal, “Gods and Greens,” *Observer* (London), 27 Aug. 1989; in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

⁷¹“Voter Turnout Lowest Since 1924,” *Associated Press*. Online. Freedom Communications, Inc. Newspaper, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.limanews.com/electionpkj/natvote.html>. 7 June 1997. The American Voter Coalition, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization “dedicated to registering, educating and inspiring all Americans to vote” notes that participation in the electoral process has steadily declined for the last fifty years and estimates that currently 70 million eligible Americans are not registered to vote. See “National Voter Registration Day,” American Voter Coalition - Campaign ‘96. Online. Global Web Publishing, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.avc.org/camp’96/nvrd.htm>. 6 June 1997.

⁷²J. P. Monroe, quoted in “Voter Turnout Lowest since 1924.” The flip side of this argument is that people are comfortable and confident with the status quo and will vote only if and when they feel their interests are threatened.

If American democracy is in such disarray, is it appropriate for the United States to embark on a proselytizing crusade for democratic values? The answer from many parts of the globe is a resounding "no." Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, certainly believes that America's effort to impose democracy is an egregious error:

It is not my business to tell people what's wrong with their system. It is my business to tell people not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work.⁷³

Lee believes that cultural values, specifically "Asian values," prohibit the adoption of democracy in many societies. There are additional factors, specifically ethnic nationalism and economic deprivation, which may impinge on the exportability of democracy. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the degree to which each of these elements, alone or in combination, present a barrier to the implementation of democracy.

A. CULTURE

Culture is the one thing that we cannot deliberately aim at. It is the product of variety of more or less harmonious activities, each pursued for its own sake.⁷⁴

In contrast to T. S. Eliot's definition, Webster's Dictionary offers a somewhat more staid explanation of culture, defining it as "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a

⁷³Lee Kuan Yew, in Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 110. Lee Kuan Yew was the prime minister of Singapore from its independence in 1959 until 1990. After stepping aside he bestowed himself with the title of Senior Minister and, as such, still exercise considerable influence upon government affairs in Singapore. Additionally, while the Senior Minister feigns reluctance to point out the flaws of other people's systems of government, it appears to take very little to coax him into a diatribe on what is wrong with the U.S.: "guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public - in sum the breakdown of civil society." See Zakaria, 111.

⁷⁴T. S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, in Rhoda Thomas Tripp, ed., *International Thesaurus of Quotations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 129.

racial, religious, or social group.”⁷⁵ Even with assistance from both of these sources, culture, like democracy, remains an elusive term “which has as much concrete definition as a snowflake in June.”⁷⁶ To begin with, it is difficult to separate, identify, and delineate the factors that are integral to a generic concept of culture. Additionally, assigning each factor a relative weight of importance as it is blended to create “culture” further increases the degree of difficulty associated with defining this term. If the general concept of culture defies satisfactory definition, it follows that it will be particularly vexing (and perhaps impossible) to definitively identify and delineate the specific cultural characteristics of a given population. And yet, it is readily apparent and commonly acknowledged that there are differences between cultures around the world. Clearly, the amorphous nature of culture presents difficulties. In one sense, it is comparable to former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s comments with regard to pornography: it is difficult to define intelligibly but you know it when you see it.⁷⁷

Fukuyama, in his article entitled “The Primacy of Culture,” identifies four distinct levels - ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture - at which consolidation must occur for democracy to be successfully implemented. Of these levels, culture is deemed the deepest and the most difficult to change. It is also the most important. If democracy does not fit a society’s cultural values, and these aberrant values resist change, then democracy will not succeed: “The almost instantaneous change in normative beliefs generated great expectations that could not be met,

⁷⁵Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.

⁷⁶Bruce Nussbaum, “Capital, Not Culture,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 165. Nussbaum is the editorial page editor at *BusinessWeek*. This article was one of a number of responses to Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*.

⁷⁷Justice Potter Stewart, quoted in Albert B. Gerber, *Sex, Pornography, and Justice* (New York: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1965), 173. Justice Stewart, grappling with the concept of pornography in *Jacobellis v. Ohio* (1964), stated “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it....”

owing to the greater degree of recalcitrance encountered at successively deeper levels.”⁷⁸ Huntington, somewhat pessimistically, concurs that culture is a significant variable. Stating that “cultural characteristics are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones,” he ominously predicts that the “great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”⁷⁹

Not all however, subscribe to the deleterious effects of culture with regard to democracy. Indeed, one must be careful to distinguish between culture itself and the wildly subjective claims made in its name. It seems to be the latter, rather than the former, that has assumed a weighty role in the debate concerning the possibility of successfully exporting democracy to a given polity. Michael J. Mazarr, editor of *The Washington Quarterly*, concurs, arguing that culture is merely “a tactic, a tool, not a fundamental cause of conflict itself; and the necessary policy responses are to address, not culture on its own terms, but the socioeconomic circumstances that bring culture to the fore.”⁸⁰ Ironically, Mazaar then cites *The End of History and the Last Man* to contradict Fukuyama’s assertions concerning the primacy of culture:

This brilliant work contends that free markets and free politics are the basic aspirations of all humankind. The “unfolding of modern natural science,” it argues, “has had a uniform effect on all societies that have experienced it.... This process guarantees an increasing homogenization of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances.”⁸¹

⁷⁸Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 9.

⁷⁹Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (May/June 1993): 22. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

⁸⁰Michael J. Mazarr, “Culture and International Relations,” *Current*, no. 382 (May 1996): 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

⁸¹*Ibid.* Mazarr does concede that Fukuyama does not completely contradict himself from one book to another, but concludes that “if history becomes a competition among rival cultures, it hardly seems that the transition Fukuyama talked about in 1992 means very much.... By the same token, a world-historical force of technology and economics that crushes mighty ideologies and powerful dictatorships in its path

Clearly, the impact of culture on democracy can be as confusing as it is divisive. Is culture an immovable object in the face of democracy's irresistible force? Or can different cultures accommodate democracy? In an attempt to shed some light on both the meaning and mutability of culture, this thesis will examine the impact of "Asian values," Russian traditions of authoritarianism, and Islam on attempts to promote democracy.

1. "Asian Values"

You are just an evil man, prone to do evil things, and you have to be stopped from doing them.⁸²

Proponents of Asian values assert that different circumstances dictate different values. Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York, argues that "diversity is an empirical fact - countries have different histories, values, and problems - and thus each nation must find its own best social and political arrangements by means of a pragmatic and continuous process of experimentation."⁸³ The implication is clear: Asians do not want or need to import American values. Lee Kuan Yew, perhaps the most emphatic critic of the contention that democracy is universal, explains:

The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment

cannot be expected to stop quietly on the doorstep of culture."

⁸²Lee Kuan Yew, in Zakaria, 112.

⁸³Bilahari Kausikan, "Governance That Works," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 27. Bilahari's article is accompanied by a disclaimer which states that the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. Yet, given the restrictive style of Singapore's government, in combination with Bilahari's status, it is extremely unlikely that he would contemplate publishing anything which contradicts government policy.

of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.⁸⁴

For Lee, "belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety and loyalty in the extended family, and most of all, the respect for scholarship and learning"⁸⁵ form the backbone of his ideal value system. Others reserve almost religious reverence for a political system that combines stability and order but allows the unfettered pursuit of the almighty profit (pun intended). This type of value system may be considered base, but it is certainly no less compelling than the beliefs expressed by the Senior Minister of Singapore. In either case, the attraction to democracy exported from America is virtually nonexistent. Lurking just below the surface of this debate on the malleability of culture is a backlash against what is perceived to be "Western democratic imperialism."⁸⁶ Indeed, the rallying cry of "Asian values" has been characterized as "largely a reaction to the lack of Western sensitivity."⁸⁷ John Naisbitt, international businessman and best-selling author, offers insight:

Asia has come of age. It seeks to determine its own agenda, to do things in the Asian way. Throughout the continent, the voices of Asia are saying good-bye to Western domination, politically, culturally and economically.... Any policymakers, government or private, who fail to see this fundamental change in mindset will be greatly disadvantaged in their dealings with Asia and Asians.⁸⁸

⁸⁴Lee Kuan Yew, in Fareed Zakaria, 111.

⁸⁵Ibid., 115.

⁸⁶Fareed Zakaria, 126.

⁸⁷Unidentified Singaporean researcher, quoted in John Naisbitt, *Megatrends Asia* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 60. Naisbitt has authored several books, including the best-selling and internationally acclaimed *Megatrends*. He is a Distinguished International Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

⁸⁸Naisbitt, 55.

It should be noted that caution must be exercised when referring to "Asian values" or an "Asian model," or simply treating the continent as a single, cohesive entity. This is because it is difficult to characterize a region as large, populous, and diverse as Asia according to a single set of policies, intentions, or values (whether hospitable to democracy or not). The term "Asian values" is at best a gross generalization; at worst it is a mindless misnomer. Indeed, when Lee Kuan Yew discusses values, he is reluctant to refer specifically to an all-encompassing "Asian model." But before democracy advocates celebrate they should know that this sword can cut both ways. Donald K. Emmerson, Professor of Political Science and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, clarifies:

It is absurd to affirm the existence of Asian values if by that we mean to ascribe a single set of beliefs to some 3.4 billion people - spread across dozens of countries, believing in different if not contradictory religions, speaking mutually unintelligible tongues - and contrast that set with an altogether different list of Western values supposedly held by nearly a billion also diverse humans in Europe, the United States, and other places largely settled by Europeans.⁸⁹

Emmerson considers both universal democracy and "Asian values" to be extreme arguments and believes attempting to defend either position (without compromise) is a ludicrous proposition. Instead, he advocates finding a common ground between these polar opposites.

Now, returning to the values that Lee outlined, these are essentially Confucian in nature. Confucianism is "a set of ethical precepts for the management of society"⁹⁰ which views the individual only in relation to society as a whole. Peter Moody, political scientist and author,

⁸⁹Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 4 (October 1995): 100.

⁹⁰"Confucianism," *The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

explains:

...Confucianism is said to look not at the individual, but at the person, the human being enmeshed in a set of relations with other human beings. Society is not a contract among previously unconnected individuals. Rather, society, especially the family, is the state of nature, and we manifest our own nature through our relations with others. Almost all of these relationships are hierarchical.... Proper behavior...is action in a manner consistent with the relationship we have with others. We should be magnanimous toward those of lower status and respectful of those in superior position....⁹¹

The practical applications of this philosophy contrast starkly with the reverence that is reserved for individual rights in a liberal democracy:

Human rights thinking looks at what is owed to me: You can't do that - I've got my rights. The Confucian stress, rather, is on what I owe others. I ought to worry less, as Confucius says that others show me respect, and more about whether I show respect for others.⁹²

Confucian values certainly have political implications, to include the "tyranny...of deference, the willing obedience of people to higher authority and their conformity to a rigid set of social norms,"⁹³ and the absence of clearly articulated civil rights. But, the impact of Confucianism falls primarily on social structures, affecting interpersonal relationships within the realm of family, work, and community. Therefore, according to Fukuyama, traditional "political Confucianism, which mandated the imperial system with its elaborate hierarchy of mandarins and gentleman-scholars, could be jettisoned relatively easily and replaced with a variety of political-institutional

⁹¹Peter R. Moody, Jr., "Asian Values," *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 179.

⁹²Ibid., 180.

⁹³Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 243.

forms without causing society to lose its essential coherence.”⁹⁴ He adds that Confucian values should be able to peacefully coexist with democratic political institutions and concludes that the true value of social structures and cultural mores such as Confucianism lies in their “ability to balance or moderate the atomizing individualism that is inherent in traditional liberal doctrine....”⁹⁵

Fukuyama’s and Emerson’s confidence in the possibility of finding a middle ground between Confucianism and democracy seems well placed. It is difficult to dismiss the idea that people are interested in having a say in the manner in which they are governed. Indeed, the Dalai Lama asserts that the “West does not have a monopoly on democratic aspirations,” adding that the “quest for equal rights and speech and thought and education and political pluralism based on the input of all the people applies everywhere.”⁹⁶ And, the portrayal of democracy as an inflexible constant does not jibe with its essential essence, namely that, because there are no universal truths, decision-making must incorporate the mechanisms of compromise and consensus.⁹⁷ Robin Wright, global-affairs correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*, concurs, noting that one of “democracy’s strengths has been its ability to adapt to local conditions.”⁹⁸

Even advocates of the impenetrability of culture are willing to make small concessions to the rationale of a middle ground. Bilahari Kausikan offers that democracy is “a very flexible concept, because it must adapt to specific sets of circumstances and evolve as those circumstances

⁹⁴Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” 12.

⁹⁵Ibid., 13.

⁹⁶Dalai Lama, quoted in Robin Wright, “Democracies in Peril: Oldest Cultures Pose Biggest Hurdles to Liberalization,” *Los Angeles Times*, 18 February 1997, p. A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: LAT. 30 May 1997.

⁹⁷Stromberg, 27.

⁹⁸Wright, “Democracies in Peril: Oldest Cultures Pose Biggest Hurdles to Liberalization.”

change.”⁹⁹ Huntington, in turn, acknowledges that culture also has some wiggle room:

[G]reat historic cultural traditions...are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, writings, and behavior patterns. Any major culture, including even Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic. Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confucian society need not be.¹⁰⁰

Ultimately, it is intuitively reasonable that, in a world filled with many gray areas, the answer to this particular debate appears to lie somewhere between two extremes.

Achieving a balance between popular participation and the Confucian values of consensus and community seems, at least theoretically, quite possible. Actually establishing such a system of governance and having it operate in an effective manner, however, is a challenging proposition. What does democracy in a Confucian society look like? Certainly it would be adapted so that there is not as great an emphasis on the protection of individual rights (to the detriment of the community). There are, however, limits. Civil liberties that are necessary to ensure “free” and “fair” elections, as those terms were discussed earlier in this paper, are a minimal requirement. Otherwise, the system cannot truly be considered democratic. Huntington looks to democracy in Japan as a model for other Asian countries to follow. Despite a level-playing field in which there is open competition for political power, and freedom of speech, press, and assembly, it is extremely difficult to depose the party in power:

[The] dominant-party systems that may be emerging seem to involve competition for power but not alteration in power, and participation in elections for all, but participation in office only for those in the “mainstream” party. It is democracy without turnover.... This type of political system represents an

⁹⁹Bilahari, 25.

¹⁰⁰Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 310.

adaption of Western democratic practices to serve Asian or Confucian political values. Democratic institutions work not to promote Western values of competition and change but Confucian values of consensus and stability.¹⁰¹

Huntington notes that dominant-party systems are practiced widely throughout Asia, but that Japan represents the more democratic end of the spectrum. In sharp contrast are the many authoritarian rulers who manipulate both elections and the "Asian values" dialogue to advance their interests. Aung San Suu Kyi, recipient of the 1991 Nobel Prize for Peace and leader of Burma's National League for Democracy, describes a scenario with which she is all too familiar:

It is often in the name of cultural integrity as well as social stability and national security that democratic reforms based on human rights are resisted by authoritarian governments. It is insinuated that some of the worst ills of Western society are the result of democracy, which is seen as the progenitor of unbridled freedom and selfish individualism. It is claimed, usually without adequate evidence, that democratic values and human rights run counter to the national culture, and therefore to be beneficial they need to be modified - perhaps to the extent that they are barely recognizable.¹⁰²

Conveniently, this description is tailor-made for Indonesia's brand of paternalistic authoritarianism.

a. Case Study: Indonesia's New Order

With one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have nine different cars?¹⁰³

Indonesia professes to be a democratic state that emphasizes consensus and cooperation in accordance with ancient Javanese cultural traditions. In actuality, the state is

¹⁰¹Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 306.

¹⁰²Aung San Suu Kyi, "Freedom, Development, and Human Worth," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (April 1995): 14.

¹⁰³Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: An Autobiography*, (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 221; quoted in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1994), 32. Also spelled Suharto.

governed by a self-serving authoritarian regime which maintains stability and control through the combination of economic growth and the fierce repression of dissent. President Soeharto's New Order, now over thirty years in the making, has demonstrated consistent economic success which, in turn has translated into impressive staying power for his government. But now, the legitimacy of the regime appears to be threatened as economic inequities, corruption, and frustration with the lack of representation in government begin to build.

Despite the authoritarian nature of its government, Indonesia possesses many of the implements of democracy, including political parties, regular elections, and a constitution. These, however, are a part of a facade which exists, in combination with frequent references to cultural values, to legitimize centralized authority. Of particular importance to regime legitimization is the 1945 constitution. As opposed to subsequent constitutions that were drafted in 1949 and 1950 but then deemed inappropriate and discarded, the 1945 constitution borrows extensively from popular conceptions of Javanese culture. This document was reinstated after President Sukarno took power in 1959 and rescinded parliamentary democracy:

The 1945 Constitution is the genuine reflection of the identity of the Indonesian nation, who since ancient times based their system of Government on *musjawarah* [deliberation] and *mufakat* [consensus] with the leadership of one central authority in the hands of a "sesepuh" - an elder - who did not dictate, but led, and protected.¹⁰⁴

The system of governance to which Sukarno refers is based on traditional Javanese concepts of power and state. The state, according to Adam Schwarz, a correspondent for the *Far Eastern*

¹⁰⁴Sukarno, "Political Manifesto," speech delivered 17 August 1959; in Harry J. Benda and John A. Larkin, eds., *The World of Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 248.

Economic Review, is viewed as a family led by a paternalistic figure:

Family matters can be discussed, though politely, but in the end, the father makes the decisions. Continued opposition to, or excessively blunt criticism of his decisions is considered destabilising, disloyal and in extreme cases subversive and unpatriotic.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps more important, however, is the manifestation of power. According to Schwarz, it is an all-encompassing commodity:

The Javanese ruler does not have some of the power, he has all of it. Power is a zero-sum game: to get it, you have to take it from someone else. There is no sense of broadening your scope of power by seeking a mandate from your subjects.¹⁰⁶

Thus, Javanese cultural traditions appear to be a mixed-bag with regard to their ability to accommodate democracy. The concept of politics as a win-lose proposition, combined with the overriding authority of the president, is troubling. Yet, the provisions for consultation and consensus suggest that there is room for popular participation. It is not inconceivable for consensus and consultation to be modified to incorporate participation, through representation, for all of the citizens of Indonesia, in manner that limits the overwhelming authority of the chief executive. Until this occurs, however, Indonesia's president will be eager to hearken back to his extremely advantageous interpretation of ancient cultural traditions for, even though he is required to go through the motions of consultation and consensus, he is the ultimate authority on any decision.

¹⁰⁵Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 235.

¹⁰⁶Schwarz, 45.

Sukarno illustrated this point quite effectively:

The Guider...incorporates a spoonful of so-an-so's opinions with a dash of such-and-such, always taking care to incorporate a soupçon of the opposition. Then he cooks it and serves his final summation with "OK, now my dear brothers, it is like this and I hope you agree...." It's still democratic because everybody has given his comments.¹⁰⁷

Contrary to his assurances, what Sukarno described is clearly not democracy. Ironically, it is not even indicative of what really transpires in Indonesian politics. Despite convoluted references to cultural traditions that vest the preponderance of power in the chief executive, the president of Indonesia - whether Sukarno or Soeharto (his successor via military coup) - has never really troubled himself with the trivialities of seeking consultation or forming a consensus. What the president wants, the president gets. Generally, according to Filipino columnist Ricardo Malay, the primary goal is self-enrichment:

...Suharto's kleptocracy has made Marcos look like a petty pilferer of paper clips and pencils. For that is the outstanding reality that has prevailed in Indonesia for years: a dictator helping himself to the country's vast economic spoils with help from his extensive family, his Golkar political party, and his Chinese business cronies.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, any allusion to governing in accordance with Javanese cultural traditions is somewhat

¹⁰⁷Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965) 279; quoted in Schwarz, 16-17. Sukarno referred to this system of governance as "Guided democracy." Though the concept remains unchanged, in an effort to distance himself from his predecessor, Soeharto refers to it as "Pancasila democracy." Pancasila is a national ideology based on the principles of "belief in one supreme god; justice and civility among peoples; the unity of Indonesia; democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives; [and] social justice for all." See *Indonesian Source Book* (Jakarta: National Development Information Office, 1992), 13; in Schwarz, 10.

¹⁰⁸Ricardo Malay, "Suharto Losing His Cool," *Manila Chronicle*, 19 August 1996, p. 4. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997. The term "kleptocrat" was coined by Jeffrey A. Winters in his Ph.D. dissertation for Yale University. See "Structural Power and Investor Mobility: Capital Control and State Policy in Indonesia, 1965-1990," December 1991.

contrived:

...Indonesia is far from the ideal of Pancasila democracy.... The imperative of "consensus at all costs" leaves Indonesians with little scope to disagree with official policy. The dismantling of political parties, the manipulation of the People's Assembly, the controls placed on the press, and the enforced weakness of the legal system have done much more than empower the guardians of the community. They have created a government that is far more authoritarian...than democratic.¹⁰⁹

While cultural values are just a thin veneer, Indonesia does have pressing concerns that provide a much more convincing argument for the justification of a strong hand at the helm of government. These concerns include the administration of an immense archipelagic state, a correspondingly large and ethnically diverse population, and economic deprivation. Sukarno suspended parliamentary democracy in 1959 because it was ineffective in dealing with factions and promoting economic development. Soeharto, in turn, deposed Sukarno because of his growing inability to balance the competing demands of the military, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Muslim activists.

Soeharto maintains power today through the combination of an ideology that limits dissent (Pancasila), an intricate system of officially-sanctioned corruption and patronage, and consistent economic growth. This last characteristic is the foundation upon which his regime rests:

Whatever we do will be meaningless for the people if there is no improvement in their life. Everything we do will be useful if the people's welfare improves.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹Schwarz, 292.

¹¹⁰Soeharto, transcript of Independence Day speech, broadcast from the House of Representatives, Jakarta TVRI Television Network, 16 August 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP:<http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997.

And the people's welfare certainly has improved. According to Soeharto, economic growth has averaged seven percent over the last two decades, while, in real terms, per capita income "has increased by more than three times."¹¹¹ Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Aurelia E. Brazeal, offers a slightly more neutral (though nonetheless favorable) assessment:

Although some question the income level that should be defined as poor, everyone agrees that poverty has declined dramatically. Looked at another way, Indonesia has moved from an income base about half that of India's in the mid-1960's to a per capita income (\$1,000) more than twice that of India today.¹¹²

Continued economic growth and a subsequent increase in standard of living for all Indonesians is necessary for the Soeharto regime to retain stability. According to Bilahari, this is because the "'acid test' of all governments everywhere in the real world is not adherence to any particular political theory or ideal but whether they can govern effectively, fairly, and in a way that increase the general welfare."¹¹³ Fukuyama disagrees, stating that if a regime has legitimate authority - that is, authority derived from the consent of those who are ruled - it can ride out perturbations in the welfare of the populace. On the other hand, the absence of this characteristic spells trouble:

The absence of legitimate authority has meant that when an authoritarian government met with failure in some area of policy, there was no higher principle to which the regime could appeal. Some have compared legitimacy to a kind of cash reserve. All governments, democratic and authoritarian, have their ups and

¹¹¹Soeharto, transcript of Independence Day speech.

¹¹²Aurelia E. Brazeal, "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia," testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: HILLPR. 30 May 1997.

¹¹³Bilahari, 29.

downs; but only legitimate governments have this reserve to draw on in times of crisis.¹¹⁴

In the case of Indonesia, the point may be moot. Economic growth does not appear to be sufficient to sustain the current regime's legitimacy. Despite consistent improvements in the health, education, and welfare of the Indonesian people, there are rumblings of dissent throughout the populace. Muslim activists want greater attention to Islamic issues, students clamor for democracy, and regional states want greater autonomy from Jakarta. Perhaps the most vocal critics of the current regime are businessmen unhappy with the overbearing burden of corruption and nepotism:

[T]he activities of Indonesia's top crony businessmen and their partners in government are a source of deep resentment and disillusionment for many Indonesians. Rampant corruption, particularly of the big-ticket variety, is more than merely disillusioning, of course. It has profound implications for Indonesia's economy and political future. Corruption is profitable for the few and expensive for the many. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and large-scale corruption both add to the cost of making products in Indonesia and, more broadly, retard the growth of the economy.¹¹⁵

While the demand for change rings clear in Indonesia, there is uncertainty about the pace or direction in which to proceed. According to Paul Wolfowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, there is a "complex balance between the desire for change and the desire for stability in Indonesia that Americans, who are able to take stability for granted, have difficulty

¹¹⁴Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 39.

¹¹⁵Schwarz, 137.

understanding."¹¹⁶ Dewi Fotuna, a political scientist at the Indonesian Institute of Science, concurs:

Everyone agrees that for the government not to respond to the pressures [for change] will be dangerous. But how far to respond is the question. There is a lot of disagreement about how fast to do it, and to what degree.¹¹⁷

Democracy is not an obvious choice for most Indonesians. The need for a strong state to guide development and quell ethnic and religious disturbances is commonly acknowledged. Additionally, since more than half of the population had not yet even been born at the time of Indonesia's ill-fated attempt at parliamentary democracy, most are unfamiliar with the concept:

A well functioning democracy requires a shared awareness of what democracy is about. It requires an ability to publicly debate - and disagree on - important matters of state without rendering the government of the day impotent; it presumes knowledge of what it means to win and lose on the political battlefield; and it assumes a common understanding of citizen's rights *and* responsibilities. These conditions do not apply to Indonesia.¹¹⁸

Finally, democracy is not necessarily the beacon of hope that most Americans assume it to be; it is not even the political model of choice in Southeast Asia. Many states, including Indonesia, have successfully experimented with authoritarianism in combination with economic liberalization. They have seen, as expressed emphatically by yet another colleague, that "authoritarianism

¹¹⁶Paul Wolfowitz, "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia," testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: FEDNEW. 30 May 1997.

¹¹⁷Dewi Fortuna, quoted in Keith B. Richburg, "After 30 Years, Is the Suharto Government Showing 'Regime Fatigue'?", *International Herald Tribune*, 26 May 1997, p. 4. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: IHT. 30 May 1997.

¹¹⁸Schwarz, 295.

and economics [can] work!"¹¹⁹ Therefore, Indonesians may be much more interested in reforming rather than replacing their current authoritarian regime.

b. Summation

The Indonesian case study interestingly represents multiple dimensions of the debate between democracy and "Asian values," to include accommodation, denial, and ultimately, disinterest. Javanese cultural traditions, much like Confucian values, appear to be flexible enough to accommodate the principles of democracy.¹²⁰ However, the president of Indonesia, much like the leaders of other Asian states, denies this possibility. Instead, traditional cultural values are interpreted and invoked in an attempt to cloak authoritarian practices:

[It is] pretty clear that the like of Lee Kwan Yew and Suharto want their people to believe that culture is an immutable object to be protected like a national treasure in a museum. Hence, there cannot be changes (like democratic reform) without harming the treasure.¹²¹

Finally, despite dissatisfaction with the current government, the people of Indonesia are not prepared for - nor would they necessarily welcome - democracy. This is also the case for other states in Asia. Indeed, while democracy is theoretically possible, it should not be implied that it is universally desirable.

¹¹⁹Wayne Hugar, classroom discussion, Government and Politics in Southeast Asia (NS3667), 11 June 1997.

¹²⁰This statement is caveated by the condition that any attempt to implement democracy, in order to be successful, must take care to incorporate the particular needs and values of the culture in which it is to take root.

¹²¹Mary P. Callahan, "Critique of Research Paper," *Memorandum*, 12 July 1997, 1. Callahan is an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

2. Russian Traditions of Authoritarianism

In Russia there has been no Revolution. All of the past is repeating itself and acts only behind new masks.¹²²

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the alleged development of a nascent democracy in Russia have been viewed by many with enthusiasm verging on euphoria. The mortal enemy of truth, freedom and the American way has disappeared and in its place is a regime attempting to emulate values quite similar to our own. Not all, however, have observed developments in Russia with optimism. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has cautioned that a leopard cannot easily change its spots:

Russia has never been a Democracy. Russia has never had a market economy. Russia has always been an empire. Russia has always dominated or tried to dominate its surrounding state. Russia has never had a separation of church and state, so that church has really been a state institution. And all of these factors have produced a tremendous tendency towards a solatarianism and towards conquest. And when a nation behaves in a certain way for 400 years you have to assume that it has a certain proclivity in that direction....¹²³

Kissinger's wariness is based on the belief that it is difficult to overcome cultural predilections established and reinforced over the course of several centuries. Russian difficulty and, at times, seeming indifference toward consolidating democracy since the dissolution of the Soviet state

¹²²Nikolai Berdyayev, quoted in Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution, Russian views of Bolshevism, 1917-22* (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 194; quoted in Jonathan Steele, *Eternal Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), xiv. Berdyayev penned these words after the seizure of the Winter Palace and the collapse of the provisional government in November 1917.

¹²³Henry Kissinger, "United States Foreign Policy: The Future of International Relations Depends Largely On Ourselves," address delivered at the 106th Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 29 April, 1996; published in *Vital Speeches of the Day* 62, no. 16 (1 June 1996): 487.

appear to justify Kissinger's pessimistic outlook. Others argue, however, that while Russian cultural values are an obstruction, they will not prohibit the establishment of democracy.

Whether optimistic or pessimistic about the possibility for a democratic future, all who observe the current Russian political situation are alarmed by the actions of President Boris Yeltsin. Once hailed as the white knight in shining armor who would rescue the damsel democracy from the communist dragon, Yeltsin is starting to look a lot like a dragon himself. Tim McDaniel, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego, concurs:

Yeltsin's actions have never flowed from any kind of commitment to democracy, and they have nurtured neither a democratic culture nor democratic institutions. Rather, his primitive understanding of democracy and capitalism as simply the negation of the Communist past has been matched by an overriding, and sometimes ruthless, commitment to his own political survival.¹²⁴

Yeltsin's efforts to consolidate control of the government apparatus have largely been successful: he has incorporated the "power" ministries - defense, foreign affairs, interior, and security - into a powerful Security Council beholden only to him. Although there is a functioning Parliament, Yeltsin governs largely by decree because the legislative branch is "largely powerless, neutered by a Constitution [which he rewrote in 1993] that gives effective control to the president and makes even the legislature's own finances entirely dependent on the executive branch."¹²⁵ Finally, the notion of an independent judiciary which scrutinizes laws and decrees and then

¹²⁴Tim McDaniel, "Out of the Past," *The New Republic* 215, issue 20 (11 November 1996): 16. McDaniel's most recent book is entitled *The Agony of the Russian Idea*.

¹²⁵Katrina Vanden Heuvel, "Yeltsin Survives; Will Democracy?," *The Nation* 260, issue 8 (27 February 1995): 271.

impartially issues rulings is but an arcane dream:

There is no significant experience in Russia with an independent legal system. Despite occasional attempts at reform, the legal system remains a creature of the state.¹²⁶

Fred Weir, a journalist living in Moscow, has assessed this situation and concludes that Yeltsin has largely revived "Russia's traditional system of autocratic, one-man rule resting upon an omnipotent security/bureaucratic apparatus."¹²⁷

That Yeltsin appears to be barreling down the road toward authoritarianism is disconcerting, particularly, it seems, for former U.S. policymakers. Kissinger has already warned us about Russian cultural proclivities, to include the absolutist tendencies of Russian leaders. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Carter, agrees, noting that "President Yeltsin's inclination toward authoritarianism has transformed the new constitution for a democratic Russia into a document that can easily be used to legitimize arbitrary personal rule."¹²⁸ He adds, rather gloomily, that "Insurance is needed against the possibility - one might even argue the probability - that the weight of history will not soon permit Russia to stabilize as a democracy, and that the single-minded cultivation of a partnership with Russia, while downgrading our other interests, will simply accelerate the reemergence of an ominously familiar imperial challenge to

¹²⁶James D. Stewart and Neil G. Kacena, "Trapped by History: From Totalitarianism to Democracy," in William C. Martel and Theodore C. Hailes, eds., *Russia's Democratic Moment?* (Montgomery, Ala.: Air War College Project on Russian Democratic Reform, 1995), 11. This is the second of Air War College Studies in National Security. The studies were established as a forum for research on topics related to U.S. national security.

¹²⁷Fred Weir, "Boris's Big Bash," *The Nation* 260, issue 20 (22 May 1995): 708. Weir writes regularly for the *Canadian Press*, *Hindustan Times*, and *In These Times*.

¹²⁸Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 71.

Europe's security."¹²⁹ Kissinger's and Brzezinski's apprehensions about Yeltsin's authoritarian leanings are derived from the fact that absolutism in the domestic realm is often equated with the increased potential for adventurism in foreign policy. This phenomenon, in turn, can be attributed to the absence of internal institutional constraints to ameliorate the capricious acts and intentions of a dictator. Indeed, Yeltsin's authoritarian actions can be seen as a symptoms of a far greater malaise: the failure to develop institutions that balance against the overwhelming authority of the chief executive.

For centuries, a lack of domestic institutional constraints has been the rule for Russia. Beginning with the first Tsar, the distinctions between state, church, and leader were blurred to the extent that potential competing institutions - whether legislative, judicial, religious, or civic - were either underdeveloped or coopted. Subsequently, the authority of the Tsar was unequivocal, unassailable, and unbounded. Jonathan Steele, author of *Eternal Russia*, notes that this is unique when compared to the statuses of other monarchs in Europe:

They [the Russian Tsars] operated on the basis that the Tsar owned his realm. The medieval Western European distinction between ownership ("dominium") and authority ("imperium") did not apply. Russian Tsars, moving out from their original territory in Kiev, acquired their land by conquest. The Tsar was both proprietor and sovereign, unlike kings in Western Europe who were [at least] bound to respect their subjects' property.¹³⁰

The Bolshevik revolution and the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in November 1917 did little to change the relationship between the state and the people it governed. Names have changed - the Russian empire became the Soviet Republic, the authority and power of the Tsar was assumed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and the domineering mysticism of the Russian

¹²⁹Brzezinski, 79.

¹³⁰Jonathan Steele, *Eternal Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 47.

Orthodox Church was replaced by the equally repressive ideology of Marxist-Leninism - but the set-up essentially remained the same. Authority was still administered from above while submission and subservience was demanded from below. According to Yuri N. Afanasyev, a Russian historian, this authoritarian legacy has crippled present efforts to develop an understanding of the rights and responsibilities of an individual in the context of civic participation:

The main reason the Russian people have not escaped totalitarian systems, before or since 1917, has been a lack of civil society. The state monopolized every activity, and no autonomous society existed apart from its all-pervasive scope.¹³¹

Afanasyev adds that while the oppressive and pervasive nature of the state has limited the development of moderating domestic institutions, the lack of such institutions, in turn, has encouraged the authoritarian legacy about which he laments. In essence, the Russian people continue to be trapped in a vicious cycle.¹³² Ironically, Yeltsin, in a speech to the legislative assembly, agreed with this assessment:

Without a developed civil society state power inevitably takes on a despotic, totalitarian character. Only owing to a civil society is this power subject to serving the individual and becomes a protecting mechanism for freedom.¹³³

A 1993 report by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe underscores the present inability of the Russian people to understand, aspire to, or protect democratic principles and

¹³¹Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform is Dead," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 22.

¹³²*Ibid.*

¹³³Yeltsin, speech to the Federal Assembly, 24 February 1994; Nina Belyaeva, trans., "Rule of Law for Civil Society," paper prepared for the XVI world Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 1994, 10; quoted in Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 258.

institutions:

Simply put, democracy remains a foreign concept to a substantial portion of the population. It did not emerge from experience, it was simply declared. Hence, even under optimal circumstances, it will take time to develop a "culture" of democracy. While the form of the totalitarian state has disappeared, the substance has not.¹³⁴

The prospects for democracy in Russia, however, are not uniformly bleak. Russian citizens, for the first time ever, possess the freedoms of speech and press. And, although political parties are characterized by "little organization, low membership and only minimal structures outside Moscow and St. Petersburg,"¹³⁵ they nonetheless exist. They are the genesis of an opposition which will serve as a countervailing balance to the president's power. Finally, according to David Remnick, a staff writer at *The New Yorker*, the most encouraging sign is that Russia's "citizens show every indication of refusing a return to the maximalism of communism or the xenophobia of hard-line nationalism."¹³⁶ Thus, it appears that democracy is at least making halting headway in Russia. While the centuries-old imprint of authoritarianism is an obstacle, it is probably not the biggest impediment to consolidation of democracy in Russia. More consequential is the exhaustion of the Russian people.

Battered by crime, frustrated with corruption, and suffering from a drastically lowered standard of living, the only thing Russian citizens can count on at the present is an uncertain future. Thus, it is plausible that the ideals of democracy could be sacrificed for simple stability. Anatoli

¹³⁴*Human Rights and Democratization*, 50; quoted in Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 181. Knight is a Senior Research Analyst at the Library of Congress.

¹³⁵Steele, xv.

¹³⁶David Remnick, "Can Russia Change?," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 48. Remnick was the Moscow correspondent for *The Washington Post* from 1988 to 1991.

Lieven, a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington D.C., observes that "the great mass or ordinary Russians has a deep yearning for stability and order," adding that "this feeling at present outweighs even the desire for social justice."¹³⁷ This desire for stability is evidenced by the general acquiescence of the population in response to decrees by Yeltsin that restrict civil liberties and reestablish much of the former Soviet Union's vaunted security apparatus. Ostensibly implemented to combat crime and corruption, as well as external threats, these actions were welcomed by many weary citizens. Yet, unless employed judiciously, they are certain to have a deleterious effect on the development of democracy.

a. Case Study: Russia's Security Service

A democratic state needs strong and effective security services, especially during the period when it is becoming established.¹³⁸

Security can be defined as "measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack."¹³⁹ The ultimate goal of a security service is to protect the sovereignty of the state. This is accomplished, in part, through the investigation, interrogation, and arrest of suspects; in short, by impinging upon the liberty of those who are accused of threatening state security. An important precept of democracy, in contrast, involves promoting liberty, that is, freedom from excessive government restriction or control. Clearly there is bound to be natural tension between those who seek to excel at the craft of enforcing security and those who wish to

¹³⁷Anatoli Lieven, "Freedom and Anarchy: Russia Stumbles Toward the Twenty-First Century," *Washington Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WASHQR. 30 May 1997.

¹³⁸Sergei Stepashin, quoted in Knight, 41. At the time Stepashin was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security. He eventually took charge of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK).

¹³⁹*The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992). Compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

promote the civil liberties affirmed by a democratic state. Without juridical rights and legislative oversight, the exuberance of security professionals can have serious consequences. Douglas Porch, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, illustrates this point nicely. Although he refers specifically to counterintelligence (a subset of security), the idea is applicable across the full spectrum of operations conducted by security services:

[D]omestic spying can institutionalize a dangerous mind-set in that portion of the secret services responsible for it. As metiers go, counterintelligence should require a hazardous-to-your-health warning. The search for spies and revolutionaries can, if perpetual and left unevaluated, result in a dangerous psychological disequilibrium, an eternal mole hunt in which the state treats its own citizens as potential subversives.¹⁴⁰

The need for security in Russia has not diminished since the demise of the communist state. If anything, disorder and chaos are a growth industry. Internal threats to order and stability come from the Russian mafia, reawakened ethnic nationalism, economic crimes, and corruption. As for external threats, despite the end of the Cold War, the intelligence business of spying and countering spies apparently continues unabated. As General Andrei Chernenko, Head of the Ministry of Security (MB) Public Relations Department, explained in October 1992:

Our adversary prefers a very simple and old-fashioned method - the recruitment of agents from among Russian citizens. Unfortunately, it succeeds.¹⁴¹

With threats abounding everywhere, it is not difficult to become obsessed with security. Such an

¹⁴⁰Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995), 429.

¹⁴¹Andrei Chernenko, October 1992 interview; quoted in Knight, 49-50. The Committee for State Security(KGB) was formerly responsible for conducting foreign intelligence and providing for internal security. After its disestablishment in December 1991 these two roles were split between the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and the Ministry for Security (MB). Duties include counterintelligence, anti-terrorism, and combating economic crimes. The MB was renamed and reorganized in 1993, and again in 1995. It is now referred to as the Federal Security Service (FSB).

obsession, however, requires a heavy commitment of resources to counter all enemies, whether seen or unseen. John Dziak, a Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), describes a phenomenon he refers to as the counterintelligence state:

The fixation with enemies and threats to the security of the party-state involved a very heavy internal commitment of the state resources. Further, this fixation demanded the creation of a state security service that penetrated and suffused all societal institutions (including the military), but not always the claimant to monopoly power, usually a self-proclaimed "revolutionary" party. This security service became the principal guardian of the party; the two together constituted a permanent counterintelligence enterprise to which all major political, social and economic questions were subordinated. The well-being (civic, economic or otherwise) of society at large was not the principled objective of such an amalgam of ensconced power and palace guard; self-perpetuation was.¹⁴²

Although Dziak speaks in the past tense, "newly-democratic" Russia is a good example of the counter-intelligence state. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the election of President Yeltsin has brought sweeping changes for the country as a whole, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) in particular. The attempt to transition from communism to "democracy" has included a flurry of legislative activity and numerous reorganizations directed at the secret services. And, according to Amy Knight, author of *Spies Without Cloaks*, glasnost has undeniably left its imprint:

[T]he security police can no longer enforce silence through censorship. The abuses and offenses of the security police are openly criticized in the press. Gone are the days when bothersome dissidents could be dealt with easily by whisking them off to labor camps or psychiatric hospitals without answering to a court or judge. And the security services do not have the unlimited resources that were at their disposal during the Soviet era. They too have to worry about their budgets.¹⁴³

¹⁴²John J. Dziak, "Reflections on the Counterintelligence State," in Walter Pforzheimer, Hayden B. Peake, and Samuel Halpern, eds., *In the Name of Intelligence* (NIBC Press, 1994), 263.

¹⁴³Knight, 4.

But a closer examination reveals that many of the changes to the Russian security services were merely cosmetic. Despite the removal of KGB leaders, budget constraints, cutbacks in personnel, and a dispersal of functions, the new Russian security services have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Indeed, rather than "curbing the powers of the security services and narrowing their functions," attempts to reorganize these institutions and codify their activities "have only served to broaden their role."¹⁴⁴

Perhaps the only significant transformation that the effort to develop democracy has wrought upon the Russian security services is a shift in allegiance. The Russian president, rather than the Communist Party, now exercises complete control over each of the intelligence services. This span of authority, unimpeded by effective legislative or judicial oversight, does not bode well for the retention of legal guarantees and individual freedoms that are normally associated with a democratic state. It should be noted that Yeltsin's unchallenged dominance of the Russian security services is not a quirk of fate. Rather than reform the intelligence apparatus, he sought to coopt and shape it to serve as an effective tool to further his political agenda:

For all his democratic leanings, Yeltsin was not prepared to relinquish this potentially powerful political weapon that was now in his hands.... Yeltsin was to become increasingly dependent on the security services to fend off opposition and carry through with his programs. Instead of restricting the powers of his security apparatus, he would do just the opposite.¹⁴⁵

This is not an unusual turn of events for a leader who at times has been beleaguered and fighting for his political survival, even one who professes to embrace the principles of democracy. Roy Godson, a consultant to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and the President's Foreign

¹⁴⁴Knight, 244.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 37.

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), concurs:

[When] the legitimacy of the government is readily challenged, the ruler's relationship to the ruled is based on preserving and expanding power - with the ruler viewing the ruled as though they were actual or potential enemies. Security and counterintelligence become the paramount intelligence elements.¹⁴⁶

Yeltsin's monopoly control over the security services has received only ineffectual challenges from the Russian parliament. This is because deputies have been unable to reach consensus on the roles, power, and pertinent relationships of these organizations. This may be viewed, in part, as a legacy of Russia's authoritarian past: politics are approached as a highly personalized zero-sum competition for power. The familiar give-and-take of democracy is nonexistent. Therefore, while one group of deputies has sought to circumscribe the power of the security service in order to protect individual rights, a second, more conservative, block has been less than cooperative. According to Knight, they are "not interested in furthering democratic reforms of the security services," but instead seek "to assert their own influence over them in order to compete successfully against Yeltsin for political power."¹⁴⁷ This parliamentary impasse has inhibited the development of meaningful legislative oversight of the security forces. And, without appropriate oversight authority, the legal rights and individual freedoms that accompany democratization cannot be guaranteed.

As mentioned previously, two additional factors have worked in tandem to impede juridical control of the Russian security services: the skyrocketing crime rate and an inadequate legal system. The former has been used to justify harsh anti-crime decrees that impinge upon basic civil liberties, including searches without warrants, and the detention of suspects for up to thirty

¹⁴⁶Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1995), 250.

¹⁴⁷Knight, 39.

days before formal charges are filed. The latter, as Knight explains, fails to balance the excesses of the security forces:

What is required is the legal infrastructure - criminal codes, procedural laws, judicial systems, lawyers - to support restraints on the security police, as well as an effective system of parliamentary oversight. Although the government and parliament have made progress in reforming the laws, this has been a painfully slow process, and Russia still lacks many of the fundamentals necessary for an effective and democratic system of justice.¹⁴⁸

This does not overly concern Sergei Stepashin, former Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB): "We...talk about expanding the rights of individuals without understanding that today, in the environment of the disintegration of the USSR and the growing criminal element that is encroaching on political power, we must to some extent give up the standard concept of human rights."¹⁴⁹

Apparently, many Russian citizens agree. A recent *U.S. News & World Report* poll conducted in Russia revealed that more than half of the respondents would be willing to give up basic constitutional rights in order to help control crime.¹⁵⁰ Although this poll result can surely be attributed to the yearning for stability discussed earlier, it reflects a trend that is dangerous to the development of democracy - namely, a lack of understanding with regard to the value and inviolability of these rights.

¹⁴⁸Knight, 251.

¹⁴⁹Sergei Stepashin, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 26 May 1994, p. 1,5; quoted in Knight, 92.

¹⁵⁰"Welcome to the Real Russia," *U.S. News & World Report*, 8 May 1995, 51. The poll of 1,035 Russian adults was conducted by Ed Goeas of the Tarrance Group and Vladimir Andreenkov of the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESS) 10-18 April 1995.

b. Summation

There have been many positive signs to indicate that democracy is feasible in Russia, to include freedom of speech and of the press, the development of political parties and, above all, a steadfast refusal to return to a communist past. Yet there is still a tremendous amount of work to be done. Sergei Kovalyov, a biologist who was imprisoned during Brezhnev's tenure and later helped lead the human rights movement, confesses that the enormity of the task has shattered the previous fanciful illusions concerning the ease with which democracy could be implemented:

The quality of democracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats. We have to wait for a critical mass of people with democratic principles to accumulate. It's like a nuclear explosion: the critical mass has to accrue. Without this, everything will be like it is now, always in fits and starts. Our era of romantic democracy is long over. We have finally fallen to earth.¹⁵¹

While traditions of authoritarianism do not appear to prohibit the establishment of democracy outright, they have clearly impeded Russian attempts to effect the transition. Ultimately, it is a mistake to assume that the long and arduous procession toward democracy will successfully overcome all of the pitfalls in its path, to include a powerful, potentially authoritarian chief executive, an impotent parliament, a desire for stability (at the expense of individual liberties) that has bolstered the role of the security services, and a disturbing lack of appreciation for a civil society in which citizens actively exercise rights and responsibilities. These are tremendous obstacles. Therefore, although democracy in Russia is possible, it is foolish to claim it is inevitable.

¹⁵¹Sergei Kovalyov, quoted in Remnick, 38.

Yet, many U.S. policymakers have rationalized any and all authoritarian perturbations and certified Russia as well on its way to democracy. This rush to erase the unpleasant memory of the evil empire and capitalize on political opportunities presents an interesting dilemma for democratic peace theorists. The desire to welcome another democratic state into the fold is tempered by misgivings about the true nature of democracy in Russia. Will a "democratic" Russia act in harmony with other democracies? Will other democratic states recognize Russia as a kindred soul and, therefore, refrain from engaging in conflict? Although Aesop cannot provide the answer to these questions, his fables offer a telling comment:

A doubtful friend is worse than a certain enemy. Let a man be one thing or the other, and we then know how to meet him.¹⁵²

3. Islam

The word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect.¹⁵³

For most Americans, Islam is associated with fanaticism, violence, and hatred. The word immediately evokes vivid images: U.S. hostages in Tehran, carnage at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, chaos following the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the tremendous crater left by the truck bomb at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Islam has become so feared and misunderstood in the United States that it is often utilized to fill the "threat vacuum" that

¹⁵²Aesop, "The Hound and the Hare," *Fables*, trans. Thomas James, in Tripp, 232.

¹⁵³Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, 15 October 1979, p. 5; quoted in Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 252.

was created after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disapprobation of communism.¹⁵⁴ Islam, however, is not a simple, one-dimensional phenomenon. Radical fundamentalism is but a single strain of Islam, though, as noted by Robin Wright, it unfortunately garners most of the headlines:

Reactive groups - motivated by political or economic insecurity, questions of identity, or territorial disputes - are most visible because of their aggressiveness. Extremists have manipulated, misconstrued, and even hijacked Muslim tenets.... [Yet, at] the opposite end of the spectrum are proactive individuals and groups working for constructive change¹⁵⁵

John L. Esposito, world-renowned Professor of Religion and International Affairs at Georgetown University, concurs, adding that viewing "Islam and events in the Muslim world...primarily through the prism of violence and terrorism...has resulted in a failure to see the breadth and depth of contemporary Islam."¹⁵⁶

Indeed, not only does Islam provide a broad scope of instruction and guidance for believers, but it engulfs a large, diverse, geographically-dispersed population. Therefore, as explained by Bernard Lewis, Professor (emeritus) of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, Islam, much like the term "Asian values," does not lend itself easily to generic characterization:

If we talk about Islam as a historical phenomenon, we are speaking of a community that now numbers more than a billion people, most of whom are spread

¹⁵⁴John L. Esposito "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace," *Current History* 93, no. 579 (January 1994): 19. Online. MSANEWS Ohio State University. Available HTTP:<http://www.mynet.net/~msanews>. 7 May 1997.

¹⁵⁵Robin Wright, "Two Visions of Reformation," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no 2 (April 1996): 66.

¹⁵⁶John L. Esposito, quoted in Gasser Hathout, "Perspective on Islam and Democracy," 26 September 1996. Online. Islamic Intellectual Forum. Available HTTP: <http://www.islamforum.org/democracy.html>. 8 May 1997. Dr. Hathout is the Chairman of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), "a public service agency working for the civil rights of American Muslims." See <http://mpac.org/mpac.html>. The "mission" of the Islam Intellectual Forum is to provide a forum "for the truth no matter how hurtful, for the free thinking no matter how difficult, and for devotion to God and only to Him." See <http://www.islamforum.com/mission.html>.

along a vast arc stretching almost 10,000 miles from Morocco to Mindanao; that has a 14-century long history; and that is the defining characteristic of the 53 sovereign states that currently belong to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). For obvious reasons it is extremely difficult (though not impossible) to make any kind of valid generalization about a reality of such age, size, and complexity.¹⁵⁷

Rather than characterizing Islamic theology as violent, radical, and threatening; Zachary Karabell, a contributing editor of the *Boston Book Review*, prefers to liken it to hot iron caught between a blacksmith's hammer and anvil:

Any successful ideology is malleable, and [Islam] is no exception. It does not dictate specific action and can - in the hands of adept leaders or intellectuals - justify almost any behavior.¹⁵⁸

And "any behavior," contrary to the perceptions of the American people, can include democratic principles, institutions, and practices.

Elements of Islamic tradition that can be construed as encouraging the development of democracy include an acceptance of diversity, a wealth of political literature that discusses the rights as well as responsibilities of both the ruler and the ruled, strong disapproval of arbitrary authority, and mutual toleration of differences of opinion. Indeed, with regard to the last characteristic, the Prophet Muhammad is said to have declared that "Difference of opinion within my community is a sign of God's mercy."¹⁵⁹ There are also specific Islamic practices such as *ijtihad* (personal interpretation of God's word), *ijima* (consensus), and *shura* (consultation) which

¹⁵⁷Bernard Lewis, "A Historical Overview," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 54.

¹⁵⁸Zachary Karabell, "Fundamental Misconceptions: Islamic Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 105 (December 1996): 76. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

¹⁵⁹Quoted in Lewis, 56.

suggest a skeletal structure of political pluralism.¹⁶⁰ Finally, Islamic tenets do not articulate a specific structure for governance, as it is meant to be a "universal religion for all times and climes."¹⁶¹ Therefore, according to Olivier Roy, a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, "the principles of political Islam can be embodied in a variety of constitutional formulas (including something that resembles Western democracy, with a parliament and elections)."¹⁶²

But there is a catch. There must be a catch, otherwise the feasibility of implementing democracy in an Islamic state would not merit analysis or discussion (and as well, on a related but somewhat more mundane level, this section of the thesis would be unnecessary). Roy continues:

What counts is neither the form nor the strength of the institution, but rather the manner in which the institution effaces itself before the establishment of Islamic principles, which then must govern the hearts and actions of men. The key to politics is in a "social morality."¹⁶³

Social morality is embodied in the shari'a, or Islamic law, and, according to Esposito, one of the few hard and fast requirements for the governance of an Islamic state is that the ruler is to "govern

¹⁶⁰The principle of consultation (shura) refers to the fact that "all sane adult Muslims, male and female, are vicereagents (agents of God)" who must "delegate their authority to the ruler and whose opinion must also be sought in the conduct of state." This is generally done through an elected representative body. See Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 149. Ijtihad refers to the interpretation of God's law by early Muslim judges and jurists. These interpretations became incorporated into law books. Ijima (consensus) refers to agreement of the Islamic community - usually religious scholars of a particular era - on a certain point of law. By the tenth century, however, in the opinion of clerics, Islamic law had been institutionalized and finalized. Therefore, technically speaking, Islamic law is no longer "interpreted," it is only "applied." See Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 20-21

¹⁶¹Abul-Ala Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1980), 260; quoted in Olivier Roy, trans. Carol Volk, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 61.

¹⁶²Olivier Roy, trans. Carol Volk, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 61.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, 61.

according to and assure implementation of the Shariah to which ruler and ruled alike are bound.”¹⁶⁴

Mohamed Elachmi Hamdi, a Tunisian-born writer and a doctoral candidate at the University of London, reemphasizes this point, unequivocally declaring that “no Islamic state can be legitimate in the eyes of its subjects without obeying the main teachings of the shari’a.”¹⁶⁵

Clearly, this presents some difficulties with regard to the implementation of democratic principles and institutions. As defined in Chapter II, democracy involves government by the people; there is no higher authority than the citizens of the state. In an Islamic state, however, the law of God, as embodied in the shari’a, reigns supreme. Mohammed Sid Ahmed, a secular Egyptian political analyst, clarifies:

When you start from the idea that there is a divine body of doctrine, man is reduced to consultative status.... Democracy starts from the theory that nothing should be accepted a priori; it puts no constraints on any given strain of thought. This cannot be in Islam.¹⁶⁶

While man may be subject to God’s law, someone of this world must interpret and apply the Almighty’s divine wisdom. This fact presents an interesting problem:

For who is it, after all, who hears and applies God’s law if not men and women ruled by their passions and subject to the limitations of their understanding? Law, it has been stated often enough, does not apply itself, but is applied by fallible human beings.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 283. Also spelled shari’a and sharia.

¹⁶⁵Mohamed Elachmi Hamdi, “The Limits of the Western Model,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 84.

¹⁶⁶Mohammed Sid Ahmed, quoted in Peter Ford, “Can an Islamic Government Foster Democratic Rights?,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 April 1993, p. 10. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com>. 11 May 1997.

¹⁶⁷Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions of Democracy,” in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 76.

This dilemma is exacerbated by the inherent ambiguity of the shari'a: much of it is quite general in nature so that it may be applied comprehensibly and timelessly to all aspects of Islamic life. As Roy explains, this characteristic leads to an amorphous, extremely flexible entity:

[T]he fatwa, formal legal opinions that decide matters not mentioned in the text, are always pronounced in the here and now and can be annulled by a subsequent authority.... [Therefore the] sharia is never closed, for it is based not on a core of concepts, but rather on an ensemble of precepts which is at times general, at times precise, and which expands to include the totality of human acts through induction, analogy, extension, commentary, and interpretation. While the basic precepts, as they are explicitly formulated, cannot be called into question, their extension is a matter of casuistics.¹⁶⁸

Because the shari'a is such an open-ended body of law, it is possible to apply (or manipulate and sidestep) it in a manner that suits the purposes of the incumbent power. Therefore, the shari'a could be employed, theoretically, in a manner which enthusiastically supports the principles and practices of democracy. Certainly it would require innovative leadership (and a superior ability to apply semantics) to manipulate a body of law concerned solely with glorifying God's name on earth, but it appears possible.

The reality of the matter, however, is altogether quite different. For an explanation as to why this is so, we must return to the question of who interprets the shari'a. While there is no "clergy" in Islam, there is "a body of lettered men, doctors of law - the ulamas - whose corpus and curriculum display remarkable stability in space and time, and who have had a quasi-monopoly on intellectual production and teaching."¹⁶⁹ These doctors of law advise the ruler on the nature of good

¹⁶⁸Roy, 10.

¹⁶⁹Roy, 28. Although Islam does not recognize the concept of a clergy per se, it is common for westerners to equate the ulama with clerics. For simplicity's sake, the terms clergy, cleric, and ulama will be used interchangeably in this thesis. Additionally, the word "ulama" is commonly used for both singular and plural, however, it is not incorrect to refer to ulamas as the plural.

government (in the context of the shari'a). Failure to adhere to this advice brings the penalty of censure and threatens the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, while the ulama have no greater privileges than anyone else and certainly no a priori right to rule,¹⁷⁰ they do exercise considerable political power:

[The end result] is a council of experts deciding on the grounds of "objective" (Islamically valid) right and wrong, judging on the basis of the common good (al-maslaha al-'amma) only, and not a political assembly representing conflicting opinion and interest. The ideal amounts to an expertocracy headed by a Just Ruler.¹⁷¹

And, for the ulama, the insuppressible desire to retain political power is concomitant to its possession. Accordingly, while there is certainly an interest in applying the shari'a in a manner that is consistent with God's will and revelation (to ensure that all believers obtain eternal salvation), the ulama are also motivated by a reluctance to relinquish their considerable influence. Therefore, any attempt to implement changes which threaten either of these imperatives - to include the advancement of the concept of popular will through democracy - will be resisted.

a. Case Study: Iran's "Ayatollah Gorbachev"

Since the people love the clergy, have faith in the clergy, want to be guided by the clergy, it is right that the supreme religious authority should oversee the work of the prime minister or of the president of the republic, to make sure that they don't make mistakes or go against the Koran.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰Abdul Karim Soroush, in Wright, "Two Visions of Reformation," 70. Soroush is an Iranian academic who supported the 1979 revolution but has since articulated ideas concerning Islamic governance that are controversial and unwelcome by the current regime in Iran.

¹⁷¹Kramer, 78.

¹⁷²Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, 15 October 1979, p. 5; quoted in Theda Skocpol, 251-252. Although Khomeini refers to the post of Prime Minister, that position was abolished through constitutional amendments in 1989.

While the previous section explains the theoretical intricacies of governance in an Islamic state, this section will be devoted to explaining how Iran fails to conform to those same precepts. It is as if the government of Iran enjoys being contrary. Certainly the Islamic Republic must derive great satisfaction from confounding and frustrating the efforts of those - such as the author of this thesis - who would pigeonhole its system of government.

Iran is viewed by many as a rogue nation because support of terrorism has been a key component of its foreign policy. Yet, in the domestic arena, the regime, at least by Islamic standards, is quite enlightened. The people exercise a voice in government through the regular election (every four years) of a legislative assembly and the president of the state.¹⁷³ Iranian citizens exercised this right fully in May of this year when 94 percent of eligible voters turned out to elect a surprisingly moderate candidate to the office of president.¹⁷⁴ Mohammed Khatami, a Muslim cleric who had been forced from his previous position of Culture Minister because of overly permissive policies, won a landslide victory over the favored candidate, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri.¹⁷⁵

Khatami, dubbed "Ayatollah Gorbachev" by those who anticipate he will initiate sweeping changes to Iran's political system, is certainly more broad-minded than many of his more conservative clerical peers. He campaigned on a platform of tolerance and social reform, highlighting the need to ensure civil rights and replace fanaticism with an appreciation for diversity and variety. Clearly, his campaign struck a chord with Iranian voters. Cyrus Mozaffarian, a

¹⁷³Suffrage is granted to all Iranians, regardless of gender, over the age of sixteen.

¹⁷⁴John Lancaster, "Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not New System," *Washington Post*, 26 May 1997, p. A1. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iran/iranlect.htm>. 26 May 1997. With 32 million voters eligible, over 29 million ballots were cast.

¹⁷⁵Ibid. Despite the fact that Nateq Nouri was supported by Iran's religious establishment, Khatami won more than 20 million votes - 69 percent of the total.

jewelry and crafts vendor in Tehran, explains:

This was a referendum about freedom. The voters were saying that we're tired of people snooping into our private lives. What we do at home is our own business. With Khatami in power, the government is going to stop telling us what we can read, what we can watch and what we can do. We voted for change, and the government will have to give it to us.¹⁷⁶

But, whether change will actually occur, and if so at what pace, are debatable issues. First, while Khatami is undeniably a breath of fresh air for Iranian politics, the fact that he met the stringent ideological criteria for presidential candidates signifies that he too is a member of the establishment.¹⁷⁷ As reported by the *Washington Post*, Khatami "is not a man from the outside, but a man from the inside."¹⁷⁸ Second, even if he has the best of intentions, Khatami must work within a system where, as the popular representative of the people, he has only an ancillary voice in government. This is because the Islamic Republic of Iran, as indicated by its name, is first and foremost Islamic: "There is a dualism in the Iranian constitution between the sovereignty of the people (derived from the dominant political discourses of modernity) and the sovereignty of God, through the principle of vilayet-i-faqih."¹⁷⁹ A republican form of governance is desired, but it remains a secondary goal and it is subject to the limits imposed by Islam.

¹⁷⁶Cyrus Mozaffarian, quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change," *New York Times*, 26 May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/world/iran-rdp.html>. 26 May 1997.

¹⁷⁷All political candidates must be vetted by the Council of Guardians, an entity which is tasked with upholding the sanctity of Islamic law. The Council consists of twelve members: half are clerics appointed by the supreme religious leader, half are Muslim lawyers who are approved by the legislative assembly. The Council also ensures that legislation conforms to Islamic tenets.

¹⁷⁸"A 'Moderate' in Tehran," *Washington Post*, 26 May 1997, p. A18. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/wplate/1997-05/000L-052697-idx.html>. 26 May 1997.

¹⁷⁹Sami Zubaida, "Is Iran an Islamic State?," in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 106.

Vilayet-i-faqih - leadership of a just and pious jurist - was an innovation of Khomeini that was subsequently incorporated into the constitution: "The governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious Faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people."¹⁸⁰ The Faqih provides policy guidance and is the ultimate arbitrator of competing views. He is also responsible for appointing clerics to the Council of Guardians, has the authority to unilaterally overturn legislation, and can dismiss the president if he is found to be negligent in his duties. He is supported by a phalanx of loyal clerics who dominate the legislative assembly, the judiciary, and the position in the cabinet of the chief executive. Thus, the Faqih, backed by his religious coterie, is the highest authority in the land:

[T]he people's capacity to determine their own social destiny through the institutions of the majles [parliament] and other constitutional mechanisms are [sic] nonetheless constrained by the faqih.... In short, while the constitution stipulates a "limited" notion of popular sovereignty, it elevates the Velayat-e-Faqih to prominence [sic] and thus denies the supremacy of the will of the people¹⁸¹

Subsequently, the nephew of Mozaffarian (the vendor) is probably accurate when he rebuts his

¹⁸⁰Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, quoted in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, "Introduction: Iran's Political Culture," in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, eds., *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic* (London: Routledge, 1992), 22. Also spelled velayat-e-faqih and vilayat-i-faqih.

¹⁸¹Farsoun, 22.

uncle concerning the potential of the new president:

Khatami is not the boss and never will be. In this country the president does not decide. Maybe Khatami has certain ideas, but he won't have real power.¹⁸²

Apparently the U.S. government agrees. Earlier this year the U.S. State Department issued a report concerning Iranian human rights practices which was less-than-complimentary with regard to the ability of Iranian citizens to change their government:

[This right] is severely compromised by the leadership of the Government, which effectively manipulates the electoral system to its advantage. Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders and their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of Shi'a Islam. There is no separation of state and religion. The clerics dominate all branches of government. The Government represses any movement seeking to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's existing theocratic foundation.¹⁸³

Despite the election of Khatami, the U.S. is not convinced that Iran will alter the manner in which it conducts the business of governance. A White House spokesperson reveals the wait-and-see attitude which is now prevalent:

We're watching the situation carefully and have no opposition to the Iranian people or an Islamic government. We need to see if there will be actual change in behavior in those issues which have concerned us in the past such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human rights.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸²Kinzer, "Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change." The nephew is not referred to by name.

¹⁸³U.S. Department of State, *Iran Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*. Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iran.html. 26 May 1997.

¹⁸⁴Stephen Kinzer, "Moderate Leader is Elected in Iran by a Wide Margin," *New York Times*, 25 May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/early/052iran-election.html>. 26 May 1997. The White House spokesperson was not named in the article.

As reflected in the United States's noncommittal stance, the deck appears to be stacked against both Khatami and the possibility of any consequential change in Iranian domestic politics. Yet, for two reasons, the situation is not clear-cut. First, while the shari'a is prominently reflected in the Iranian constitution, it is not, of and by itself, the sole guidance for governance of the state. Roy explains:

[T]he constitution sets the place of the sharia, and not vice-versa.... The new Islamic state developed a positive law that became "Islamic" by virtue of the sole fact that the state was Islamic: it thus marked the end of the sharia as the sole foundation for the judicial norm.¹⁸⁵

This point was punctuated by Khomeini himself when he issued an edict stating that the "government is authorized unilaterally...to prevent any matter, be it spiritual or material, that poses a threat to its interests," including even the essential elements of Islam such as "prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca."¹⁸⁶ Daniel Pipes, editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, notes that this subordination of Islam to the state has radically diminished the importance of the shari'a and, in turn, the power of the clergy.¹⁸⁷ Sami Zubaida, contributing editor of the *Middle East Report*,

¹⁸⁵Roy, 177.

¹⁸⁶Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam," *First Things*, issue 58 (December 1995). Online. Christian Leadership Ministries, 9 June 1996. Available HTTP: <http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft912/pipes.html>. 25 May 1997. Khomeini's motivation in issuing this edict is unclear. The justification given was that the interests of the Islamic Republic were synonymous with the interests of Islam and, therefore, the Republic was to be maintained at all costs. However, Pipes claims that the real reason "lies in the fact that, like countless other twentieth-century rulers, he sought [uncontested] control of his country's spiritual life." Khomeini was apparently leery of the power represented in the Council of Guardians' responsibility to review and abrogate legislation, particularly initiatives that he supported. This edict can be seen as a move to circumvent that possibility. *First Things* is "an interreligious, nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance a religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society."

¹⁸⁷Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam."

concurr:

This far-reaching ruling gives the government and the Leader the competence to decide when the provisions of Muslim law, however, interpreted, are or are not binding. Given that the "tenets of Islam" are the ultimate constitutional limit on legislation and government power, their effective removal gives the government and parliament unlimited powers.¹⁸⁸

Zubaida's assessment may be overstated, but it is clear that, due perhaps to internecine rivalry, the overall power of the clergy has suffered a blow. If this is the initial reason why the winds of political change cannot be ignored, the second is the relative diminution of the position of Leader. Khomeini's successor is Ali Khamenei, a comparatively junior cleric who formerly served as Iran's president. Khamenei, who possesses neither the religious credentials nor the popularity of his predecessor, is having difficulty following in the footsteps of an icon. Zubaida explains:

While Khomeini as Leader stood above factional strife (and manipulated it), Khamene'i leads one faction against the others. The effect is to make the Leader just another politician and thus to denude the position of faqih of its sanctity and charisma.¹⁸⁹

b. Summation

The promise of democracy swirls about Islam like the wind-borne down of a dandelion. Whether the seed takes root in fertile ground remains more a factor of circumstances and luck than careful planning and preparation. This is certainly the case in Iran. Now, with the election of a moderate as president, the potential for democracy in the Islamic Republic is greater than at any other time in that state's history. Jubilant celebration, however, would be premature.

¹⁸⁸Zubaida, 107.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 108.

Khatami's candidacy was approved by religious leaders who deemed the presidential hopeful to be politically (or, more accurately, religiously) correct. This stamp of approval casts aspersions on Khatami's desire to effect real political changes. Even if Khatami is willing, it is difficult to be optimistic about his chances for success because of the seemingly insurmountable inertia created by the imposing application of religion. According to Zubaida, despite hairline cracks in its previously impervious ramparts, institutionalized Islam remains an overwhelming force:

[T]he government is Islamic in its personnel. The clerics are in control of the highest echelons of state, government, and public life.... Their political discourse is couched in religious terms, and their conflicts often conducted with religious rhetoric.¹⁹⁰

Religion and the legitimacy of the regime are hopelessly entangled. Therefore, Iran remains a theocracy. As it will for some time to come. Ultimately, the impact of Khatami's landslide victory, rather than a signal to replace the excessive emphasis on Islam, is likely to be limited to the initiation of "new ideas, new people, [and a] more responsive government"¹⁹¹ within the current religious framework.

4. Culture vs. Democracy: The Unequivocal Verdict

Democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to maintain.... Democratic polities inevitably find themselves saddled with certain "built-in" paradoxes or contradictions. The tensions these cause are not easy to reconcile, and every country that would be democratic must find its own way of doing so.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰Zubaida, 118.

¹⁹¹Lancaster, "Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not New System."

¹⁹²Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 95.

Culture does not necessarily prohibit democracy. Instead, returning to Huntington's assertion, most cultural traditions are complex and diverse amalgamations of beliefs, values, and behaviors that, in some shape or form, can reach accommodation with democracy.¹⁹³ The key is how the ambiguous concept of culture is defined. Employed by those who seek political reform, culture may very well be the key that unlocks the door to democracy. In the hands of authoritarian leaders such as Lee Kwan Yew, Soeharto, or Ayatollah Khamenei, however, culture can be wielded as a bludgeon against those who agitate for democratic values and institutions. Therefore, ironically, the same cultural amalgamation that accommodates democracy can also serve as an obstacle to its implementation.

Perhaps the most concrete statement that can be made with regard to culture and democracy is that mixing the two together is bound to alter each one. According to Bhikhu Parekh, a political scientist of Indian descent, to "insist on the [immutable] universality of liberal democracy is to deny the west's [sic] own historical experiences and to betray the liberal principles of mutual respect and love of cultural diversity."¹⁹⁴

Democracy it is not a single, solid, uniform, seamless, insoluble, mass-produced commodity. Rather, it is a elaborate set of values, principles, practices, and institutions which are linked in a flexible, wholly adaptable, and ever-changing manner. Therefore, a culture can alter the face of democracy simply by choosing to change the emphasis that is placed on any of these integral linkages or characteristics. And, as Parekh notes, this is a natural and inevitable tendency:

How a polity combines liberalism and democracy or how liberal and democratic it chooses to be depends on its history, traditions, values, problems and needs. A polity is not a chance and fluctuating collection of individuals but has

¹⁹³Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 310.

¹⁹⁴Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy," in Held, 167-168.

a history and character, and needs to work out its political destiny in its own distinct way.¹⁹⁵

Emmerson concurs, noting that manner in which different cultures implement democracy may force a re-evaluation of how the term is perceived:

For if differing societies may democratically implement differing views of the relative importance of social order versus individual rights, it follows that alongside right-tilted or liberal democracies there could be nonliberal - or at any rate less liberal - variants of democracy that are, compared to their liberal counterparts, more order-inclined.¹⁹⁶

While different cultures will revise the concept of democracy to suit their needs, the acceptance of this ideology invariably alters the pace and direction in which the adopting societies evolve. Democracy ensures access to different ideas, views, and information. These spark a gradual, but inevitable, change in the beliefs, values, and institutions that imbue a particular culture. Carried to its logical end, this process will result in the assimilation of all cultures. Benjamin Barber, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, vividly describes such a scenario: "[The future is painted] in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize peoples everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food - MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's - pressing nations together into one homogenous global theme park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵Parekh, 168.

¹⁹⁶Emmerson, 96.

¹⁹⁷Barber, 4.

Barber's description may be extreme, but it evokes some interesting questions with regard to attempts to intertwine democracy with different cultures. First, can a mutually satisfactory compromise be reached between the defenders of cultural tradition and advocates of the principles and practices of democracy? Phrased in a more explicit (but certainly no more concise) manner, is there a democratic "half-way house," or once the process has been started, will it snowball until either full-fledged liberal rights are achieved or drastic authoritarian measures are imposed to reverse the course of events? The historical experience of the United States does not provide any clear-cut answers: although there has been an overriding advance toward greater liberalism in this country, it has been in fits and starts, and the process, on occasion, has been reversed. If the trend toward homogenization of both democracy and culture can be thwarted, then a second, equally compelling question must be answered: will culturally diverse democracies recognize each other as like entities (and therefore refrain from fighting each other)? As mentioned previously, U.S. citizens imprecisely equate liberalism with democracy. Will the United States recognize and respect other, less-liberal democracies? Although all of the aforementioned questions are vital to the tenets of democratic peace theory, they may not be answerable. They certainly imply, however, that democratic peace theory is not a simple either/or proposition.

Discussions concerning democracy and culture frequently revolve around how these two entities can be merged, rather than addressing whether or not they *should* be merged. That democracy is good for everyone is assumed; all that remains is to determine how it should be implemented. It is a common (and not uniquely American) tendency for the members of one culture to presume that the values that they hold near and dear are equally cherished by another culture. In the name of democracy, however, the United States has elevated this banal and egregiously ethnocentric practice to the level of formal government policy. Stromberg warns that

this is a mistake:

Democracy fits somewhere into the faith of the American people, and perhaps the faith of others. It is a word that has taken root in the structure of popular linguistic consciousness with sacred communal connotations. But it has this quality in few other societies. We believe in democracy as a kind of national faith, without rational grounds. We should refrain from temptations to force our particular values on others.¹⁹⁸

While it cannot be said that culture prohibits democracy, it is a mistake to assume that all cultures welcome democracy. The fact that Americans have chosen to embrace popular representation, extensive freedom, and individualism over all other values does not mean that other societies will make the same choices. Given the diversity that is present in the world, it is a safe bet that different people will choose to stress different values. These values may reflect a desire for order and stability, or a predilection towards family, community, or religion. As discussed earlier, these values can alter the appearance of democracy. But, if they are sufficiently accentuated, they can also prevent its acceptance outright.

Certainly one does not need to travel the globe to witness the divisive impact of divergent values. Differences of opinion, even with regard to the balance of rights and responsibilities that are integral to democracy, can be found in the United States. For instance, Americans profess to value freedom of expression, yet they cannot agree on whether it should extend to burning the national flag. We believe in protecting individual rights and due process, but are frustrated with the crime rate and a perceived coddling of criminals. Intrinsicly we accept that the rights and freedoms we are granted are our most valuable possessions but, for most of us, these concepts remain abstract as we struggle with our workload, finances, and other more mundane aspects of everyday life. Americans cannot even agree on the most sacrosanct rite of democracy: the right

¹⁹⁸Stromberg, 161.

to elect the leaders of this country. While most American citizens would not limit their own choices, they may quietly wish to eliminate possibilities for society as whole. Their motivation? To avoid the middling mind of the masses. As James Fenmore Cooper once noted, the "tendency of democracies is, in all things, to mediocrity."¹⁹⁹ Given the lack of consensus in the United States, it should not be surprising to Americans that the mélange of ideas and values we call democracy is not readily accepted by each and every culture to which it is presented.

The idea of cultural relativism, where the citizens of a particular state (and culture) choose not to embrace democracy, is not accepted by everyone. In fact, according to scholar and author Joshua Muravchik, it is a logical fallacy:

The reason it is wrong to impose [democracy] on others, presumably, is because it violates their will. But, absent democracy, how can their will be known? Moreover, why care about violating people's will unless one begins with the democratic premise that popular will ought to be sovereign?²⁰⁰

Muravchik's point - choosing against democracy in and of itself implies democratic criteria - is persuasive. However, he incorrectly equates the ability to influence a government's decisions with democracy. Even citizens of the most authoritarian state have some means to express popular will, whether it be through violence, protest, passive resistance, or communal non-participation. Additionally, Muravchik states that "adult human beings ought not to be governed without their consent"²⁰¹ and suggests that, if they are given the ability to exercise a voice in government, they certainly will not relinquish or restrict such a freedom.

¹⁹⁹James Fenmore Cooper, "On the Disadvantages of Democracy," *The American Democrat*; in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

²⁰⁰Muravchik, 34.

²⁰¹Ibid., 35.

Demonstrating that a particular culture categorically prohibits democracy is a difficult, if not impossible, proposition. Conversely, it is equally problematic to advance the idea that democratic values are universally welcome. Instead, if and when accommodation is reached between a particular culture and democracy, it is always a unique affiliation that often falls somewhere between the extremes of each partner. Cultures that do adopt democracy adapt the characteristics that they deem appropriate - a fitting end for a concept that, above all, espouses compromise.

B. ETHNIC NATIONALISM

[Will self-determination not] breed discontent, disorder and rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!²⁰²

While the collapse of the Soviet Union signified the end of the communist menace, the jubilation surrounding that event was short-lived. The specter of unbridled ethnic nationalism quickly assumed prominence in its stead. Ethnic nationalism is essentially a volatile mixture of culture and democracy, each in its most concentrated form: "communities of blood rooted in exclusion and hatred"²⁰³ that manipulate and distort the democratic principle of self-determination to the nth degree. The result, as described by Barber, is a future that offers "the grim prospect of a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence,

²⁰²Robert L. Lansing, in David Blinder, "Trouble Spots"; quoted in Barber, 10. Lansing was the Secretary of State for President Woodrow Wilson. Aghast at the provision in Wilson's Fourteen Points which called for self-determination, Lansing actively sought to undermine this policy. See Barber, 312.

²⁰³Barber, 6.

every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality....”²⁰⁴ According to J. Brian Atwood, an administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development, traditional institutions and beliefs, particularly the notion of statehood, are effortlessly swept away in the face of this onslaught:

[D]isintegrating societies and failed states...have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability. Increasingly, we are confronted by states without leadership, without order, without governance itself.²⁰⁵

The phenomenon on ethnic nationalism, which can be characterized as virulent, pervasive, and indifferent to appeals of compromise or reason, seems to poses a particular threat to the implementation of democracy. According to Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, co-editors of the *Journal for Democracy*, “More than other forms of government, democracy, as a system of institutionalized competition and conflict, requires a reliable means for managing conflict peacefully and constitutionally, keeping it within certain boundaries of decency, order, and restraint.”²⁰⁶ Inherently, this involves the acceptance of the institutionalization of “uncertainty” (as discussed earlier in Chapter II - page 15).

Democracies are founded on the bases of consent and cohesion. According to Diamond, they require that “citizens assert themselves, but also that they accept the government’s

²⁰⁴Barber, 4. Jihad is an Islamic term which can be interpreted as either a struggle on behalf of religious faith or a fanatical holy war. Barber borrows the latter definition and broadly applies it to “suggest dogmatic and violent particularism of a kind known to Christians no less than Muslims, to Germans and Hindis as well to Arabs.” See Barber, 9.

²⁰⁵J. Brian Atwood, “Suddenly Chaos,” *Washington Post*, 13 July 1994; quoted Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr., “The Insecure State: What Future for the State?,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (22 March 1995): 175. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

²⁰⁶Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), xix.

authority.”²⁰⁷ Acceptance of authority is derived from trust. Trust combines the belief that the actions of other actors will not be exceedingly or unfairly detrimental to your own interests with confidence that the system of governance will not exclude you from power or resources. Only when there is trust will there be the acceptance of the uncertainty inherent to democracy. Diamond and Plattner note, however, that ethnic nationalism is antithetical to trust: “Once deep ethnic divisions are mobilized into electoral and party politics...they tend to produce suspicion rather than trust, acrimony rather than civility, polarization rather than accommodation, and victimization rather than toleration.”²⁰⁸ Excluded minorities do not trust either the system or their fellow actors.

Compromise, another principle that is integral to democracy, is also a casualty of ethnic nationalism. Nationalists have a tendency to view compromise as only a one-way street: they demand it from others, but refuse to embrace it themselves. This can be attributed to the incendiary mixture of intense racial, ethnic, religious, and communal feelings that the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism incorporate. Therefore, according to Plattner, compromise is not an option:

Ethnicity is the most difficult type of cleavage for a democracy to manage. Because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues - basic notions of identity and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement - the conflicts it generates are less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues.²⁰⁹

Plattner suggests that if only ethnic nationalism is tied to economics then the problem would become eminently easier to solve. What Plattner expresses as wishful thinking, however, is a certainty for others. Many commentators view power and economic inequities as the true

²⁰⁷Diamond, “Three Paradoxes of Democracy,” 103.

²⁰⁸Diamond and Plattner, “Introduction,” xix.

²⁰⁹Marc F. Plattner, quoted in Robin Wright, “Democracies in Peril: Freedom’s Excesses Reduce Democracy’s Life Span,” *Los Angeles Times*, 17 February 1997, p. A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: LAT. 30 May 1997.

source of ethnic nationalist passions. John R. Bowen, Professor of Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis, concedes that some "conflicts involve ethnic or cultural identity, but most are about getting more power, land, or resources."²¹⁰ Culture, race, religion and ethnicity are just employed as a convenient emotional means to bring attention to inequities and lobby for change. Bowen adds that the perception of ethnic nationalism as a product of ancient historical animosities is false. In fact, ethnic nationalism is a fairly recent phenomenon:

[E]thnicity is a product of modern politics. Although people have had identities - deriving from religion, birthplace, language, and so on - for as long as humans have had culture, they have begun to see themselves as members of vast ethnic groups, opposed to other such groups, only during the modern period of colonization and state-building.²¹¹

A particularly divisive colonial custom involved the practice of "divide and rule." Colonizers segregated the population along ethnic lines and then embarked on a "partnership" with one of the newly-cognizant ethnic groups (usually a group in the minority) to administer colonial rule. Not surprisingly, this special relationship came at the expense of other ethnic groups (often the majority group). The legacy of this uneven treatment in post-colonial societies, according to Bowen, is the true motivation behind ethnic nationalism:

Only in living memory have the people who were sorted into these categories begun to act in concert, as political groups with common interests. Moreover, their shared interests have been those of political autonomy, access to education and jobs, and control of local resources. Far from reflecting ancient

²¹⁰John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (October 1996): 3.

²¹¹*Ibid.*, 4.

ethnic or tribal loyalties, their cohesion and action are products of the modern state's demand that people make themselves heard as powerful groups or else risk suffering disadvantages.²¹²

If the origins of ethnic nationalism can indeed be attributed to the institutionalized preference of one group over another, rather than to historical animosity, then it seems plausible that ethnic conflict can be resolved by simply addressing existing inequities in the distribution of power and resources.²¹³ Ironically, given the previous discussion concerning its shortcomings in the eyes of nationalists, democracy is probably the best mechanism with which to accomplish this endeavor. As noted earlier in this thesis, democracy is a flexible concept. It can be tailored to allow maximum autonomy and adequate representation for each group while retaining the stability, structure, and integrity of the state as a whole.

But the answer is not that simple. According to Robert A. Dahl, renowned political scientist, before you have democracy, you must have an agreement with regard to the nature of the state:

The criteria of the democratic process presupposes the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not [considered] proper or rightful - if its scope or domain is not justifiable - then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures.²¹⁴

²¹²Bowen., 7

²¹³This assumes that the inequities are not carried out in such a fashion and for such a long period of time that they become a self-fulfilling prophecy, developing into deep-seated historical animosities.

²¹⁴Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1989), 207, quoted in Linz, 26.

You need people to stand and support the idea of the state; to affirm their interest in citizenship:

The nation-state is the politics of the first person plural. Its government can speak for the people because it is part of the "we."... No government, unless it is prepared to rely entirely on brute force, can do its job properly in the modern world if the people it governs do not have a clear-cut sense of identity that they share with the government - unless, in other words, they are both part of the "we."²¹⁵

But unhappy, agitated ethnic groups will not begin to think in terms of "we" with regard to the state unless they have a voice in its structure and manifestation. This leaves us with a conundrum similar to that of the "chicken and the egg." Which comes first? The ideation of a state, the governance of which will then be subject to the principles of democracy? Or the principles integral to democracy - particularly the concept of compromise - which will then be employed to forge an agreement on the shape of the state? Although there may not be a satisfactory answer, it is clear that both concepts are prerequisites for the lasting resolution of ethnic conflict.

1. Case Study: Ethnic Conflict in Burma

The greatest lesson that the struggle for independence taught us was that nothing of national significance could be achieved without the wholehearted participation of all those whose fates are linked to the dignity of the nation.²¹⁶

The ethnic minorities in Burma appear to have circumvented the conundrum of the "chicken and the egg." In return for assurances of autonomy and equitable representation, they have agreed in principle to accept the notion of "we" and are now willingly to participate in a democratic federal Union of Burma. This is happening despite a long history of autonomy

²¹⁵"The Nation-State is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State," *The Economist*, 23 December 1995, p. 15. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.

²¹⁶Aung San Suu Kyi, message to the International Convention for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, New Delhi, India, 4 January 1996; in *BurmaNet News* (Internet), 6 January 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 3 June 1997.

interspersed with bouts of antagonism and conflict with the Burman majority. The catalyst that has allowed Burma's innumerable ethnic minority groups to forge an agreement with Burman citizens is the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the oppressive military junta that has ruled Burma since seizing power in 1988. Enmity toward SLORC, combined with a desire to participate equitably in the governance of the state, are the common denominators that cement this bond. However, once the junta has been deposed - an occurrence which all groups (except SLORC) consider inevitable - a large portion of the motivation to work together will also be gone. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the best intentions of Burmese ethnic minorities and Burman dissidents will be sufficient to implement democracy and distribute resources and power in a manner that is satisfactory to all.

Accommodating this diverse population is no mean feat as the numbers of ethnic groups that reside within the territorial boundaries of Burma are virtually uncountable. While the minority ethnic population can be divided into several major groups - to include the Shan, Karen, Arakan, Mon, Wa, Kachin, Chin, and Kayah - each of these groups can almost be infinitely subdivided into smaller fragments. According to Martin J. Smith, author of *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Burma possesses perhaps the most complex mix of ethnicity in the world:

Over 100 languages have been identified in Burma. The 1931 census, the last available to attempt to give any kind of detailed ethnic breakdown, distinguished 44 ethnic sub-groups amongst the Chin alone.²¹⁷

Managing the demands of these disparate groups becomes exponentially more difficult when one

²¹⁷Martin J. Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Books, 1991), 30.

factors in their most disturbing common characteristic - an affinity for armed conflict:

Dissidents from virtually every ethnic and political group have taken up arms against the central government at some stage since independence [was granted in 1948].... In short, insurgency has remained endemic and, in many areas of Burma, the armed struggle is virtually a way of life.²¹⁸

This ethnic bellicosity is a factor of demographics, colonial rule, and the armed resistance against the Japanese during World War II. Historically, the rugged upland hills of Burma have been occupied by ethnic minorities while the Burman majority primarily populated the lowland plains. Burman rulers occasionally sought to exercise sovereignty over portions of the upland hills, but these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to the difficult nature of the terrain and the pugnacity of the people. According to Edmund Leach, former Professor of Anthropology at Cambridge University, upland ethnic minority groups exercised considerable autonomy:

[T]he control which Valley Princes were able to exercise over Hill subjects was seldom more than marginal, and the Hill people were quite indiscriminate in their favors. If it suited his convenience a Hill chieftain would readily avow loyalty to several different Valley Princes simultaneously.²¹⁹

This legacy of autonomy remained undisturbed during British colonial rule. The British administratively partitioned their new colony into Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, and the Frontier or Excluded Areas. Colonial subjects that resided in Burma Proper - the Burman majority and some ethnic minorities - were allowed to exercise limited power in a legislative assembly. The Excluded Areas, in contrast, were theoretically administered directly by the governor. In reality, the ethnic groups in these areas were generally left to their own devices.

²¹⁸Smith, 28.

²¹⁹Edmund R. Leach, "The Frontiers of 'Burma,'" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3, no. 1 (October 1960): 59.

In addition to reinforcing the legacy of autonomy in the Excluded Areas, British colonial administrators, in a conscious effort to divide and rule, nurtured preexisting seeds of discontent among Burmese ethnic groups. The litany of grievances includes displeasure with the special relationship between the Karen and the British, the nonsensical distribution of seats in the assembly that favored some groups (particularly the Karen) and omitted others (the Mon, Southern Chin, and Muslims), and the large-scale immigration of Indian laborers and administrators.

Perhaps the most divisive event that fanned the flames of ethnic conflict was the advent of World War II. Burman nationalists, eager to win independence from Britain, initially fought with the Japanese. Other ethnic groups, however, remained loyal to the British and fought alongside the Allies. The inevitable confrontations between the Japanese-trained Burma Independence Army (BIA) and ethnic minority troops have ensured lasting animosity. For Saw Tha Din, a member of the Karen Goodwill Mission to London in 1946 and a future leader of the Karen insurrection, the memory of BIA atrocities will not soon be forgotten:

How could anyone expect the Karen people to trust the Burmans after what happened during the war - the murder and slaughter of so many Karen people and the robbing of so many Karen villages? After all this, how could anyone seriously expect us to trust any Burman government in Rangoon?²²⁰

A second, but no less important, consequence of ethnic minority participation in World War II was the realization of the effectiveness of armed insurgency:

[T]he wartime experience led many young nationalists of very different political beliefs and persuasions to realise the potential of armed struggle in the political upheavals to come. Many of the campaigns and battles that have rage across Burma since independence have eerie echoes of the campaigns of the war.²²¹

²²⁰Saw Tha Din, interview, 23 December, 1985; in Smith, 62.

²²¹Smith, 64.

Following the war, Britain decided it would be prudent to grant Burma independence rather than fight numerous nationalist movements to retain the colony. Most of the Burmese ethnic groups met in Panglong in 1947 to attempt to draft a constitution for the new state. Armed, trained, and flush from their victory over the Japanese, each group was reluctant to bargain away their new-found power. Indeed, many groups, including the Karen, Arakanese, Pao, and Wa did not participate in the conference at all. Other minority groups demanded special concessions. The resultant constitution was as lopsided and riddled with inconsistencies as the administration of British rule that preceded it.²²² Thus, according to Josef Silverstein, former Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University and acknowledged expert on Burma, that country's entrance onto the world stage as an independent nation in 1948 was less than graceful: "it had incompletely defined states, dissatisfaction over the inequality of states, a minority preparing to defend its people against the Burman majority and a communist party preparing for revolution."²²³ It is no surprise, therefore, that almost immediately following independence, the new state of Burma plunged into civil war. Although the military seized power in 1962, ostensibly to restore order and stability, and has essentially ruled the state since then, the insurrection continues to this day. If Burma is to ever successfully implement a democratic government it must find some way to accommodate or ameliorate the demands of its diverse population and overcome this legacy of armed ethnic strife.

Burma's military regime has battled to retain control of the state in the face of both armed ethnic insurrection and a peaceful democracy movement. The latter, currently led by Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the National League for Democracy (NLD), has the support of the majority Burman

²²²Smith, 79. The 1947 constitution did, however, set one significant precedence: it codified the concept of autonomy for ethnic states.

²²³Joseph Silverstein, "Civil Wars and Rebellion in Burma," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* xxi, no. 1 (March 1990): 116.

population. SLORC, however, does not differentiate between these two challenges, equating both democracy and continued ethnic uprisings with unmitigated self-determination that will ultimately lead to chaos.

The regime's attempts to force order and unity from the barrel of a gun have been largely unsuccessful. SLORC has, however, made headway in recent years by offering ethnic groups limited autonomy and promises of development in exchange for cease-fires and the acceptance of Rangoon's sovereignty. These economic and political inducements, in combination with exhaustion from decades of fighting, have convinced seventeen ethnic organizations to sign cease-fire agreements.²²⁴ Only four major groups do not have agreements, but the largest of those, the Karen National Union (KNU), is currently negotiating for an agreement. SLORC's desire for a cessation of hostilities is primarily motivated by economics - a comprehensive cease-fire will ease international criticism and increase stability, making Burma more attractive to foreign investment. Additionally, it will allow access to valuable natural resources in the regions under ethnic control.²²⁵

On paper it seems that SLORC's carrot-and-stick approach to Burma's ethnic problems has a good chance of working. After all, the minority ethnic groups get the autonomy they desire, while SLORC is able to reap economic benefits. But, when Than Shwe, the leader of the junta, jubilantly proclaims that in the "Union of Myanmar [Burma] today, the kind of national solidarity which was not experienced in the past has been restored,"²²⁶ he is uttering a delusional non sequitur.

²²⁴"Ethnic Groups with Cease-Fire Agreements,"Burma Project. Online. Open Society Institute, November 1996. Available HTTP: <http://www.soros.org/burma/ethngrps.html>. 30 May 1997. The Burma Project is "dedicated to increasing international awareness of conditions in Burma and helping the country make the transition from a closed to an open society." See <http://www.soros.org/burma/burmtext.html>.

²²⁵Mary P. Callahan, "Burma in 1995: Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi," *Asian Survey* xxxvi, no. 2 (February 1996): 162.

²²⁶Than Shwe, quoted in "Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Ethnic, Pro-Democracy Groups to Join Forces," *Agence France Presse*, 12 February 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: AFP. 27

This is because SLORC's pacification program is fatally flawed. It does not institutionalize the equitable access to power and resources that is necessary to ensure the long-term satisfaction and cooperation of ethnic minorities. SLORC treats the cease-fire pacts as surrenders rather than mutual agreements,²²⁷ and abides by their conditions only when it suits them. Subsequently, many of the minority groups "have grown increasingly disillusioned with SLORC's lack of sincerity,"²²⁸ and have thrown their support behind Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement.

Despite past grievances and the fractious nature of Burmese politics, it appears that, if given the chance, Burma's diverse population is willing to try democracy in the context of a federal union. Since 1984 members of the National Democratic Front (NDF), a loose alliance of ethnic organizations that was formed in 1976, have renounced the goal of independence in exchange for autonomy and equality in a federation of Burmese states. This goal has since been reaffirmed on many occasions, by many of the ethnic minority groups, most recently in January of 1997 at a seminar of ethnic nationalities held in KNU territory. At this gathering, which included representatives from more than sixteen ethnic organizations, the goal of a democratic union was once again pledged:

We are resolved to carry out democratic changes in accordance with the will of the people of Burma and to establish a genuine federal union based on the equality and self-determination of nationalities, in accordance with the will of the

May 1997.

²²⁷"Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Ethnic, Pro-Democracy Groups to Join Forces."

²²⁸Seri Klinchan Assawin Chumworatayee, "Burma's Minorities Sign Pledge to Fight Against Junta," *Thailand Times*, 26 February 1997. Online. The Burma Project, Open Society Institute. No date . Available HTTP: <http://www.soros.org/burma/signpldg.html>. 30 May 1997.

ethnic nationalities.... We ardently support the people's movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for democracy and the dismantling of the military dictatorship.²²⁹

Aung San Suu Kyi, representing the Burman majority group, also recognizes the need for reconciliation with ethnic minorities and equal representation for all:

National governments must find new ways of enabling their people to participate more in government and to allow them much greater influence on the decisions that affect their lives. Unless this is done, and done in time, the irresistible tide of people's rising aspirations will inevitably clash with inflexible systems, leading to anarchy and chaos.²³⁰

But the agreement between the ethnic nationalities and the NLD on the value of democratic institutions is not enough. SLORC remains implacable, and even if this obstacle is hurdled, peaceful coexistence and cooperation are not guaranteed. The cycle of ethnic violence can quickly begin again if there are perceptions of inequity in the access to and administration of central authority. As noted by Tin Maung Win, Vice-President of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), the balance of power between the proposed federal government and the diverse population of Burma must be carefully delineated:

The rights of our people, especially the ethnic minorities problem, should be spelled out clearly and the restrictions placed on the power of the government

²²⁹"Ethnic Nationalities Seminar at Mae Tha Raw Hta,"Burma Project. Online. Open Society Institute, November 1996. Available HTTP: <http://www.soros.org/burma/ethnnats.html>. 30 May 1997.

²³⁰Aung San Suu Kyi, "Democracy, the Common Heritage of Humanity," address written by Suu Kyi and delivered at her request by Corazon Aquino, UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development meeting, Manila, Philippines, 21 December 1994; extracts published in *UNESCO Courier*, issue 3 (March 1995): 7-8. The UNESCO Courier is a publication of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The objective of UNESCO is "to contribute to peace and security in the world by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science, culture and communication in order to further universal respect for justice, for rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world...by the Charter of the United Nations." See <http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/infoserv/index.html>.

must be enumerated. From experience, we know not to trust any government with sufficient power to enslave a nation.²³¹

2. Democracy: Part Poison, Part Cure

In summary, the problem of ethnic nationalism can be both caused and cured by democracy. On the one hand, the democratic principle of self-determination, in combination with a zealous defense of ethnic identity, can lead to dissension and the desire to fling aside "multicultural wholes in the name of monocultural fragments."²³² On the other hand, democracy offers the flexibility to incorporate and protect that same ethnic identity in a manner that institutionalizes equitable access to power and resources for all citizens. Before democracy can be implemented to accomplish this goal, however, there must be agreement with regard to all participants on the necessity of achieving a unified state. The citizens of Burma appear to have reached this consensus. The concept of statehood is now expressed in the first person plural. It remains to be seen, however, if the Burmese can successfully achieve this goal. SLORC remains a formidable opponent and, even if the junta relinquishes power, building an effective, efficient, responsive democracy is not a simple task. There will be many opportunities to fail, with each setback increasing the potential for nationalist sentiments to resurface.

²³¹Tin Maung Win, interview, in "Burma: Activist Said Confident Democracy to Prevail," *Sunday Post* (Bangkok), 12 June 1996, p. 18. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 3 June 1997. The Democratic Alliance of Burma is a national coalition of forces for democracy, to include minorities (represented by the NDF), students, and Buddhist monks. Its announced goals are "the overthrow of the military regime, establishment of a democratic government, an end to civil war and the restoration of peace, and the creation of a genuinely federal union." See Silverstein, "Civil Wars and Rebellion in Burma," 127.

²³²Barber, 158.

C. ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES

Poverty is a great enemy to human happiness; it certainly destroys liberty, and it makes some virtues impracticable and others extremely difficult.²³³

Democracy is among the virtues commonly thought to be impracticable and extremely difficult (if not impossible) to cultivate in the presence of poverty. According to Huntington, poverty "is a principal - probably the principal - obstacle to democratic development."²³⁴ Certainly an examination of the states that have successfully consolidated democracy would reveal that most are economically advanced.²³⁵ Robert Pinkney affirms this axiom: "It is certainly difficult to refute the fact that virtually all countries of Western Europe, North America, and the Old Commonwealth have achieved substantial economic development and arrived at the democratic destination, despite different starting points [and] different problems along the road...."²³⁶ The implication is that development must precede democracy, a mantra that is often used to justify dictatorial regimes. Pinkney is quick to point out, however, that correlation is not the same as causation. Indeed, many political and social scientists fervently believe that the practices and institutions of democracy are not only complementary to economic development, but assert that they will hasten the process. Clearly this is more than just an academic impasse. At the heart of the matter are attempts to justify (or criticize) U.S. foreign policy towards less-than-democratic regimes. While both sides - to be distinguished as "development first" versus "democracy now" - present convincing arguments, the

²³³Samuel Johnson, 20 July 1763, quoted in *James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791); in Rhod Thomas Tripp, ed., *The International Thesaurus of Quotations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 492.

²³⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 22.

²³⁵India is a clear exception.

²³⁶Pinkney, 20.

issue appears unresolvable. A clear-cut, definitive answer with regard to whether or not economic imperatives must precede democracy is not discernible.

The lore of democracy holds that the concept of citizen's rights arose in conjunction with the development of a middle class that sought to protect its economic interests from an absolute government. Without sufficient economic development there can be no middle class. And, without a middle class to demand rights, there will be no need for democracy. Corollaries to this theorem add that the upper class has no need for democracy because it is the ruling elite, while the lower classes cannot afford to be concerned with abstracts ideas such as democracy - they are preoccupied with determining how they will get their next meal. Musa Hitam of Malaysia, Chairman of the United Nations commission for Human Rights, refers to the latter phenomenon as "stomach-ism." He emphasizes that freedom from hunger is of paramount importance, and urges that this human right be fulfilled first.²³⁷

Economic development has been deemed the cure for all of the aforementioned ills.²³⁸ It creates a middle class that eventually, through democracy, restrains the excesses of the ruling elite. It also further enriches the rich so that they are unconcerned about relinquishing some authority. Finally, it provides the economic opportunity that lifts the poor from their morass. That this medication often comes in the form of a bitter dictatorial pill is unfortunate but necessary. Arthur A. Goldsmith, Professor of Management at the University of Massachusetts, summarizes the logic

²³⁷Musa Hitam, interview, in "The Rights Debate; It Would gain From Less Big-Power Politics and More Attention to Economics," *Asiaweek*, 1 December 1995, p. 55. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASIAWK. 27 May 1997.

²³⁸S. M. Lipsett conducted a landmark study which attributed the phenomenon of democracy to economic imperatives. See "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. Pinkney offers a synopsis of Lipsett's findings: "With increased wealth...the question of who ruled became less important, because governments had less power to affect the 'crucial life chances' of the most powerful groups, who now enjoyed sources of wealth independently of the state, while poorer groups could secure some redistribution of wealth relatively painlessly without the rich having to make any great sacrifice." See Pinkney, 20.

of the "development first" school:

[D]emocratic politics [reflects the pull of interest groups and] leads to demand for welfare spending, which in turn blocks social saving and the accumulation of capital, consequently impeding economic growth.... The two goals are incompatible - poor countries must choose democratic freedom or material growth, not both. Since poor countries cannot simultaneously pursue democracy and a larger national income, authoritarianism serves them better in the early stages of development. Tough regimes do a superior job of bringing order to society, and lay a firmer underpinning than democracies can for material development. Premature efforts to democratise boomerang, for they invite political instability that drives away investment.²³⁹

Fukuyama adds that authoritarian regimes are better suited to make the tough choices required to implement the market reform that will spark economic development:

Authoritarian regimes...are in principle better able to follow truly liberal economic policies. They do not have to be accountable to workers in declining industries, or subsidize inefficient sectors simply because the latter have political clout. They can actually use the power of the state to hold down consumption in the interests of long-term growth.²⁴⁰

In contrast, citizens of democracies are fair-weather fans who "may affirm free-market principles in the abstract, [but] are all too ready to abandon them when their own short-term, economic interest is at stake."²⁴¹

Critics of "development first" note that if "the argument that economic development leads to enhanced political freedoms held, Singapore would be the freest state in Asia."²⁴² Additionally,

²³⁹Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Democracy, Property Rights, and Economic Growth," *Journal of Development Studies* 32, no. 2 (December, 1995). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 2 June 1997.

²⁴⁰Fukayama, *The End of History*, 124.

²⁴¹Ibid., 123.

²⁴²Sidney Jones, "The Role of Commercial Diplomacy; Human Rights in Asia," *Current*, no. 390 (February 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

they point out that it is incorrect to presume that the poor do not have either aspirations for a better life or a desire to be heard simply because they are poor. Indeed, according to Georges Bernanos, a French novelist and political writer, a “poor man with nothing in his belly needs hope, illusion, more than bread.”²⁴³ Finally, “democracy now” advocates assert that authoritarian regimes are no better at achieving economic development than nascent democracies. Przeworski, in a study of 135 countries from 1950 to 1990, determined that “transitions to democracy are random with regard to the level of [economic] development....”²⁴⁴ He concludes that “dictatorships offer no advantage in attaining the dual goal of development and democracy.”²⁴⁵

As opposed to the order and stability that authoritarian regimes offer, “Democracy now” proponents argue that the freedom of expression and the open exchange of ideas, characteristics of democracy, are vital to economic development. There is no guarantee that an authoritarian regime will make the correct choices to spur economic development, and in fact, many squander or pocket windfalls rather than reinvest in the economy. In contrast, democracies, in conjunction with the mechanisms of the marketplace, “nurture a climate of open debate that is helpful for the efficient allocation of resources....”²⁴⁶ Finally, democratic regimes offer long-term stability because they represent the legitimate interests of the population as a whole, rather than those of a precarious elite.

²⁴³George Bernanos, *Diary of a Country Priest* (1936); in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

²⁴⁴Adam Przeworski, Aichale Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure?,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 40.

²⁴⁵Ibid.

²⁴⁶Goldsmith, “Democracy, Property Rights, and Economic Growth.”

So which position is correct? Each side of the economic imperatives debate offers an intrinsically reasonable argument. Each side can also point authoritatively to studies that support its assertions. Ultimately, after wading through numerous case studies, endless dependent, independent, and control variables, and numbingly persuasive analyses, there just does not appear to be a clear-cut answer to this dilemma. In any case, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that economic imperatives impede the development of democracy.

1. Case Study: Cambodia's Democratic Moment

There can be no lasting peace without sustainable development, without endogenous development, through the uprooting of frustration, poverty and exclusion.²⁴⁷

Battered by decades of war and insurrection, the Kingdom of Cambodia is, by any standard, one of the poorest countries in the world. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is only \$290.²⁴⁸ and the United Nations Human Development Report ranks Cambodia 156th out of 174 countries with regard to its human development index.²⁴⁹ According to conventional wisdom Cambodia would not be the ideal country in which to try to implement democracy. Yet in 1993, with the help of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 90 percent of Cambodians cast a ballot not only for the candidate of their choice, but democracy in general. Now certainly a single election cannot be equated with democracy, but, despite the crushing weight of poverty,

²⁴⁷Federico Mayor, "Commentary," *UNESCO Courier*, issue 4 (April 1996): 38. Mayor is the Director General of UNESCO.

²⁴⁸"General Information on the Kingdom of Cambodia." Online. Royal Embassy of Cambodia to the United States of America, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.embassy.org/cambodia/info.htm>. 30 May 1997.

²⁴⁹"Human Development Index," *Human Development Report 1996*. Online. United Nations Development Programme, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.undp.org/undg/news/hdr96ind.htm>. 30 May 1997. The human development index measures a country's achievements in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real income.

Cambodians have demonstrated persistent interest in participating in the governance of the state. And, while the slow pace of economic development will remain a chronic challenge, it is the corrupt, imperious, and belligerent nature of Cambodia's elected leaders that is the biggest obstacle to the successful implementation and consolidation of democracy. This point was clearly demonstrated in June when Hun Sen, one of Cambodia's deputy premiers, orchestrated a coup against his counterpart, Prince Norodom Ranariddh.²⁵⁰

Poverty in Cambodia can be quantified in any number of ways: half of the population has no health care; the life expectancy of the average Cambodian is less than 50 years; one out of every eight children dies before his first birthday; and less than 20 percent of the population has access to potable water.²⁵¹ Ultimately, according to Fredrick Z. Brown, Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University, "90 percent of the Cambodian people...live in abject poverty."²⁵² Cambodia has used the influx of international aid in an attempt to ameliorate some of

²⁵⁰Prince Norodom Ranariddh heads the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC, a royalist party loyal to his father, King Norodom Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC won most of the seats in the parliamentary election of 1993. The Cambodian People's Party, headed by Hun Sen, came in second in the same election but was able to force a power-sharing arrangement that was favorable to his party by threatening to resume Cambodia's civil war. As demonstrated recently, this was a credible threat because the CPP "controls up to 80 percent of the Army and maintains an iron grip on most key administrative structures." See Yvan Cohen, "Who Really Rules Cambodia? Rivals Square Off," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 March 1997. Online. No date. Available HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com>. 26 May 1997. King Sihanouk initially resolved the crisis by declaring himself "as head of state, prime minister, and supreme commander of the armed forces with Ranariddh and Hun Sen as deputy premiers." See Shawcross, 25. Sihanouk, however, is largely a figurehead who spends more time in China undergoing medical treatment than in Cambodia. Therefore, Ranariddh and Hun Sen were left to squabble over both policy and power. Hun Sen has used his leverage with the military to gain an upper hand and depose Ranariddh.

²⁵¹William Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, Contemporary Issues Paper no. 1 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994): 79. The Carnegie Endowment "conducts programs of research, discussion, publication and education in international affairs and American foreign policy in an effort to promote international peace and understanding."

²⁵²Fredrick Z. Brown, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 44.

these deficiencies. It has also begun to rebuild an infrastructure badly damaged by conflict in the hope of attracting foreign investment.

There have been some positive signs: GDP is expected to sustain a seven percent rate of growth, inflation has decreased dramatically, and Cambodia's currency (riel) has stabilized.²⁵³ Lorne W. Craner, President of the International Republican Institute (IRI), notes that throughout Cambodia "the effects of the growing economy on everyday life are evident, from the replacement of bicycles with cyclos [motorbikes] on Phnom Penh streets to the substitution of clay tiles for straw on the roofs of rural hamlets."²⁵⁴

Overall, however, while the government of Cambodia struggles to effect change, poverty retains its tight grip on the population. Maureen S. Steinbruner, President of the Center for National Policy, notes that the symptoms of extreme poverty, to include "lack of infrastructure, low educational levels and a limited base of physical capital" are a double-edged sword, not only negatively affecting the lives of average Cambodians, but "also severely limit[ing] the ability of the government to function in an effective and constructive way."²⁵⁵ According to Shawcross, the government has little to spend on either social welfare or capital reinvestment because of administrative difficulties collecting revenue from entire sectors of the economy, as well as levying

²⁵³Lorne W. Craner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 52. Craner is the President of the International Republican Institute, an organization which lists its primary goal as "advancing democracy worldwide."

²⁵⁴Craner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 14.

²⁵⁵Maureen S. Steinbruner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 61. The Center for National Policy is a non-profit public policy research center located in Washington D.C.

taxes on income and consumption.²⁵⁶ This economic morass is exacerbated by the rivalry between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. Renewed conflict between these two parties has not only impeded the government's efforts to rebuild Cambodia's infrastructure, but has also led to the cancellation of foreign aid designed to bolster the development of democracy and chased away any hopes of commercial investment.

Despite the economic quagmire in which the Cambodian people find themselves, they have demonstrated remarkable resolve, patience, and perseverance with regard to the institutions and practices of democracy. As a matter of fact, despite Hun Sen's coup, the citizens of Cambodia could be considered a shining example of the efficacy of "democracy now." As noted earlier, 90 percent of Cambodians "braved minefields and Khmer Rouge violence to vote,"²⁵⁷ thereby stamping their mark of approval on a democratic system of parliamentary government. Craner has also documented subsequent grass-roots interest in democracy:

In villages and towns throughout the country, IRI has found a deep desire on the part of Cambodians to learn about democracy, to participate in politics, and to have a voice in their government.... [A] recent IRI informal poll shows how closely held the rudiments of democracy are in rural areas. Of 1,245 provincial part activists from all four parliamentary parties, 96 percent favored holding local-level elections in 1996.²⁵⁸

Additionally, there are healthy signs of the development of an organized opposition party to challenge the rule of the current incumbent, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Sam Rainsy, former Finance Minister for the coalition government, has formed a new

²⁵⁶Shawcross, 76.

²⁵⁷Winston Lord, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 5.

²⁵⁸Craner, prepared statement, 56.

political party - Khmer Nation - which has received enthusiastic support from Cambodian citizens. Unfortunately, the genesis of this party can be attributed to the undemocratic principles of Cambodia's elected leaders. Rainsy has been a continually outspoken critic of both the government's corruption and its surprisingly unenthusiastic support of the liberal rights guaranteed in the Cambodian constitution. Rainsy's comments led FUNCINPEC to strip him of his party membership and request that he be removed from his National Assembly seat.

Indeed, neither Hun Sen nor Ranariddh seemed particularly enamored of the concept of democracy. Prior to his coup, Hun Sen threatened to cancel next year's parliamentary elections, saying that Cambodians "can go back to farming rice."²⁵⁹ Meanwhile, Ranariddh equivocated on the meaning and importance of democracy:

[D]emocracy is just a phrase to be talked about in idle gossip. What is one person's democratic and human rights can be another man's poison. Discipline is more essential in our society than democracy, though they have a need of both. When the rural poor have sufficient food, shelter, education, and basic amenities, then democracy can be preached and installed in abundance.²⁶⁰

Thus, as Craner laments, it appears that rural farmers and families are "far more interested in human rights and democratic governance than the government of Cambodia."²⁶¹

Indifference to democracy, in part, can be attributed to the affinity the ruling elite holds for the profits that they derive from corruption. Rainsy, because of his tenure as Finance Minister, claims to know the amount of government funds that are diverted into private pockets: "Its hundreds of millions of dollars, those individuals keep half for themselves and give half to their

²⁵⁹Hun Sen, quoted in "Attack in Phnom Penh Raises Spectre of Anarchy," *The Nation*, 31 March 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NATION. 30 May 1997.

²⁶⁰Prince Norodom Ranariddh, quoted in Craner, prepared statement, 53.

²⁶¹Craner, prepared statement, 56.

parties.” Disdain for democracy is also a likely product of the unique power-sharing arrangement between FUNCINPEC and the CPP. Both Hun Sen and Ranariddh spent considerable energy trying to counter the moves and initiatives of the other. In the process the rights and aspirations of the Cambodian people have been trampled upon. Ominously foreshadowing events to come, a senior FUNCINPEC official conceded that the CPP had derailed the best intentions of his party:

We have been swallowed and digested by the CPP. We were elected by the people to bring peace and development. Instead we have been pushed into adopting all the CPP’s policies, including attacking the Khmer Rouge.... The CPP have stopped us [from] keeping any of our promises. Sometimes I think that all aid should be stopped. There is no point in giving analgesics when surgery is required.²⁶²

Even prior to the coup, aid donors questioned the wisdom of continuing to fund a clearly corrupt regime that struggled to comply with the democratic principles upon which it was founded. However, threats from France and the United States to withhold aid drew only petulant excuses:

[I]t should be understood that Cambodia has just emerged from more than two decades of war, and the restoration of democracy in Cambodia is only at its nascent stage because it is barely three years old. Having said this, how can one force a three-year-old child to think and behave like an adult? This cannot be done no matter how good the teacher is. What one must do it [sic] is to continue nurturing and fostering the child so that he will grow up and become able to shoulder the burden in a manner expected of a grown-up.²⁶³

It is not only aid donors that have grown impatient and frustrated with Cambodia’s leadership. For many Cambodians, democracy offers a ray of hope, a departure from politics that

²⁶²Quoted in Shawcross, 94. The official was not named.

²⁶³“Commentary,” Phnom Penh National Radio of Cambodia Network, 5 June 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997.

are "synonymous with exploitation alternating with neglect."²⁶⁴ The democratically-elected leaders of Cambodia squandered that state's most recent and, perhaps, best chance to institutionalize democracy. Still, as noted by Julio A. Jeldres, a former member of Sihanouk's staff and his current biographer, the window of opportunity may not remain closed forever:

A crisis of legitimacy may be brewing, as more and more Cambodians come to believe that most political leaders place their own interests above those of their country. Even in the rosiest scenario, democracy will take a long time to put down firm roots in Cambodia. If it is to have a real chance, however, the country's political elites must begin respecting norms of accountability and transparency, and must get serious about fulfilling the mandate for democratization they received from the voters in may 1993.²⁶⁵

2. Economic Development: Democracy's X-Factor

Common knowledge holds that economic development and the establishment of a middle class must precede the successful implementation of democracy. Numerous studies have certified the veracity of this assertion. Yet, there is also a plethora of analyses that have chronicled a definitively contrary conclusion; namely, that the concurrent development of the economy and democracy is not only possible, but is advantageous and desirable. The lack of conclusive evidence prohibits concrete generalizations with regard to the possible impact of economic imperatives on the development of democracy. Instead, the consequences of economics must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Although democracy has been derailed in Cambodia, it can be attributed more to the imperious and belligerent attitudes of elected leaders rather than the slow pace of economic development.

²⁶⁴David Chandler, *A History of Modern Cambodia* (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1996), 242.

²⁶⁵Julio A. Jeldres, "Cambodia's Fading Hopes," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 155-156.

D. DEMOCRACY IS UNIVERSALLY POSSIBLE

No country's culture, history, or economic circumstances bar it from democracy.²⁶⁶

U.S. national security strategy, incorporating democratic peace theory, states that democracies are "more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and to encourage free and open trade and economic development - and less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their people."²⁶⁷ From this assertion it seems logical to deduce that promoting democracy worldwide will ultimately ensure U.S. security. And indeed, the White House's 1997 *National Security Strategy For a New Century* lists the promotion of democracy abroad as one its three core objectives.²⁶⁸ There is, however, an important premise in this train of logic that has been overlooked or assumed; namely, that democracy can be successfully exported. U.S. policymakers have made a leap of faith by assuming that the intrinsic merits of democracy are both universally appreciated and welcome. However, while democracy is universally possible it cannot be said to be universally probable.

As demonstrated in the preceding sections, neither culture, ethnic nationalism, nor economic imperatives prohibit the implementation of democracy. Culture consists of diverse and complex traditions that can accommodate and even complement democratic principles, institutions, and practices. Additionally, democracy may be the only means with which to extinguish the raging fires of ethnic nationalist passion. Finally, while impact of economic underdevelopment remains

²⁶⁶Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Without Illusions," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 93. Carothers is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

²⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 2.

²⁶⁸Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, i.

somewhat nebulous, it certainly cannot be said - with absolute conviction - to prevent the implementation of democracy.

This acknowledgment may be interpreted by some as an unequivocal endorsement for the universal promotion of democracy. It is not. Each of the aforementioned factors do not preclude democracy, but they certainly can impede or limit the scope of its implementation. Indeed, while some aspects of cultural tradition are able to accommodate democracy, it may be antithetical to other portions of the same culture. Likewise, if democracy is to be effective in quelling ethnic nationalism, the values of compromise and consensus must receive greater emphasis from disenchanted minority groups than the desire for unfettered self-determination.

The key is the value that is ascribed to democracy. While democracy may be universally possible, the manner in which it is assessed and prized is not necessarily uniform. Therefore, attempting to implement democracy where it is not acknowledged as a preeminent goal is akin to cultivating crops in the desert: it can be done, but the time, resources, and effort expended quite often exceed the value of the finished product. The export of democracy should not be an ideological crusade that is clouded by rhetoric and illusions. Instead, it must resemble an accountant's ledger sheet - that is, a pragmatic assessment that balance all potential costs against any possible benefits. Such an assessment, within the confines of U.S. national security strategy, will be conducted in Chapter V. The bottom line with regard to the promotion of democracy is that it must be tangibly demonstrated to be in the best interest of the United States.

IV. PERILS OF PEACE

It is essential...for a Prince who desires to maintain his position to have learned how to be other than good, and to use or not to use his goodness as necessity requires.²⁶⁹

Current U.S. security strategy adheres to the tenets of democratic peace theory in an attempt to achieve lasting peace and, ultimately, guarantee America's security for the future. This endeavor, which involves enlarging the rolls of democracies, essentially rests on two assumptions. The first, discussed at length in Chapter III, holds that democracy is both universally exportable and desirable. The second assumption, to be examined in this chapter, is that the advent of peace is sufficient to ensure a nation's security.²⁷⁰

At first glance it seems that the latter assumption is rather obvious, even self-evident: while war represents the preeminent threat to a state's security, the establishment of peace denotes that this threat has been alleviated. Therefore, the presence of peace, ipso facto, should guarantee a nation's security. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes readily apparent that this chain of logic is flawed.

The problem lies with both the determination of what represents a threat to national security and the definition of "peace." Webster's dictionary defines peace as "a state of security or order within a community," and, alternatively, "a state or period of mutual concord between

²⁶⁹Niccolo Machiavelli, "Recommendations for the Prince," in Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, eds., *Classic Readings of International Relations* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), 25; excerpted from Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, N. H. Johnson, trans., (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), 57-59.

²⁷⁰As stated previously, for the sake of argument, the assertions of democratic peace theory will be accepted at face value. Therefore, the intermediate step that ties these two assumptions together - namely, that enlarging the number of democracies worldwide will lead to peace (or at least inhibit war) - is also assumed.

governments.”²⁷¹ In contrast, democratic peace advocates narrowly define peace as simply the absence of war. This limited definition forces a myopic focus upon the ultimate form of conflict while shunting other, lesser clashes between states to the side, dismissing them as inconsequential to either peace or national security. But, as Hobbes wrote in *Leviathan*, the absence of war cannot necessarily be equated with peace:

For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.²⁷²

Hobbes adds that, because states cannot rely on a central authority to enforce law and order, they must seek to help themselves. Subsequently, all states pursue what they perceive to be their national interests in an attempt to survive and bolster their position in an anarchical international realm. According to George Washington, this maxim holds true regardless of whether the state is democratic or authoritarian:

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering

²⁷¹Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.

²⁷²Thomas Hobbes, "Relations Among Sovereigns," in Williams, 29; excerpted from Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909), 94-98.

conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or advantage, to the common good.²⁷³

Additionally, contrary to the assertions of democratic peace theorists, the activities that states engage in during "peace" are not always benign. Indeed, while Karl von Clausewitz concluded that war is a continuation of politics by other means,²⁷⁴ the intrigue, competition, and conflict that occurs between states that are pursuing national interests can be viewed as a continuation of war. Certainly many of these ventures are capable of jeopardizing the security and sovereignty of a targeted state.

The object of this chapter is to demonstrate that a democratic peace cannot and will not guarantee a state's security. While democracies may not go to war with one another, they do not necessarily bask in the cooperation of a pacific union. Instead, they exhibit a remarkable proclivity to engage in lesser, but still hostile, acts against their brethren. Of particular significance are the activities of intelligence services, specifically covert action, economic espionage, and military espionage. While falling far short of war, these malevolent deeds can violate a state's sovereignty and jeopardize its security. Therefore, the promise of a democratic peace is hollow: the "peace" that is proffered is not without perils, and often it can be downright menacing.

²⁷³George Washington, *The Writings of George Washington*, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1931-44), Vol. X, 363; quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Political Realism," in Williams, 36; excerpted from Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4-6, 8-12.

²⁷⁴Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832), in *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

A. COVERT ACTION

From time immemorial, nations have sought to affect one another's internal affairs, if not by the egregious display of cannon, then by royal marriages and the casuistry of envoys. Sometimes they resort to open threats and blandishments, or foreign aid with strings, both visible and otherwise.... Especially when the stakes are high, statesmen seek secretly to alter subtly the balance of political forces within a rival state or even suborn political violence.²⁷⁵

Covert action, as defined by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, is "an activity or activities of the U.S. government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the [U.S.] role...will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."²⁷⁶ Of all the activities in which intelligence and security services engage, covert action is the one that is most easily identified as being blatantly incompatible with the principles of a democratic peace. The "basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention...."²⁷⁷ As covert action clearly violates this dictum, it is undoubtedly an activity in which democracies should not engage, at least not against other democracies.

This type of interference in the sovereign affairs of other states, as noted earlier in this paper, falls short of the threshold established in the definition of "war." It should not be implied, however, that these ventures are without casualties or consequences for the targeted nation. For example, coups and military insurgencies that are initiated through covert action can lead to violence and upheaval that exceeds the death toll required by war while seriously compromising the stability and security of the state. Thus, covert action, in addition to being easily identified as

²⁷⁵Frank R. Barnett, "Preface," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action* (Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1985), vii.

²⁷⁶Roy Godson, "Covert Action in the 1990s: Neither Exceptional Tool nor Magic Bullet," *Covert Action in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), 3-4.

²⁷⁷Doyle, "Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 10.

incompatible with a democratic peace, also clearly represents a challenge to the security and sovereignty of targeted states.

For many Americans, simply mentioning the phrase “covert action” evokes a profoundly adverse reaction: it is seen primarily “as a secret policy tool of presidents (or worse, ‘rogue’ agencies)”²⁷⁸ that “in the absence of clear and present danger, is a controversial proposition at best..., and is generally incompatible with a democratic foreign policy.”²⁷⁹ This is despite the fact that covert action can involve a broad spectrum of activities from the exotic and dramatic, to include organizing and equipping an opposition group to overthrow the government of a targeted state, to the relatively mundane, such as discretely providing funding to a sympathetic political candidate. Pat M. Holt, former staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, notes that “Almost all covert action is dirty tricks, [but] some [are] dirtier than others.”²⁸⁰ Frank R. Barnett, an observer of the role of intelligence in a free society, concurs, adding that:

clandestine acts need not be *beastly*. Indeed, many forms of “covert operations” are non-violent and as routine - and as benign - as providing advice and funds to politicians, labor leaders, and editors....²⁸¹

Discomfort with the concept of covert action appears to be a uniquely American trait. Indeed, Godson notes that the term “covert action” is difficult to translate into other languages because the activities it encompasses are not considered particularly extraordinary or sufficiently

²⁷⁸Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 8.

²⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 120.

²⁸⁰Pat M. Holt, *Secret Intelligence and Public Policy* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), 163.

²⁸¹Barnett, viii.

distinguishable from the other forms of influence that may be pursued:

Other states do not use the term, even if many at some point seek to exert influence in a covert way. In any case, most states do not make a sharp distinction between overt and covert behavior. While they may create special components within the bureaucracy to deal with some aspects of covert tradecraft, they regard the exertion of influence, with varying degrees of secrecy, as a normal function of statecraft.²⁸²

Covert action - to borrow from Clausewitz - is considered by most states to be essentially the continuation of politics by other means (short of war). Angelo Codevilla, formerly a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, agrees, stating that the "secret means of exerting influence are part and parcel of foreign affairs, intrinsically no more and no less appropriate than other means."²⁸³

Despite the squeamishness of the American public and occasional Congressional displeasure, covert action is a tool that has been regularly employed by U.S. policymakers in an attempt to exert influence abroad. And, not only has this instrument of American foreign policy been routinely utilized, it has been routinely utilized against other democracies:

- From November 1947 to March 1948, in an attempt to affect the outcome of elections, Truman authorized "financial assistance to Italy's Christian Democrats, the anti-Communist Social Democrats, the more conservative Liberal and Radical parties, and individual left-wing Socialists, plus some useful propaganda and counterpropaganda initiatives."²⁸⁴

²⁸²Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 2-3.

²⁸³Angelo Codevilla, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*, 79.

²⁸⁴Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*, 31.

- In 1954, with Eisenhower's approval, the CIA financed, equipped and trained a group of exiles to overthrow the democratically elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz.²⁸⁵
- In 1964, in Chile, the CIA financed the mobilization of many interest groups in support of the moderate Christian Democratic party. "The CIA spent \$3 million, or about \$1 per Chilean voter in the 1964 elections. In the U.S. election the same year, the major party candidates together spent about 50 cents per voter."²⁸⁶
- In 1970, again in Chile, at Nixon's behest, the CIA began a program, the thrust of which "was to inspire a coup by the Chilean military to prevent Allende from taking office."²⁸⁷ Although it was not immediately successful, subsequent efforts did lead to the overthrow of President Allende in 1973.
- Beginning in 1981, the Reagan administration authorized aid to the Contras in an effort to topple the popularly supported Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Although Nicaragua, at that time, could not be considered a democracy, presidential and legislative elections were held in 1984 in which a "number of respected human rights groups certified that the actual voting was reasonably fair and free."²⁸⁸
- More recently, the U.S. government has sought to influence the outcome of elections in former communist bloc states by funding candidates that are sympathetic to U.S. views rather than supporting the electoral process itself. Parties that were formerly socialist (much less communist) are unable to win the trust and support of the West. This despite the fact that many have garnered a popular mandate and adopted moderate economic programs.²⁸⁹ These parties have also enthusiastically demonstrated a willingness to abide by the principles of free and fair elections. Meanwhile, U.S. governmental agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), both funded through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), industriously skew and subvert the democratic process that they profess to support in an effort to ensure that a candidate of their choosing is elected.

²⁸⁵CIA activity in this case will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.

²⁸⁶Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 180; quoted in Holt, 145.

²⁸⁷Holt, 217.

²⁸⁸David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992), 390.

²⁸⁹William Blum, "Teaching Communists What Democracy is All About," *CovertAction*, no. 51 (Winter 1994-95): 30.

These brief case histories clearly show that a succession of presidential administrations not only developed an affinity for covert action, but demonstrated little compunction about utilizing it against:

political regimes that were not only elected but which could be accurately termed partially or basically democratic. In political or somewhat hyperbolic terms, there was a war between the USA and these elected governments.²⁹⁰

That each of the aforementioned presidential administrations sought to rationalize its actions as warranted in the face of a ubiquitous (or lingering) communist threat is not particularly relevant. What is important is that the U.S., a purportedly shining model of democratic ideals, has, on many occasions, subverted both popular expression and the development of democracy in other states. In each case, a higher value was placed "on the results expected [read "national interest"] than on the democratic process in a target country."²⁹¹ As will be demonstrated in the case study on Guatemala, it is as if U.S. policymakers have paradoxically felt that destroying existing democratic processes was necessary in order that they ultimately be saved.

1. The CIA in Guatemala

Guatemala has a very small minority of Communists, but not as many as San Francisco.²⁹²

On June 18, 1954, the vanguard of a revolutionary force of exiles entered Guatemala from Honduras, ostensibly to overthrow the communist regime of President Jacobo Guzman Arbenz.

²⁹⁰Forsythe, 392.

²⁹¹Codevilla, 85.

²⁹²William Prescott Allen, correspondence (telegram) to Eisenhower, 24 June 1952; quoted in Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 183. Allen, publisher of the *Laredo Times* and a personal friend of Eisenhower, had just visited Guatemala.

Led by Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas, “a fugitive Guatemalan colonel”²⁹³ who was a former military academy classmate of Arbenz, this force advanced no further than six miles into Guatemala. While such limited success can be attributed, in part, to a lack of competency, bravery, and daring, it must also be attributed to the fact that Armas was not really leading the vanguard of a revolutionary army. Instead, he commanded what was described by Richard Bissell, then a special assistant to Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, as a “rag-taggle”²⁹⁴ group of no more than 150 men. Funded, organized, and trained by the CIA, this group was supported by an “air force” that consisted of a handful of Cessnas and two P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers. Thus, the “army” was not really an army. In fact, it had no hope of successfully engaging the numerically superior Guatemalan army. Additionally, the target of its revolutionary ire was not a communist. And, for that matter, its ire was not particularly revolutionary.

Less than a decade earlier, Guatemala underwent a true revolution when dictator Jorge Ubico Castenada was deposed. The Guatemalan people, now free to express their wishes and concerns via the ballot box, overwhelmingly elected Juan Jose Arevalo president on December 14, 1944. Arbenz, Arevalo’s successor, also achieved the presidency through a free and fair election in November 1950. This was a significant event. As noted by historian Richard H. Immerman, “For the first time in the 130-year history of the Guatemalan republic, executive power had passed peacefully and on schedule from one man to another.”²⁹⁵

²⁹³Immerman, 3.

²⁹⁴Richard Bissell, quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, *Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981): 229.

²⁹⁵Immerman, 61. Arbenz’s election was also significant because it was the second successive free election, an occurrence that is considered by many political scientists to be the benchmark measurement for the successful consolidation of democracy.

Arbenz, like his predecessor, was a liberal reformer who “vowed to modernize Guatemala, to create the conditions necessary for the country’s self-sufficiency, and to increase the standard of living for the majority of the population.”²⁹⁶ His initiatives included labor reform, improved health care, and a literacy program. Land reform, however, was the primary focus of the Arbenz administration. The need for this change was readily apparent: “in a nation overwhelmingly rural, 2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of the arable land [and] the annual per capita income of agricultural workers was \$87.”²⁹⁷ Arbenz seized uncultivated land and redistributed it to peasant farmers in an effort “to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a feudal economy into a modern, capitalist one.”²⁹⁸

Not surprisingly, both foreign investors and the few privileged Guatemalans who had benefitted from the status quo were alarmed by these actions. The United Fruit Company (UFC), a U.S. company and the single largest land-owner in Guatemala, was particularly incensed by Arbenz’s expropriation of hundreds of thousands of acres of its land.²⁹⁹ They began an unabashed public relations campaign that sought to trigger U.S. government intervention. UFC vehemently depicted Arbenz’s actions as communist-inspired. Spruille Braden, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and subsequent public relations director for United Fruit, insisted that “party members, fellow travellers, demagogues, gunmen and killers, have joined with opportunists, extreme nationalists, some of the military, and a few misguided idealists, to make a

²⁹⁶Immerman, 183.

²⁹⁷William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 79.

²⁹⁸Jacobo Arbenz, *Discursos* (Guatemala City, 1951), 14; quoted in Immerman, 63.

²⁹⁹While UFC complained that the land was worth 16 million, Arbenz offered to compensate the company with approximately \$600,00 in long-term, non-negotiable agrarian bonds. “The figure \$600,000...was not pulled out of thin air - it was United Fruit’s own declared valuation for tax purposes.” See Ambrose, 221.

beachhead for international Communism [in Guatemala]."³⁰⁰ Braden went so far as to challenge the Eisenhower administration to take action:

Frequently it is necessary to fight fire with fire.... No one is more opposed than I to interference in the internal affairs of other nations. But...we may be compelled to intervene....I should like to underscore that because Communism is so blatantly an international and not an internal affair, its suppression, even by force, in an American country...would not constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the former.... I pray that the new Administration will attack this danger rapidly, intelligently, and energetically.³⁰¹

John E. Peurifoy, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala under Eisenhower, aided UFC's character assassination of Arbenz. In testimony before a House committee, he stated that Arbenz "talked like a Communist, he thought like a Communist, he acted like a Communist, and if he is not one, Mr. Chairman, he will do until one comes along."³⁰²

Peurifoy's predecessor as ambassador to Guatemala, Richard Patterson, Jr., did not have particularly flattering things to say about Arbenz either. He did note, however, that it is often difficult to prove that a person is a communist. In the case of Arbenz, Patterson recommended applying the duck test:

Suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says "duck." But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to the pond and you notice that he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.³⁰³

³⁰⁰Spruille Braden, speech to the United States Inter-American Council, Houston, April 1952; quoted in Immerman, 126.

³⁰¹Spruille Braden, "Syllabus on the Communist Threat in the Americas," lecture at Dartmouth College, 12 March 1953; quoted in Immerman, 127.

³⁰²John E. Peurifoy, in House of Representatives, *Ninth Interim Report of Hearings*, 2; quoted in Immerman, 181.

³⁰³Richard Patterson, Jr., speech to Rotary Club, 24 March 1950; quoted in Ambrose, 222.

Apparently the Eisenhower administration misapplied the “duck test.” While Arbenz was certainly a liberal reformer who aggravated his conservative opponents, he lacked many of the unmistakable characteristics of a communist: he encouraged freedom of the press, he did not restrict political activity, and he did not seek to nationalize the means of production. Additionally, while “Party members played a part in his land reform agency,...they were excluded from his cabinet, from the national police force, and from most departments of government.”³⁰⁴ Finally, Arbenz was guided by an enlightened and extremely democratic constitution that, drawing upon the theories of Montesquieu and Thomas Jefferson, guaranteed civil rights and divided authority between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches in a system of checks and balances that safeguarded against the systemic abuses that formerly prevailed in Guatemala.³⁰⁵

If Arbenz was not a communist, and the government of Guatemala was a fully functioning democracy that incorporated popular opinion, why did the CIA fund an armed band of “revolutionaries” to topple Arbenz? Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister for the Arbenz administration, suggests that it was the inescapable tendency of the U.S. to categorize “as ‘communism’ every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive liberal reforms.”³⁰⁶ This tendency was, in part, a product of the almost overwhelming Cold War fear that the Soviet Union was intent on establishing world hegemony, one country at a time. That the UFC preyed on this fear and fanned its flames to frenzied heights certainly impeded an objective evaluation of the Arbenz regime. The end result, in this case, was that the world’s leading democracy organized a

³⁰⁴Christopher Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 206.

³⁰⁵Immerman, 49.

³⁰⁶Guillermo Toriello, quoted in Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 77.

“revolutionary army” that was neither an army nor revolutionary (The men that Armas led could be more aptly described as counter-revolutionaries and opportunists) in an attempt to topple a “communist” who was not communist (but was, instead, quite democratic).

The absurdity of this situation was compounded by the fact that less than two weeks after Armas concluded his “offensive” (it is not certain that he ever engaged any government troops) and set up camp just inside the Guatemalan border to await the surrender of the government, Arbenz complied. Arbenz’s resignation was the culmination of CIA propaganda and a series of psychological operations that not only convinced the Guatemalan people that the revolutionary force command by Armas was much more substantial than it actually was, but that it roamed the countryside with impunity, wreaking havoc everywhere it went. According to historian William Blum, this was actually far from the case: “The Castillo Armas forces could not have defeated the much larger Guatemalan army, but the air attacks, combined with the belief in the invincibility of [an] enemy [that was believed to be backed by the U.S.], persuaded Guatemalan military officers to force Arbenz to resign.”³⁰⁷

While Armas was quickly being installed as the head of the new government, John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, orchestrated a nationwide television and radio broadcast to report to the American people that, “Now the future of Guatemala lies at the disposal of the Guatemalan people themselves.”³⁰⁸ Nothing could have been further from the truth. Armas was the first in what was to be a long succession of dictators who, in the name of anti-communism and with the silent acquiescence of the U.S., employed kidnaping, false imprisonment, torture, and even murder to retain power. Ironically, as noted by historian Richard H. Immerman, it was these repressive

³⁰⁷Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History*, 86.

³⁰⁸John Foster Dulles, quoted in Ambrose, 233.

measures that “fueled the very Communist movement that the Eisenhower administration [originally] overestimated in 1954.”³⁰⁹ Thus, in this case study, one democratic state purposefully and successfully engaged in activities (short of war) that endangered another democratic state’s national security and impinged on its sovereignty.

2. Summation

Almost immediately following the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala, Eisenhower commissioned a secret review concerning the effectiveness of and need for covert action. Headed by retired LTG James H. Doolittle, this Special Study Group overwhelmingly endorsed the merits of covert action:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever costs. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must...learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.³¹⁰

Although both Doolittle’s assessment and U.S. intervention in Guatemala were certainly products of Cold War hysteria, neither is an anachronism in today’s world. While there is no longer a Cold War to compel U.S. covert activities, there are, and always will be, other significant challenges to American national interests. And, as demonstrated with Arbenz and Guatemala, a democratic state may be more than willing to sacrifice its idealism, not to mention a fellow democracy, in the name of expediency and the pursuit of perceived national interests.

³⁰⁹Immerman, 200.

³¹⁰James H. Doolittle, “Report of the Special Study Group on Covert Activities,” 30 September 1954; quoted in Andrew, 211.

Because the primary tenets of democratic peace theory - cooperation and noninterference - are unable to account for the actions of democracies in heretical cases such as this, democratic peace advocates engage in sophistry in an attempt to overcome this dilemma. First, they dismiss the destructive potential of covert action, noting that it pales in comparison to war. This may be true, but, as demonstrated by the case study of CIA activity in Guatemala, it does not erase the fact that covert action clearly has the potential to impinge on the sovereignty of a state and jeopardize its security.

Second, democratic peace advocates assert that, because of its inherently secretive nature, covert action cannot be mitigated, at least not in a timely manner, by the influence of an informed and concerned citizenry. As expressed by Daniel P. Forsythe, a professor of political science, "when we come to covert forcible action, the decisions are not taken in the open, subject to the full range of checks and balances and popular participation."³¹¹ Forsythe adds that, in most cases, there is little prospect of U.S. covert action leading to large numbers of U.S. casualties, and therefore, "liberal assumptions about open decision-making and popular desires to avoid the human and other costs of war do not affect secretive decisions using mostly foreign personnel."³¹² Thus, the implication is that the chief executive's authority to engage in covert actions can be likened to the prerogatives of an authoritarian ruler.

This is a gross exaggeration which disregards the existence of oversight mechanisms enforced by elected representatives and undervalues eventual impact of popular opinion. Covert action, like many intelligence service activities, is not subject to immediate public scrutiny. Over time, however, details concerning these secretive actions (like the aforementioned cases) inevitably

³¹¹Forsythe, 393.

³¹²Ibid., 393-4

enter the realm of public knowledge. When this occurs, the citizens of a democracy have an opportunity to voice their displeasure over these ventures and initiate legislation to restrict their scope. They can also ban them outright. That the American public has not taken the latter step implies de facto recognition and acceptance of covert action as a utilitarian tool of foreign policy. This despite the fact that it is employed against democratic and authoritarian states alike.

No matter how it is sliced, covert action leaves democratic peace theorists in a quandary. If they assert that a democracy is unable to adequately control the covert actions undertaken by its intelligence services, then they must also acknowledge the inability of a democratic peace to guarantee the security of other democratic states (from this potential threat). If, on the other hand, democratic peace advocates acknowledge that the citizens of a democracy are able to moderate the covert activities of a state (in a manner similar to the way in which they affect decisions of war), then they must explain why it is that, while democracies are reluctant to engage like states in war, they are quite willing to make them targets of covert action. In the end, democratic peace advocates are unable to adequately address the implications of covert action in their equation for peace between democracies.

B. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

War is relatively clear-cut: there is a winner and an eventual loser; a beginning and an end.... [B]ut the economic struggle...is not clear-cut. Winners win quietly, and losers are often either unconscious of loss, or too embarrassed to admit it. And it is a war that does not end. The stage for the studiously low-key dramas of economic espionage is set...in a kind of perpetual limbo [between war and peace].³¹³

³¹³John J. Fialka, *War By Other Means: Economic Espionage in America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), xii-xiii.

Intelligence has been described as the "pursuit of secret advantage,"³¹⁴ the ultimate high-stakes competition against "both external and internal enemies - or even friends."³¹⁵ The latter portion of this statement may come as a surprise to many Americans. We are not accustomed to having our allies spy on us. Peter Schweizer, author of *Friendly Spies*, explains:

...Americans see our allies as partners in the fight against hostile enemy services, working courageously to protect Western secrets.... [A]lthough this country's allies have indeed oftentimes been gallant in their efforts to counter Soviet intelligence activities and espionage perpetrated against the West, they have all too often engaged in the same activities with the United States as their victim. And they have been enormously successful.³¹⁶

With few exceptions, it has only been in the last decade that friendly spying has received significant public scrutiny. This is despite the fact that, according to Godson, it has been an almost commonplace occurrence: "Other governments will be friendly to overall U.S. interests and will even cooperate on some issues, such as terrorism and organized crime [yet] even the services of many friendly governments will devote a portion of their resources to learning U.S. secrets...."³¹⁷ Admiral Bobby Inman, former director of National Security Agency (NSA) and ex-deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), attributes the dearth of publicity to the rigors of the Cold War:

Industrial espionage only received attention when the Soviets were involved. In those instances where the activity of friendly intelligence services have been particularly abhorrent, Washington has handled the matter quietly rather

³¹⁴Thomas Powers, "The Truth About the CIA," *New York Review of Books* xi, no. 9 (13 May 1993); quoted in Porch, 470.

³¹⁵Porch, 470.

³¹⁶Peter Schweizer, *Friendly Spies* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), 3.

³¹⁷Godson, 253.

than by going public and raising a huge international stink that would fracture relations with our Cold War allies.³¹⁸

Thus, Senator David Boren was not entirely accurate when he announced in 1990, with a degree of alarm, that an “increasing share of espionage directed against the United States comes from spying by foreign governments against private American companies aimed at stealing commercial secrets to gain a national economic advantage.”³¹⁹ Friendly espionage activity existed prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, and it remains a fact of life today.

Economic espionage, a specific subset of espionage, is defined by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation as “foreign-power sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons for the purpose of unlawfully obtaining proprietary economic information.”³²⁰ While this definition is impressively authoritative, the activity that it describes is far from compelling. To most observers, economic espionage lacks the drama required to maintain even a cursory interest. After all, it does not involve the intense suspense and death-defying risks that characterize the genre of spy thrillers with which most of us are familiar. Additionally, it is difficult to causally link economic espionage activities to an observable reduction in the overall security of the state. Such links do exist, but they are not easily discerned or quantified. While the FBI confidently asserts that over 50 countries tried to covertly obtain proprietary advanced technologies from U.S. industries in 1996, it is far less certain of the

³¹⁸Admiral Bobby Inman, in a conversation with the author, Schweizer, *Friendly Spies* 6.

³¹⁹Senator David Boren, *New York Times*, 3 April 1990; quoted in Schweizer, *Friendly Spies*, 12.

³²⁰Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Economic Espionage and Protection of Proprietary Economic Information Act of 1996,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation Proposal*, 4 December 1996, 2; quoted in Edwin Fraumann, “Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined,” *Public Administration Review* 57, no. 4 (July/August 1997): 304.

actual annual cost of economic espionage to American industry.³²¹ Depending upon how it is calculated, the figure could be as little as \$50 billion or as much as \$240 billion.³²² A study by the White House Office of Science and Technology estimates losses to U.S. businesses to be somewhere in between, in the \$100 billion range.³²³ In contrast, the consequences of covert action and military espionage are, for the most part, much more immediate and apparent. As discussed previously, the U.S.-sponsored covert action readily and transparently deposed the Arbenz government in Guatemala. As for military espionage, the Soviet theft of nuclear weapons technology from the U.S., an event which dramatically altered the balance of power during the initial years of the Cold War, serves to demonstrate the tangible impact of "conventional" spying.

Perhaps because of its amorphous nature, many critics claim that the threat posed by economic espionage is nonexistent or, at the very least, greatly exaggerated. Howard M. Metzenbaum, former Senator from Ohio, has characterized it as a ploy to retain funding:

...I have the feeling that intelligence agency officials sort of thought that the Congress might be thinking of cutting back on the budget for intelligence activities and said, "well we'd better find another area where we can be claiming we're doing more work. Let's get into this whole field of economic intelligence and let's make this the issue."³²⁴

John F. Hayden, then a corporate vice-president of Boeing, also has downplayed the threat of

³²¹U.S. Senate Hearings on Economic Espionage, 104th Congress, 2nd session S. 1556 (1 February 1996): 104-359; quoted in Frauman, 303.

³²²Sam Perry, "Economic Espionage and Corporate Responsibility," *Criminal Justice International* 11, no. 2 (date unknown): 3; quoted in Fraumann, 303.

³²³White House Office of Science and Technology, quoted in Arlen Specter, "Economic Espionage," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 10.

³²⁴Howard M. Metzenbaum, "Economic Intelligence," prepared statement the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 August 1993, 2.

economic espionage to American industry, quantifying it as a 'two' on a scale of one to ten (with one being a very slight problem, ten a very serious problem).³²⁵ Additionally, according to a study done by the American Society of Industrial Security, seventy percent of economic espionage cases can be attributed to simple "internecine warfare among corporate competitors, most of which pits one American firm against an unscrupulous rival,"³²⁶ rather than intrigue perpetrated by foreign intelligence agencies.

Those that warn of the dangers of economic espionage are not swayed by these arguments. According to Reinhard Vogler, a former East German intelligence officer who advises multinational companies on economic espionage, American corporations are deluding themselves if they do not believe that espionage poses a substantial threat:

The level of sophistication of espionage operations directed against U.S. companies is extraordinary. American companies are like innocent children in the forest. They have no idea how many wolves are after them.³²⁷

Therefore, it is quite likely that the cost of economic espionage, in terms of national security as well as real dollars, is severely underestimated. According to Louis Freeh, director of the FBI, losses go unreported because companies are unaware or unwilling to admit that they have been victimized:

...U.S. industry is reluctant to publicize occurrences of foreign economic espionage. Such publicity can adversely affect stock values, customers' confidence, and ultimately competitiveness and market share. Therefore,

³²⁵John F. Hayden, "Economic Intelligence," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 August 1993, 28.

³²⁶Robert Dreyfuss, "Spy vs. No-Spy," *New Republic* 215, no. 26 (23 December 1996): 10.

³²⁷Reinhard Vogler; quoted in Ronald E. Yates, "Corporate Cloak-and-Dagger," *Chicago Tribune*, 1 September 1996, p. 1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.

gathering the empirical data to quantify the damage is problematic. But regardless of the exact number, the damage caused by economic espionage is significant.³²⁸

Schweizer adds that impact of economic espionage is far more sinister than what is immediately perceived:

Economic espionage can grossly disrupt trade and corrode a nation's science and technology base. It is a parasitic act, relying on others to make costly investments of time and money. And to destroy the rewards of investment [in this manner] is to destroy the incentive to innovate.³²⁹

Is economic espionage truly a threat? It stands to reason that if economic espionage was not a profitable enterprise in which to engage, the field of "competitors" would not be so crowded. Judging from the comments provided by spokesmen from various foreign governments, economic spying is not only a commonplace occurrence, but a growth industry. An unidentified German official, commenting on U.S. allegations that the French had established a prioritized list of American industrial espionage targets, was remarkably nonchalant:

Being Europeans, we are not surprised when someone is not breaking into our briefcases. No self-respecting intelligence agency would not obtain information in this manner but you have to maintain the golden rule that you do not get caught.³³⁰

And, although the French denied this particular accusation, they appear at ease with the practice

³²⁸Louis Freeh, "Economic Espionage," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 13.

³²⁹Peter Schweizer, "The Future of Spying is Business," *Baltimore Sun*, 31 March 1996, p. 5E. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: BALSUN. 15 August 1997.

³³⁰David Silverberg, "Spy Charges Fray Ties Between U.S., France," *Defense News*, 3 May 1993, p. 1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: DEFNEW. 15 August 1997.

of spying on their compatriots. They demonstrate a facile ability to balance the competing responsibilities of cooperation and national self-interest. Economics falls into the latter category.

Pierre Marion, former chief of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), explains:

[Y]ou have to separate very clearly what are the fields which are covered by an alliance and the fields which are not covered by an alliance. It's clear that when you are allies, you have certain sectors. I'm speaking of the armaments. I'm thinking of diplomatic matters where normally you should not try to gather intelligence. But in all of the other fields, being allied does not prevent the states from being competitors.... In economics, we are competitors, not allies. I think that even during the Cold War getting intelligence on economic, technological, and industrial matters from a country with which you are allies is not incompatible with the fact that you are allies.³³¹

It should be no surprise then, that the Russians, upholding the finest tradition of the KGB, also shamelessly indulge in economic espionage. Indeed, Yeltsin has been quoted as saying that he expects foreign intelligence to "produce the information needed for the adoption of fundamental state decisions on the...implementation of our economic policy and the securing of scientific and technical progress."³³² Finally, while the U.S. is an extremely vocal critic of economic espionage, other countries are quick to point out that America's behavior has not been above reproach. In March 1995, five CIA agents were expelled from France for attempting to divine information concerning that country's position during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. That same year the U.S. was accused of spying on Japan during auto trade talks. More recently, in March of this year, the German newspaper *Der Spiegel* reported that a CIA agent working under diplomatic cover tried to recruit senior government officials to steal secrets related

³³¹Pierre Marion, quoted in Schweizer, *Friendly Spies*, 9. DGSE is responsible for French foreign intelligence.

³³²President Boris Yeltsin, speech at the Foreign Intelligence Service headquarters; in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 29 April 1994, p. 3; quoted in Knight, 128.

to high-technology projects. The U.S. intelligence community, in accordance with presidential direction, is prohibited from engaging in economic espionage and according to Freeh, the incidents in question were counterintelligence operations designed to ferret out the activities of foreign intelligence services. Whether the Director's spin on these events is true or not is not particularly relevant to the countries involved. They are unlikely to be convinced that the information in these operations would not ultimately be used to serve the interests of American businesses.

The government policymakers and captains of industry who are the targets of this unwelcome attention undoubtedly find the practice of economic espionage to be wholly disturbing. They are joined in their discomfort by democratic peace theorists who are unable to account for the use of devious shortcuts to gain the upper hand financially. It is not unreasonable for democracies to compete in the realm of economics - indeed, one of Kant's prerequisites for a liberal regime is a market economy, which inherently involves thriving competition. Yet, one would anticipate that the competition between democracies at the interstate level would be conducted with the same normative values, practices, and restraints that are employed domestically. As Layne reminds us, democratic states assume that "other democracies also subscribe to pacific methods of regulating political competition and resolving [domestic] disputes, and that [they] will apply these norms in their external relations with fellow democracies."³³³ If these normative values are sufficient to regulate political competition, they should also be sufficient to regulate economic competition. Judging from the attitudes and actions of numerous democracies, however, they are not. To add insult to injury, commerce is expected to "create cross-cutting transnational ties that serve as

³³³Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," 161.

lobbies for mutual accommodation.”³³⁴ Instead, when espionage is factored into the equation, economics often serves as a source of dissension.

The problems for democratic peace theorists do not stop there. Traditional conceptions of national security have revolved around the threats “posed by military forces, political ideologies, and the foreign policies of actual or potential adversaries....”³³⁵ Today, however, when U.S. leaders “think about external events, actions, or developments that could cause injury to members of the U.S. population or to their ability to pursue of life, liberty, happiness, or prosperity on their own terms, [they] think about economic matters.”³³⁶ According to William Webster, former director of the CIA, that sentiment has global relevance: “there is now universal recognition that economic strength is key to global influence and power....”³³⁷ A recent RAND study underscores this point, emphasizing “the connection between a country’s economic performance and its ability to pursue the traditional aims of national-security policy [such as] maintaining and projecting military forces, influencing the behavior of other nations, controlling its own destiny, and generally remaining a great power.”³³⁸ The report notes that, “It was, after all, the economic failures of Communist regimes that were in a large measure responsible for the decline in the military and political power of the Soviet Union and its former allies.”³³⁹

³³⁴Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 31.

³³⁵C.R. Neu and Charles Wolf, Jr., *The Economic Dimensions of National Security* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994) 1.

³³⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

³³⁷William Webster, speech, World Affairs Council of Boston, 12 April 1990; quoted in Jeffrey W. Wright, “Intelligence and Economic Security,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 206.

³³⁸Neu, 3.

³³⁹*Ibid.*

Certainly the Clinton administration considers economics to be a vital part of national security - bolstering America's economic revitalization is a central component of both *Engagement and Enlargement* and *A Strategy for a New Century*. Warren Christopher, former U.S. Secretary of State, adds that "national security is inseparable from our economic security."³⁴⁰ Because economic espionage threatens economic security, it follows that it also impinges upon national security. The Clinton administration considers economic espionage to be a threat. The President's 1995 annual report to Congress on foreign economic collection and industrial espionage confirms this point:

While a military rival steals documents for a state-of-the-art weapon of defense system, an economic competitor steals a U.S. company's proprietary business information or government trade strategies. Just as a foreign country's defense establishment is the main recipient of U.S. defense-related information, foreign companies and commercially oriented government ministries are the main beneficiaries of U.S. economic information. The aggregate losses that can mount as a result of such efforts can reach billions of dollars per year, constituting a serious national security concern.³⁴¹

Therefore, state-sponsored economic espionage, instead of merely being an annoying violation of the normative values of democratic interaction, can be elevated to consideration as a substantial threat to the well-being of a state. It is, if you will, a subtle, indirect means of engaging in warfare that a democratic peace is powerless to prevent.

³⁴⁰Warren Christopher, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 November 1993; quoted in Freeh, 11.

³⁴¹President William J. Clinton, *Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage*, July 1995. Online. National Security Institute. No date. Available HTTP:<http://nsi.org/Library/Espionage/indust.htm>. 18 August 1997. It is ironic that the Clinton administration, in its national security strategy, extols the virtues of a zone of peace where democracies cooperate, yet, in this report, decries the devious methods that these same democracies use to compete against America.

1. Case Study: The French Secret Services

Simply put, the French are trying to rob American industry blind.³⁴²

In August of 1996, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a CIA assessment that concluded that a half-dozen governments have “extensively engaged in economic espionage”³⁴³ against the United States. At the top of this list of offenders is the government of France. Despite the vociferous protests of the French embassy, this was not a particularly surprising revelation. Indeed, the most recent directors of French intelligence, have, in succession, commented favorably on the utility of economic espionage. Count Henri de Marenches, who served as director of the French secret service from 1970 to 1981 (known then as the Service de Documentation Extérieure et Contre-Espionage (SDCE)), admitted in his memoirs that:

Spying in the proper sense is becoming increasingly focused on business and the economy, science and industry - and very profitable it is.... This form of espionage prevails not only with the enemy but to some extent among friends....³⁴⁴

Marenches' successor, Pierre Marion, has been quoted previously in this chapter rationalizing the dichotomy between cooperating with and spying upon allies (see page 124). And, most recently, Claude Silberzhan, named to head the DGSE in 1989, has stated that “Espionage today is essentially economic, scientific, technological, and financial.”³⁴⁵

³⁴²Frank Wolf, quoted in Bruce Bartlett, “Misguided Spying for Economic Prizes?,” *Washington Times*, 15 March 1997, p. C1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WTIMES. 15 August 1997.

³⁴³CIA assessment dated 10 May; quoted in Reuters “CIA Names Names on Espionage,” *Chicago Tribune*, 15 August 1996, p. 8. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.

³⁴⁴Henri de Marenches, *Dans les Secrets des Princes* (Paris: Editions Stock, 1986); quoted in Schweizer, *Friendly Spies*, 13.

³⁴⁵Claude Silberzhan; quoted in Porch, 487.

In a case of actions speaking even louder than words, the French have routinely sought access to U.S. technology in an effort to bolster both their defense industrial base and their arms export industries. According to classified French documents mysteriously delivered to Frank Greve, a reporter for Knight-Ridder syndicated newspapers, the French government has "targeted 49 high-tech companies, 24 financial institutions and six U.S. government agencies with important roles in international trade."³⁴⁶ Greve also reports that the French planned to focus "on research breakthroughs and marketing strategies of leading-edge U.S. aerospace and defense contractors that compete directly with French companies."³⁴⁷ A study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) notes that "these cutting-edge technologies [are] needed to compete with U.S. systems in the international arms market."³⁴⁸

The methods that the French employ to garner proprietary economic information range from very sophisticated, intricately planned operations to opportunistic and downright crude machinations. The former includes planting moles in selected high-technology companies such as Texas Instruments, Corning, and IBM,³⁴⁹ and recruiting disgruntled former employees with access

³⁴⁶Frank Greve, "Documents Reveal French Plans to Spy on 49 U.S. Companies," *Orange County Register* (Calif.), 18 April 1993, p. A12. Online LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: Not listed. 15 August 1997. The 21-page memo, written in French, on French paper, was delivered unsigned, undated, and stamped "Defense Confidential." Greve states that it appears to have been prepared by the DGSE in 1989 or 1990, and claims that it is "considered authentic by senior U.S. experts." The French, in return, insist that it is a fraudulent.

³⁴⁷Ibid.

³⁴⁸United States General Accounting Office, "Economic Espionage," *Economic Espionage: Information on Threat From U.S. Allies*, report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 19. This GAO report does not specifically name names for reasons of political sensitivity and plausible deniability, but the identity of each country that is discussed is fairly obvious.

³⁴⁹Schweizer, "The Future of Spying is Business."

to targeted technology.³⁵⁰ The lower end of the scale involves rifling through unattended briefcases, electronic eavesdropping equipment, "data dipping, in which corporate computer databases are breached by expert hackers...[and] dumpster diving, in which industrial spies retrieve secret company paperwork from the trash...."³⁵¹

Although the DGSE has demonstrated considerable imagination and determination in its pursuit of economic secrets - enough to at least earn the CIA's righteous indignation - there are those that still doubt the magnitude of the threat presented by the French secret service. Douglas Porch, the author of a substantial volume on French intelligence agencies, aptly titled *The French Secret Services*, argues that "industrial spying by official French agencies is likely to be fairly small potatoes [when compared to the damage done by corporate competitors]."³⁵² He suggests that the ease with which economic espionage can be conducted, combined with virtually negligible risk - few countries have adequate laws to protect against or discourage economic espionage - and the potential for substantial gain, encourages private corporate espionage. Additionally, he notes that there are numerous impediments to incorporating any worthwhile intelligence that may be gleaned by the state, to include social and communication barriers between those who gather intelligence and the *énarque* elite who might apply it, the lack of formally defined economic espionage requirements, and the inability of corporations to easily safeguard classified material.³⁵³ Ultimately, Porch points to the recent failures of French businesses in head-to-head competition for contracts

³⁵⁰Charles M. Sennott, "New Cold War: Spies Target Corporations," *Boston Globe*, 19 January 1997, p. A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: BGLOBE. 15 August 1997.

³⁵¹Yates, "Corporate Cloak-and-Dagger."

³⁵²Porch, 489

³⁵³*Ibid.*, 490. *Énarques* are Ecole Nationale d'Administration graduates who dominate important government and business positions.

with U.S. companies as evidence that the French economic espionage effort is only marginally effective.³⁵⁴

Many of Porch's points concerning the awkwardness of spying for corporate entities are valid. Still, the incentive to gain an edge in this "life-or-death economic war"³⁵⁵ is tremendous. And, since espionage provides a relatively easy means to achieve an economic advantage (according to Porch) it is also likely to be difficult for the state to ignore any opportunity to do so. This is particularly true for the French because the state subsidizes many businesses. Norman R. Augustine, president and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation, explains:

[E]conomic espionage is a particular concern with nations in which there is either state ownership of businesses, or an extremely close cooperative relationship between industries and the state. Obviously, when there is no clear separation between business and government agencies, the likelihood increases that the intelligence agency of the government would view the economic success of the business as part of its official business.³⁵⁶

Thus, when one points out that there are incentives for corporations, rather than the state, to spy on competitors, in the case of the French, it begs the following question: How do you distinguish between the two? As for the failings of French companies such as Airbus and Thompson CSF in head-to-head competition with Boeing and Raytheon, their American counterparts, it must be noted that espionage is only a tool to be used to tilt the playing field to your advantage. It cannot guarantee a successful outcome, particularly when, as in the cases mentioned above, the competitor is able to counter your information advantage by bringing overpowering political pressure to bear

³⁵⁴Porch, 489.

³⁵⁵Norman R. Augustine, "Economic Espionage," prepared statement submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 32.

³⁵⁶Ibid., 35.

on the prospective client. Additionally, it is important to note that while DGSE setbacks have received tremendous publicity, it is the successes which, in all likelihood, go unnoticed that are a threat.

FBI Director Freeh recently testified that friendly and neutral governments, as well as traditional opponents, are increasing their economic espionage efforts. Given the potential rewards and negligible risks, it is a safe bet that this trend will continue unabated. And, despite the recent setbacks mentioned above, the French government is likely to follow suit.

2. Summation

That state-sponsored economic espionage occurs is an established fact. It is also evident that, given a sufficient number and magnitude of occurrences, economic espionage can jeopardize national security. All that remains is to quantify "sufficient" and then to gauge the degree of success our economic adversaries have had breaching the ramparts of economic security. It would be a gross understatement to say that such an undertaking would be a divisive task.

Critics claim that "McCarthy-style hyperbole"³⁵⁷ concerning the threat of economic espionage is used to rationalize institutionalized xenophobia and justify assaults on civil liberties. They also portray it as a make-work program for Intelligence Community alarmists. The "alarmists," in turn, warn that the threat is real. They point to existing cases and claim that they are only the tip of the iceberg. "Alarmists" assert that most cases go unreported - leading to an underestimation of the threat posed by espionage - because most companies are either unaware that they have been had or are unwilling to publicize the fact.

For the purposes of this thesis, the magnitude of the economic espionage problem is not particularly important. Instead, it is intent that matters. In this case, democracies are willfully

³⁵⁷Dreyfus, 9.

engaging in acts that jeopardize the well-being of other democracies. Although not all would agree that it can be equated with a lesser form of "war," clearly economic espionage represents a potential threat to a targeted state's security. As such, it is antithetical to the tenets of democratic peace theory.

C. MORE "FRIENDLY" ESPIONAGE

Gentlemen do not read each other's mail.³⁵⁸

Contrary to the sentiments expressed above, according to Allen Dulles, former director of the CIA, "When the fate of a nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read each other's mail - if they can get their hands on it."³⁵⁹ They also lie, steal, and cheat, not to mention tap phone lines, plant moles, and blackmail or bribe those who have access to information in an effort to learn each other's secrets. And, while the preceding sections discussed the lengths that an intelligence service, whether an adversary or friend, might go to obtain economic intelligence, it should be noted that military, political, and technical information are also pursued. Indeed, in many cases, it is difficult to distinguish among them. Once again, Director Freeh explains:

[P]ieces of economic and technological information seldom exist in a vacuum. Foreign countries collect sensitive economic intelligence frequently to enhance both their military capabilities and their economic stability and competitiveness. Likewise, the line separating purely economic intelligence from political intelligence is as difficult to draw as that between technical and military intelligence.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸Henry L. Stimson, in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (1948); in Jay M. Shafritz, ed., *Words On War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1990), 204. Stimson, then U.S. Secretary of State, offered these words as an explanation for dismantling the U.S. government's codebreaking capability.

³⁵⁹Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963); in Shafritz, 205.

³⁶⁰Freeh, 12.

Having acknowledged that intelligence information cannot always be distinctly parsed according to a particular discipline, the remainder of this chapter will concern itself with espionage that targets more traditional types of information: namely, such things as military capabilities, political intentions, and technical specifications.

Newspapers in recent years have been peppered with stories about U.S. spies who have betrayed their country: CIA counterintelligence expert Aldrich Ames, FBI agent Earl Pitts, and former CIA chief of station Harold Nicholson. What these “gentlemen” had in common was that they were enticed to become agents by an American adversary, the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia). Dismaying as that fact might be to Stimson, he would be aghast to learn that it is not just America’s adversaries, but our allies as well that attempt to illicitly “read our mail.” In September of 1996, Robert Kim, a computer specialist for the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), was arrested for passing secrets - not to an enemy, but to the Republic of Korea (ROK), a steadfast ally of the United States. In a similar situation, just over a decade earlier, Jonathan Pollard, also employed by Naval Intelligence, was arrested for passing secrets to another ally.³⁶¹ In this case it was Israel. As discussed previously, such incidents of “friendly” espionage are on the rise. William Sessions, former director of the FBI, acknowledged this disturbing trend by announcing in October of 1990 that his organization would begin to devote greater assets to counter “the intelligence activities against U.S. interests by so-called ‘friendly’ intelligence services.”³⁶²

Finding a spy in your midst is certainly a frustrating revelation. But when that spy is from a country that you consider to be an ally, frustration and anger are often outweighed by

³⁶¹Pollard’s adventures in espionage will serve as the case study for this section and, therefore, will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

³⁶²William S. Sessions, speech before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New York, 25 October 1990; quoted in Schweizer, *Friendly Spies*, 4.

disappointment and confusion. In response to the news that Israel had been spying on the U.S., Ronald Reagan is reported to have declared, with equal measures of pain and puzzlement, "I don't understand why they are doing it."³⁶³ Still, those who know the profession well acknowledge that "friendly" espionage is not an uncommon occurrence. Wolf Blitzer, CNN correspondent and author of a book that details Pollard's traitorous escapades, states that all countries engage in "friendly" espionage:

[A]ll countries spy - not only on their adversaries but on their friends as well.... Friends, after all, can take actions that may have serious and damaging consequences. Therefore, although the United States and Israel are allies, their interests do not always overlap - no two countries, no matter how close, always see eye to eye.... Thus the United States understandably and legitimately wants to know what's going on in Israel - and vice versa.³⁶⁴

Anecdotal evidence derived from open-source reporting appears to support Blitzer's claim that the U.S. spies on its allies, particularly Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, former prime minister of Israel, in response to the uproar concerning Pollard's arrest, noted that five U.S. spies had been discovered in the late 1970s and early 1980s in sensitive nuclear and industrial facilities.³⁶⁵ Authors Daniel Raviv and Yossi Melman also note that David Durenberger, then chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, acknowledged that the CIA accepted information from an Israeli military walk-in during the war in Lebanon in 1982.³⁶⁶ Finally, the *New York Times* reported earlier

³⁶³Ronald Reagan, *Los Angeles Times*, 27 November 1985; quoted in Daniel Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 318.

³⁶⁴Wolf Blitzer, *Territory of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 302.

³⁶⁵Raviv, *Every Spy a Prince*, 307.

³⁶⁶Daniel Raviv and Yossi Melman, "A Clash of Cultures in the Spy Game," *Chicago Tribune*, 19 April 1994, p. 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.

this year that "American intelligence eavesdropped on a conversation between the Israeli embassy here [in Washington D.C.] and Tel Aviv."³⁶⁷

Assuming that Blitzer's claim is true, that all countries do spy on their friends, two questions come to mind. The first: what motivates this behavior? Although Schweizer asserts that the "U.S. effort has never been as extensive as that of our allies," he concedes that U.S. operations against allied countries "almost always hinge on a need or desire to know about the internal military and political developments in friendly countries or on a need or desire to influence events overseas."³⁶⁸ In the case of South Korea, the ROK military, "has engaged in a broader, systematic effort to spy on its closest ally and protector out of fear that Washington is withholding intelligence data or that it is secretly dealing directly with North Korea."³⁶⁹ According to Donald Gregg, former U.S. ambassador to Seoul, "We are very close working partners, but it is fair to say that there is a continued residue of suspicion in Seoul."³⁷⁰ Israel spies ostensibly to ensure its survival as a state. While Joseph Sisco, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has insisted that "Israel can get ninety-eight percent of what it wants"³⁷¹ from normal intelligence-sharing

³⁶⁷Steven Erlanger, "FBI Inquiry: Is Israel Using a Mole in U.S.?", *New York Times*, 8 May 1997, p. A15. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NYT. 15 August 1997. It is interesting to note that the vision statement for the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. organization responsible for acquiring information derived from signals and information systems, declares that NSA will work to give "us an information advantage over our adversaries and competitors." The same vision statement later asserts that the single goal of NSA is "information superiority for America and its Allies." These statements are somewhat contradictory as America's allies are often also its competitors. See Kenneth A. Minihan, *National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century* (June 1996), 4.

³⁶⁸Schweizer, *Friendly Spies*, 15.

³⁶⁹David Johnston, "Korean Spy Case More Serious Than Was Thought," *New York Times*, 3 October 1996, p. A8. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NYT. 15 August 1997.

³⁷⁰Donald Gregg, in Johnston.

³⁷¹Joseph Sisco, quoted in Blitzer, 159.

arrangements, Blitzer paints a far different picture:

[N]ervous Israeli officials, living on a very thin margin of security and always worried about a worst-case threat, were not convinced of [Sisco's] logic. Cooperation - while significant - was by no means that complete. There were still many secrets which Washington, for one reason or another, refused to share with Israel.³⁷²

"Friendly" espionage may also be motivated by a desire to acquire military technology that will aid a state's efforts to compete in the arms export market (à la the French), a need to confirm existing intelligence from yet another source, or a hope to trade information stolen from one country to a third country in exchange for political favors or goods and services.

The second question that must be asked with regard to friends spying on friends is, What is the harm in these actions? Alternatively, is the security of the targeted state jeopardized? If the latter question is placed in the context of the democratic peace, the answer would surely seem to be "no." After all, even if a democracy spies on a fellow democracy, the two should never have cause to take up arms against one another. Therefore, the information that is gained through espionage will not be used to further a hostile course of action (toward another democracy). In reality, however, espionage, whether conducted by an adversary or ally, does have the potential to weaken a state's security. This is because once information has been compromised, even by an ally that makes every effort to safeguard it within its own intelligence services, there are no guarantees that it will not also find its way to an adversary.

The greatest danger to a state that is targeted for espionage is that the information that is purloined will be used in a manner that reveals intelligence methods and sources that are even more

³⁷²Blitzer, 159-160.

valuable than what was initially stolen. Blitzer explains:

[I]ntelligence services are primarily concerned with protecting their sources and methods in the collection of vital information. Sometimes it takes years to plant an agent; other times it can take years to crack a code. Developing appropriate technical means of gathering intelligence can cost huge sums of money. Very often, friendly countries do not exchange information because they fear it would compromise these very sensitive sources and methods: The other country might innocently initiate some action which might tip off a hostile force that it has been penetrated.³⁷³

Additionally, the state that initiates the espionage effort may have a mole within its own organization and can, therefore, unwittingly leak any information that is gained to an actual adversary. Finally, the state that steals the information may only be interested in trading it on the open market to the highest bidder (figuratively speaking). In each of these scenarios, the state that has been targeted must deal with the sobering loss of sources and methods that, although they will not be necessary to protect against aggression from the “friendly” state that conducted the espionage in the first place, were vital to ensuring national security in the face of other, truly adversarial states. Thus, “friendly” espionage, despite its benign name, has potentially severe repercussions for a state’s security that places it at odds with the spirit of democratic peace.

³⁷³Blitzer, 303-304.

1. Case Study: Jonathan J. Pollard

I've never met a man who had better motives for all the trouble he's caused.³⁷⁴

On 21 November 1985, Jonathan J. Pollard was arrested outside the compound of Israel's embassy in Washington D.C. while attempting to seek asylum. A civilian analyst who worked for the Naval Investigative Service at the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center, Pollard was charged, convicted, and ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment for utilizing his access to classified information to pass secrets to the government of Israel. Pollard handed over a wealth of material to the Israelis, including top secret documents, classified message traffic, satellite photos, and communications information:

[I]n the seventeen months of Pollard's activities, more than 1,000 classified documents - 360 cubic feet of them - were compromised. The majority of these were "detailed analytical studies containing technical calculations, graphs and satellite photographs." Some of them were hundreds of pages long and more than 800 were classified "Top Secret."³⁷⁵

Was Pollard, as he seems to be arguing by quoting Greene, guided by the best of intentions and motives? A Jew and ardent Zionist, Pollard asserts that he was driven to spy by the U.S. refusal to share intelligence vital to Israel's survival: "my sole objective in this affair was to provide Israel with information concerning threats to its existence."³⁷⁶ While Pollard's claim that the U.S. held

³⁷⁴Graham Greene, *The Quiet American* (London: Penguin Books, 1973); quoted by Jonathan Pollard in Blitzer, xvi. In Greene's novel, the protagonist, an international news correspondent, characterizes an acquaintance of his - an American diplomat - with these words. Pollard, a great fan of Greene's, offered this line when Blitzer asked how he ended up in the predicament that he did. Pollard added that the quote "aptly characterizes both my motives and my subsequent involvement in this affair."

³⁷⁵Official damage assessment report, quoted in Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 420.

³⁷⁶Jonathan J. Pollard, quoted in Blitzer, 92.

back information is accurate, it is a feeble attempt to deflect blame and cannot be used to justify his actions. U.S. intelligence officials do not share information with any state if they feel that doing so will compromise future sources and methods of intelligence collection and, ultimately, endanger America's security. Caspar Weinberger, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted this fact in a written statement to the judge presiding over Pollard's case:

Unauthorized disclosures to friendly powers may cause as great a harm to the national security as to hostile powers because, once the information is removed from secure control systems, there is no enforceable requirement nor any incentive to provide effective controls for its safekeeping. Moreover, it is more probable than not that the information will be used for unintended purposes. Finally, such disclosures will tend to expose a larger picture of U.S. capabilities and knowledge, or lack thereof....³⁷⁷

Israel, in turn, protects its classified information in the same manner. As an experienced intelligence analyst, Pollard knew that this was the primary rule of the intelligence-sharing game and must have understood that by violating it to pass extremely sensitive information to Israel, ostensibly to bolster Israeli security, he was jeopardizing the security of the United States.

Despite his assertions to the contrary, U.S. prosecutors maintain that Pollard was motivated by a multitude of other, less honorable factors, to include revenge for personal slights, the excitement and allure of being a spy and, above all, unadulterated greed. The Israelis, for their part, took the chance of damaging their relationship with their strongest ally and most generous benefactor because of a deep-seated fear that the U.S. does not share all that it can concerning threats to Israel. Additionally, there was the simple fact that the information Pollard provided was "breathhtaking"³⁷⁸ in both scope and detail.

³⁷⁷Caspar Weinberger, official damage assessment report, quoted in Blitzer, 225.

³⁷⁸Unnamed U.S. intelligence official, quoted in Blitzer, xxii.

It is unlikely that the Pollard case was the first time that the Israelis have sought to enhance the quality of information that they receive from the U.S. by tapping sources with direct access to classified information. Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, authors of *Merchants of Treason*, claim that the Israelis have attempted to blackmail a consular employee in Jerusalem, sought to recruit the U.S. Marines responsible for security at the embassy, and tapped phones and bugged offices in U.S. offices and residences in Israel.³⁷⁹ Additionally, Allen and Polmar insinuate that the Israelis successfully recruited a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.³⁸⁰ Nor is it likely that the Pollard case will be the last incident. Indeed, just this year, U.S. intelligence officials frantically attempted to determine if another Israeli spy was operating in their midst. A harried search was initiated because a communications intercept of a conversation between an Israeli intelligence officer at the embassy in Washington D.C. and his superior in Tel Aviv alluded to a source of information, codenamed "Mega," inside the U.S. government (see page 140). David Bar-Ilan, chief spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, quickly denied that any such source existed: "Israel does not indulge in any kind of illegal action in information gathering in the United States."³⁸¹

Israel, via Bar-Ilan's quick denial, eagerly sought to avoid dredging up the animosity that lingers from the Pollard case. That a residue of ill-will remains, despite the fact that this was an instance of "friendly" espionage between allies, is testament to the amount of damage that can be

³⁷⁹Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Merchants of Treason* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), 295.

³⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 295-296.

³⁸¹David Bar-Ilan, quoted in Erlanger.

inflicted in such cases. Pollard has stated all along that it was not his intention to spy *against* the U.S.:

I had absolutely no intention of spying on the United States or to provide any critical national defense information to a belligerent. At no time did I ever compromise the names of any U.S. agents operating overseas, nor did I ever reveal any U.S. ciphers, codes, encipherment devices, classified military technology, the disposition and orders of U.S. forces, war fighting plans, secret diplomatic initiatives and obligations, classified organizational [wiring] diagrams or phone books, vulnerabilities of nuclear stockpiles, or communications security procedures.³⁸²

Rather, he sought only to spy *for* Israel and aid that state's defense: "The collection effort was clearly directed against the Soviets and those Arab states which pose a clear and present danger to Israel's security."³⁸³ Pollard adds that, in his mind, assisting Israel in this manner did not equate to betraying the U.S.:

I never thought for a second that Israel's gain would necessarily result in America's loss. How could it? Both states are on the same side of the geopolitical barricade.³⁸⁴

The preceding statement is simplistic, irresponsible, and frankly, unbelievable. While Pollard, as noted above, may not have directly provided information to a belligerent, he had to be aware that by passing such sensitive material to Israel he was taking the risk that, if the Israelis acted on the information, U.S. sources and collection methods would be revealed, albeit indirectly, to America's adversaries. Blitzer's discussion of the compromise of a communications handbook

³⁸²Pollard, quoted in Blitzer, 92.

³⁸³Ibid., 93.

³⁸⁴Blitzer, 93.

illustrates this chain of events:

[T]he most important single document Pollard provided to Israel consisted of a lengthy, extremely sensitive U.S. handbook on communications intelligence that had been his handlers' number one priority.... The United States had no intention of ever sharing it with Israel or any other country because that could endanger the future collection of that kind of intelligence. If Israel knew what was in the handbook, U.S. officials said, it would undertake certain actions that would almost certainly signal to hostile powers that the United States had penetrated their most sensitive communications.³⁸⁵

The official damage assessment of Pollard's actions provides yet another example of compromise:

"Numerous classified analyses of Soviet missile systems reveal much about the way the U.S. collects information, including information from human sources whose identity could be inferred by a reasonably competent intelligence analyst."³⁸⁶ Thus, despite Pollard's denials, he clearly jeopardized America's ability to collect intelligence information and, subsequently, national security. Indeed, Weinberger's assessment to the court stated that "The defendant has substantially harmed the United states, and in my view, his crimes demand severe punishment."³⁸⁷ In fact, he considered the betrayal so devastating that, in a telephone conversation with the Israeli ambassador, he stated unequivocally that "Pollard should have been shot."³⁸⁸

2. Summation

Why is spying on a friendly state, particularly a fellow democracy, such a big deal?

Pollard's lawyers asserted that other than hurt feelings and ruffled feathers, there were no lasting

³⁸⁵Blitzer, 171.

³⁸⁶Black, 421-422.

³⁸⁷Weinberger, official damage assessment report, quoted in Blitzer, 224.

³⁸⁸Blitzer, 238.

repercussions from their client's actions:

This case is lacking the essential ingredient that would make this a heinous crime: the beneficiary was not, and is not, the enemy, but one of our closest friends.... [T]he punishment must be appropriate to the actual severity of his criminal conduct. Applying that measure, no harm has come to this country. Accordingly, Mr. Pollard's sentence ought to reflect this indisputable fact.³⁸⁹

Democratic peace theorists are likely to agree. After all, democracies do not attempt to obtain this information so that they might initiate hostilities against their brethren, but seek to gain a greater measure of security from adversaries.

The Pollard case demonstrates, however, that if information is compromised, even to an ally, it can quite easily find its way into an enemy's hands. Therefore, despite the best of intentions, an attempt to garner military, political, and technological information through "friendly" espionage is an inherently hostile act that endangers the overall security of the targeted state. A democracy that engages in such acts against another democracy damages the intelligence collection capability of that state and, subsequently, reduces its options in the event of hostilities with a true adversary. Ultimately, such activity is inimical to the premise of a democratic peace.

D. PEACE AMONG DEMOCRACIES

With the support of the American public, I am committed to sustaining our active engagement abroad in pursuit of our cherished goal - a more secure and prosperous America in a more peaceful and prosperous world where democracy and free markets know no limits.³⁹⁰

Democratic peace advocates enthusiastically assert that democracies do not go to war with one another. National security strategy, embracing this theory of international relations, equates security with the presence of democracies (and therefore, the absence of war) which leads to

³⁸⁹Richard A. Hibey and Gordon A. Coffee, rebuttal to the official damage assessment report; quoted in Blitzer, 230.

³⁹⁰Clinton, *Strategy for a New Century*, iii.

prosperity and peace for American citizens. The Clinton administration has prescribed the manner in which U.S. security can be attained as follows:

In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and to encourage free and open trade and economic development - and less likely to wage war [against each other] or abuse the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests.³⁹¹

Thus, the adaption of democratic peace theory to current U.S. national security strategy can be nicely crammed into a single quote. Unfortunately, the practical application of this strategy is not nearly so simple.

A definition of peace and, thus, security as simply to the absence of war is of limited utility. Democracies, like all states, pursue national interests and embrace expediency in an attempt to compete and ensure their self-preservation in the international realm. In doing so they engage in many activities, to include covert action and espionage, that may impinge on the sovereignty and threaten the security of other states. These actions may be taken against authoritarian regimes or, as demonstrated in the case studies of this chapter, against fellow democracies. The scope of these activities may pale in comparison to the havoc and destruction that accompanies war, but the bottom line is that they still threaten the well-being of a state. Certainly, Jacobo Arbenz would vouch for the ability of covert action to jeopardize a state's sovereignty. Similarly, FBI Director Louis Freeh has testified that economic espionage is a significant detriment to a state's economy and, subsequently, its national security. Finally, Caspar Weinberger has emphatically sworn that

³⁹¹Clinton, *Strategy for a New Century*, 2.

“friendly” espionage is an insidious misnomer that belies the threat such an activity poses to the defense and well-being of a state.

That democracies frequently indulge in covert action and espionage against other democracies serves to demonstrate that the peace - defined as the simple absence of war - that is promised by a democratic peace is of extremely limited utility. Assuming that such a peace will guarantee a state's security could prove perilous.

V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN INAPPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

It is folly to bolt a door with a boiled carrot.³⁹²

U.S. national security strategy assumes that democracy is a universally desirable commodity and that, if the world is filled with democratic states, the international environment will be inherently peaceful and secure. However, as noted in Chapter III, democracy may be universally possible but it is not, in fact, universally welcome across the globe. Chapter IV, in turn, demonstrated that the existence of a growing community of democratic states, despite their inherent reluctance to engage in war with one another, will not guarantee the national security of the United States. The end result is a mismatch between U.S. national security strategy - which attempts to adapt democratic peace theory into a cogent formula for lasting peace and stability - and the gritty realities of international relations. This mismatch has clear consequences for U.S. foreign policy, national military strategy, and the efforts of America's intelligence community.

A. FOREIGN POLICY: THE VAIN PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY

[There are several] long-standing tendencies of American foreign policy - missionary zeal, bewilderment when the world refuses to conform to American expectations and a belief that for every problem there is a quick and easy solution.³⁹³

The goal of the *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* is to "create conditions in the world where our interests [and security] are not threatened...."³⁹⁴ The key to success is, of course, the promotion of democracy. This commodity is viewed as a means to an end: its

³⁹²English proverb, in Tripp, 569.

³⁹³Stephen J. Steadman, "The New Interventionists," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 4.

³⁹⁴Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 5.

successful spread, it is believed, will bring with it economic growth, global stability and, inevitably, security for the United States: "All of America's strategic interests - from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory - are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations."³⁹⁵

That the community of democracies is growing, "enhancing the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution and greater hope for the people of the world,"³⁹⁶ is undoubtedly gratifying to U.S. policymakers. Now, if the ball can only be kept rolling. U.S. direction is deemed indispensable to this effort:

Never has American leadership been more essential - to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our engagement....³⁹⁷

Engagement and Enlargement explicitly maps out the direction that U.S. foreign policy must take to foster democracy: First, America needs to strengthen the economic and security cooperation between existing democracies. Then, through careful and persuasive diplomacy, the U.S. must enlist the support of these fellow democracies in the crusade to further expand their fraternity. Specific steps to be taken to accomplish this goal include mobilizing resources and expertise to ease the transition to democracy for potential candidates, offering the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, strengthening the state's civil society, and combating

³⁹⁵Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 32.

³⁹⁶Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, i.

³⁹⁷Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, i.

corruption.³⁹⁸ Additionally, the U.S. must publicly proclaim an interest in preventing anti-democratic reversals and, if necessary, use force to combat that possibility:

[O]ur global interests and ideals lead us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors. At the same time, all nations should be able to expect their borders and their sovereignty will be secure; however, this does not mean we or the international community must tolerate gross violations of human rights within those borders.³⁹⁹

The preceding paragraphs outline an overly optimistic view of how to obtain national security. In actuality, the promotion of democracy is not a crucial, unconditional determinant of this nation's well-being. Its spread cannot guarantee the attainment of U.S. national interests such as prosperity, stability, and peace. Indeed, single-minded pursuit of this goal has hidden costs and can prove to be a counterproductive drain on resources which can serve to imperil national security.

Kissinger has noted that "The growth of democracy will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognise the obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming philosophical triumph."⁴⁰⁰ The first such stumbling block is the prohibitive cost that is involved. Nurturing a burgeoning democracy to fruition requires a tremendous investment of time, energy, and resources. While *Engagement and Enlargement* states that the selective use of military force may be necessary to "provide a window of opportunity"⁴⁰¹ for democracy to take root, it does not address how large that window must be or how long it will need to stay open. Thomas Falkenberg, an alumnus of Naval Postgraduate School and a Major in the German Air Force, believes that the

³⁹⁸Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 33-34.

³⁹⁹*Ibid.*, iii.

⁴⁰⁰Kissinger; quoted in "The Bloodhounds of History," *The Economist*. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.economist.com/issue/12-04-97/sf0860.html>. 12 May 1997.

⁴⁰¹Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, iii.

requirements for this "window" - and the subsequent investment of resources - are almost always greater than initially anticipated. To demonstrate this point he suggests that, despite the complete reconstruction of government institutions following World War II and more than a half-century of extensive economic and political support, not to mention the presence of occupying armies, democracy is still not comfortably consolidated in either Germany or Japan.⁴⁰²

Cambodia is another example of the expense associated with installing democracy. The bill for the UNTAC operation was estimated to be \$3 billion, an international investment unprecedented in size and scope.⁴⁰³ Yet, the operation was, ultimately, unsuccessful: democracy did not take.

The Cambodia example points to the second problem associated with making the advancement of democracy the primary emphasis for U.S. foreign policy: despite the potentially exorbitant outlay of resources, a return on the investment is not guaranteed. Walter Russell Mead vividly illustrates this point, comparing democracies to assorted members of the animal kingdom:

[W]e see beautiful democratic butterflies clawing their way out of authoritarian cocoons. It is a lovely and comforting metaphor, but countries take longer than butterflies to escape their cocoons. Sometimes much longer. [Additionally, when] butterflies escape their cocoons, it's a one-way trip. Butterflies don't turn back into caterpillars. With countries, it's different. Some are more like groundhogs than butterflies: They emerge for a few minutes, see their shadows and head back to the cave.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰²Thomas G. Falkenberg, classroom discussion, Civil-Military Relations and Transitions to Democracy (NS4225), 14 May 1997.

⁴⁰³Barbara Crossette, "Outsiders Gone, Cambodia Unravels," *New York Times*, 3 December 1995.

⁴⁰⁴Walter Russell Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy," *The National Times* (January/February 1997). Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nattimes.com/tntissues/i0297/delicate_birth.html. 19 July 1997. This op-ed article was originally printed in the *Los Angeles Times* on 29 September 1996.

Stromberg concurs, noting that the world seems to waver “endlessly back and forth between democracy and antidemocracy, finding neither tolerable for long.”⁴⁰⁵ According to Thomas Carothers, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, there is an extensive list of states which once reached out for democracy but which are now are moving, like a pendulum, in the opposite direction:

[P]olitical life in Russia is still only very partially democratic, and not especially stable.... Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, Belarus has quietly sunk into dictatorship. The Central Asian states are a dispiriting collection of politically retrograde entities. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are under absolutist rule.... In sub-Saharan Africa, the surge away from one-party regimes toward democracy has fragmented.... [M]any of the more than 30 countries that experienced political openings early in the decade have gone seriously off course.... The transition to democracy in Algeria, once held out as a model for Arab countries, was abruptly derailed in 1992 by a military takeover after Islamist victories in national elections, and has since degenerated into a vicious civil war. Yemen’s surprising experiment with democratization in the early 1990s...collapsed in 1994....⁴⁰⁶

Carothers adds that these failures demonstrate that “democratization will not be an end-of-the-century global deliverance from the strife, repression, and venality that afflict political life in so many parts of the world.”⁴⁰⁷ They also indicate the ultimate futility of making the unflagging promotion of democracy the principle foundation for U.S. foreign policy.

The difficult transition to democracy for these states has been hampered by the uneven commitment of American support. Despite fervent declarations of advocacy and the acknowledgment of the need for a “patient application of American will and resources,”⁴⁰⁸ U.S.

⁴⁰⁵Stromberg, 171.

⁴⁰⁶Carothers, 86-88.

⁴⁰⁷Ibid., 99.

⁴⁰⁸Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, iii.

patronage of fledgling democracies has been inconsistent. This can be attributed, in part, to the difficulty of steadfastly pursuing particular policy objectives inherent to all democracies. As noted earlier in this thesis, democratic decision-making is the product of concessions and compromises between different branches of the government, political parties, and personalities. The end result is not necessarily the coherent, consistent execution of policy. Indeed, as Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in *Democracy in America*:

It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me to be decidedly inferior to other governments. Foreign politics demands scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.⁴⁰⁹

The effect of the complicated and intricate machinations of democratic politics upon foreign policy is most easily demonstrated by the battle for control of the budget. The Clinton administration has sought funding to back its "democratic peace" rhetoric. The Republican Congress, however, has been somewhat skeptical of the utility of the requested appropriations. The end result, according to J. Brian Atwood, is the inability of the U.S. to put its money where its mouth is: "The budget cuts put us in the ironic position of having encouraged democratic change but not having the resources to effectuate change."⁴¹⁰ Funding for democracy in Russia is a pertinent example: initially pegged at \$1.6 billion in 1994, it has since dwindled to \$147 million.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1836); quoted in Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy."

⁴¹⁰J. Brian Atwood, interview, in Robin Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Hope Turns to Frustration as Wave of Freedom Ebbs," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 February 1997, p. A13. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.

⁴¹¹Richard L. Morningstar, "Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance Programs in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the Other Newly Independent States," prepared statement for the House Committee on International Relations, 13 June 1996, 48. Ambassador Morningstar is a Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Assistance to the Newly Independent States (NIS). The wide disparity between

According to Charles W. Maynes, former editor of *Foreign Policy*, the tendency to be miserly with aid to Russia and other former Communist states, has probably cost the U.S. a "decisive moment of influence."⁴¹²

Budgetary machinations may not be the only reason for lapses in America's drive to promote democracy. Despite routine expressions of idealism in American foreign policy, it seems that more than a hint of realism has crept into the Clinton administration's pursuit of national interests and security. Certainly this is not without precedent. Author G. Pope Atkins notes that historically:

U.S. attempts to extend the practices of representative democracy and protection of human rights have been ambiguous and vacillating. When resources have been committed to the goal of democratic development, it has usually been viewed as an instrumental objective aimed at achieving...other...long-range goals.⁴¹³

For the current administration, an overriding interest in short-term economic prosperity is clearly one of the "other long-range goals" that occasionally sidetracks the stated idealism of U.S. foreign policy. Thomas W. Lippman, staff writer for the *Washington Post*, concurs:

[W]hile concern over human rights abuses and restrictions on freedom are the determining factors in relations with some countries - notably Cuba and Burma - they are often subordinated to economic and strategic interests. The Clinton administration has made that choice most dramatically in the case of China.

these two figures is only partially explained by the plan to front-load funding in the first year so that the program would get off to a running start. The precipitous decline in allocations for subsequent years can be attributed to budget-cutting measures.

⁴¹²Charles W. Maynes, "The New Pessimism: Wasn't the Cold War Better?," *Current*, no. 378 (December 1995). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.

⁴¹³G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), 111-112; quoted in Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Exploring Democracy: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 218.

Strategic and economic concerns there are so powerful that Albright, Vice President Gore, and President Clinton are all planning to visit this year despite what yesterday's [U.S. State Department human rights] report called "widespread and well documented human rights abuses."⁴¹⁴

Whether the frequent reversals in U.S. foreign policy are caused by partisan bickering and the resulting budgetary pressures, or momentary lapses into pragmatism, they can be frustrating and bewildering to the states that are the recipients of this inconsistent attention. And, if "do as I say, not as I do" is not a particularly effective method for a parent to raise a child, it is especially inappropriate for the global promotion of democracy. Jose Ramos-Horta, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner, agrees, noting that skepticism "about U.S. good intentions or professed ideals about promoting democracy" generally prevails because "U.S. policy is full of complex contradictions."⁴¹⁵

Indeed, the growing skepticism of the global audience has become yet another impediment to the successful achievement of national security through the promotion democracy. Cynics suggest that the policy reversals discussed above reveal the true nature of both the Clinton administration and U.S. policy in general: idealistic and moralistic proclamations, such as those found in the two most recent statements national security strategy, serve as propaganda for public consumption, while the U.S. pursues a policy of uninhibited, unabashed self-interest. Certainly this

⁴¹⁴Thomas W. Lippman, "State Dept. Human Rights Report Chastises Several U.S. Allies," *Washington Post*, 31 January 1997, p. A16. Online. Available HTTP: <http://wp4.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/searches/mainsrch.htm>. 17 August 1997.

⁴¹⁵Jose Ramos-Horta, quoted in Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Hope Turns to Frustration as Wave of Freedom Ebbs."

is how many states perceive the U.S. crusade for democracy. As Niebuhr wrote:

[W]e are still inclined to pretend that our power is exercised by a particularly virtuous nation. The uniqueness of our virtue is questioned both by our friends and our enemies.⁴¹⁶

Given the exorbitant expense involved, the ephemeral nature of any possible successes, partisan political quarrels over funding, unpredictable shifts toward pragmatism, and general skepticism about U.S. motives and intentions, the current basis of national security strategy, that U.S. foreign policy be used as a tool to promote democracy in order to secure peace and stability, is simply unrealistic. The time, energy, resources, and political capital that would have to be expended in this endeavor would be better applied to less grandiose, more practicable goals.

B. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: STRETCHED TOO THIN

The means of security can only be regulated by the means and dangers of attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these rules and no others....⁴¹⁷

Engagement and Enlargement proclaims that U.S. "military might is unparalleled"⁴¹⁸ and that our armed forces are "the best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared fighting force in the world."⁴¹⁹ Moreover, "the United States is the only nation able to conduct large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders."⁴²⁰ The only thing that the U.S. military lacks is a

⁴¹⁶Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), ix; quoted in Muravchik, 23.

⁴¹⁷James Madison, in James E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1961); quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., *The New World Strategy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 59.

⁴¹⁸Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, i.

⁴¹⁹*Ibid.*, iii.

⁴²⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

formidable adversary. Since the end of the Cold War no single state is able to challenge U.S. military supremacy.

America's leaders have responded with a two-pronged plan of attack designed to wring a peace dividend from this happy post-Cold War state of affairs. First, they cut defense spending and downsized the military; not a particularly novel course of action. Major George C. Marshall remarked in 1923 that, "We continue to follow a remarkable cycle of the doing and undoing of measures for the National Defense."⁴²¹ Second, they have sought to get more bang for their buck by employing the military in new missions that support U.S. values and interests. Chief among these missions - and this should not be a surprise - is the promotion of democracy. By securing peace and stability, the military can provide the "window of opportunity" for democracy to thrive.

According to *Strategy for a New Century*, the scope of operations in which U.S. forces might be employed to achieve national objectives is quite varied:

The U.S. military conducts smaller-scale contingency operations to vindicate national interests. These operations encompass the full-range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions.⁴²²

The use of military force at a lesser level of conflict is justified by the hope that it will alleviate the need for a more substantial commitment later: "Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts."⁴²³ And, of course, there is the obligatory, almost

⁴²¹George C. Marshall, "The Effect of School Histories on National Defense," *Report of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States*, 7-8 March 1923; quoted in Summers, 133.

⁴²²Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 12.

⁴²³*Ibid.*, ii.

instinctive acknowledgment that any deployment of troops must serve U.S. national interests: "We must be selective in the use of our capabilities, and the choices we make always must be guided by advancing our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free America."⁴²⁴

The U.S. military has not been particularly enthusiastic about its new set of missions. In November 1994, William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, accepted the new emphasis on operations other than war (OOTW), but groused:

[O]rdinarily the Defense Department will not be involved in humanitarian operations because of the need to focus on its war-fighting missions. We field an army, not a Salvation Army.⁴²⁵

Still, the military, as it always does, has responded to this new direction with a crisp salute and an hearty "Yes, Sir." General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), confirmed acceptance of these new requirements: "Under this national strategy we will enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability, promoting cooperative security measures, working to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth, and promoting democracy abroad."⁴²⁶ He added that "the challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon."⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 3.

⁴²⁵William Perry, "Rules of Engagement," speech, 4 November 1994, reprinted in *Defense Issues* 9, no. 84 (1994); quoted in Summers, 167.

⁴²⁶John M. Shalikashvili, cover letter, *National Military Strategy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1995).

⁴²⁷*Ibid.*

The most recent *National Military Strategy* (1995), responds to *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* and the findings of the Bottom-up Review. It has three pillars: Fight and Win, Deterrence and Conflict Prevention, and Peacetime Engagement. Fight and Win, as explicitly explained by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, is the U.S. military's primary mission:

Let me begin by giving a little bit of a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture within the Armed Forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win this nation's wars.⁴²⁸

As Powell has indicated the remaining two pillars of national military strategy are concerned with OOTW that are designed to promote U.S. national interests. The missions that fall within this spectrum of operations are referenced by a confusing and sometimes redundant array of titles such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, humanitarian operations, nation assistance, nation building, and preventive diplomacy. It is sufficient to understand that they are military operations with the possibility of conflict (on a scale less than war) which are pursued to achieve national interests. Frequently, the national interest in question is, of course, the opportunity to promote democracy:

The community of democratic nations and free-market economies is growing throughout the world - a trend consistent with U.S. interests. The United States is committed to supporting nations transitioning into this community and therefore will assist in efforts to defend against threats to democratic and economic reform....⁴²⁹

⁴²⁸Colin L. Powell, press conference for *The Bottom-Up Review*, 1 September 1993; quoted in Summers, 85.

⁴²⁹Shalikashvili, cover letter, *National Military Strategy*, 3.

A robust, flexible military is the key to any nation's security. Without such a force to fight conflicts when called upon, security becomes a hopeless illusion. U.S. national security strategy recognizes this fact: "military force remains an indispensable element of our nation's power."⁴³⁰ But, at the same time, it levies inordinate requirements - in the form of these operations other than war - that compromise the ability of the U.S. armed forces to act effectively in time of conflict.

In addition to the OOTW discussed previously, the military must be able to fulfill the requirement to simultaneously win two major regional contingencies (MRCs): "For the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."⁴³¹ To be able to meet this requirement, the military must invest in "readiness," that is, training, operations, and maintenance, which allow "forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deploy without unacceptable delays to perform the tasks for which they were designed."⁴³² According to *Joint Vision 2010*, the military's template for future warfighting, "Realistic and stressful training has been the primary way to keep readiness high and prepare our men and women to face the challenges of combat."⁴³³ Such training, whether it is scaled for an individual, a crew, or a larger organization, costs money. As does the requirement to "maintain the technological superiority of U.S. forces"⁴³⁴ through selective modernization.

⁴³⁰Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, iii.

⁴³¹Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 12.

⁴³²J. Matthew Vaccaro, "Peace Operations and Combat Readiness," in Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, eds., *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 68.

⁴³³John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 6.

⁴³⁴Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 13.

If all of these requirements are balanced against the trend of flat or decreasing defense budgets, the figures will not balance. According to political scientist Dennis S. Ippolito, even the most creative of accounting techniques cannot possibly make the math work:

Assuming that planned forces can adequately support official strategy, can projected budgets maintain these forces at prudent levels of readiness and modernization? Here, the overwhelming consensus is that funding will prove to be inadequate....⁴³⁵

Although Franklin C. Spinney, an analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, takes a slightly different tack with his examination of the Quadrennial Defense Review, he reaches essentially the same conclusion: "Many observers, including myself, do not believe this force structure is large enough to execute these strategies, particularly when the high rates of overseas rotations reduce readiness by wearing out equipment, degrading training, and depressing morale."⁴³⁶

It is an understatement to suggest that the repeated use of the military for lesser contingencies, whether in pursuit of valid national interests or not, "confronts military thinkers with a host of nettlesome doctrinal, training, financial, and operational issues...."⁴³⁷ At some point you simply cannot "do more with less." Clearly, something has to give, and it does not appear that it is going to be the myriad of operations other than war in which U.S. forces increasingly find themselves engaged. Despite rhetoric that promises that the U.S. will only engage in peace operations that are clearly vital to the nation's interests, American participation has climbed from

⁴³⁵Dennis S. Ippolito, *Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 1.

⁴³⁶Franklin C. Spinney, "Quadrennial Defense Review: What Went Wrong? How to Fix It," position paper, 20 June 1997 (version 2.3), 1.

⁴³⁷Hans Binnendijk, *Strategic Assessment 1996* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 129.

25 operations in the period from 1982 to 1985 to triple that figure for the same time period a decade later.⁴³⁸

So far, the preoccupation with OOTW has not impeded America's ability to respond to a major regional contingency. But, this may be due more to luck than skillful planning. Harry G. Summers, Jr., a retired Army Colonel who is now an author and commentator on military affairs, suggests that the U.S. narrowly avoided catastrophe when, in the midst of humanitarian support operations in Rwanda, a crisis flared in Korea.⁴³⁹ Eric Schmitt, a correspondent for the *New York Times*, reported that the U.S. Army "sent five ships full of trucks medical supplies and tents from Saipan, Thailand and Diego Garcia - supplies earmarked to supply American troops in Korea if a war erupts there - to the crisis in central Africa."⁴⁴⁰

While the U.S. has not (yet) been forced to hurriedly disengage from a peace operation to answer the call to war, its ability to do just that may already be compromised. Excessive participation in peace operations and other lesser contingencies has accompanying baggage in terms of opportunity costs, hidden costs, and actual expenses which, more often than not, are borne by operational units. The opportunity costs for units involved in these operations include postponed or neglected maintenance periods and an excessive rate of wear and tear on equipment. More significant is the missed training time for troops. Although participation in peace operations can provide an excellent learning experience that strengthens problem-solving skills and fosters unit cohesion, it may also lead to a diminution of that unit's war-fighting capability. The General

⁴³⁸Stinson Center, in Binnedijk, 129. The U.S. engaged in 81 peace operations from 1992-1995.

⁴³⁹Summer, 166.

⁴⁴⁰Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," *New York Times*, 31 July 1994; quoted in Summer, 166.

Accounting Office reports that:

Combat skills can atrophy if not used or practiced repeatedly. Each peace operation offers unique conditions that may affect combat capabilities differently, depending upon the nature and duration of the mission and other variables (such as the type of unit involved and the skills employed). These variables also affect the amount of time needed to recover war-fighting skills after a peace operation.⁴⁴¹

There are also hidden costs associated with maintaining excessive operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to satisfy the myriad U.S. commitments to lesser contingencies. These include a reduction in retention rates, lowered morale, and personnel problems such as declining performance, substance abuse, and divorce. A GAO analysis that attempted to quantify these hidden costs was inconclusive due to a lack of data. The report did note, however, that, over a four-year period, high-deploying units

had elements that were deployed for more than one-half of each year. Peace operations were the driving force behind the increases, accompanied by smaller increases in joint activities.... [D]iscussions with officials in major commands revealed pronounced concerns about [the relationship between] personnel problems [and this rate of OPTEMPO].⁴⁴²

While the hidden and opportunity costs are a difficult burden to bear for the units that deploy in response to a particular contingency, the actual expenses associated with those operations becomes a hardship for the units that stay behind:

Despite repeated involvement in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, advance funding has not been provided. Therefore, in order to offset contingency costs, the Services must draw upon the Operations and Maintenance Accounts (OMA) of units that are not deployed. This, in turn, means that bill-

⁴⁴¹U.S. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, October 1995, 28.

⁴⁴²*Ibid.*, 2-3.

paying units will have to curtail training, defer maintenance or replenishment of supply stocks, or take some other action that will likely undermine short- and perhaps long-term readiness. If reimbursement is delayed too long, the effects of the initial shifts cascade....⁴⁴³

And, according to Gordon Sullivan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, the system for reimbursement has "failed to provide for timely reimbursements or reprogramming of funds, and when it has done so, it has never been at 100% of our costs."⁴⁴⁴

Thus, for U.S. troops, involvement in a seemingly endless number of operations other than war has resulted in an overall decline in combat readiness. It should not be suggested, however, that the U.S. completely abandon these operations. Indeed, Denis McLean, former Ambassador to the United States from New Zealand, notes that such a course of action may, in the long run, be even more costly: "Peace operations start at the 'ounce-of-prevention' end of the scale of conflict resolution; a relatively modest, timely collective effort can accomplish much and avoid the need for a much more demanding unilateral 'pound of cure' later."⁴⁴⁵ Instead, we must apply the "rigorous criteria"⁴⁴⁶ that is promised in the national security strategy to determine whether U.S. armed forces should be deployed, rather than respond reflexively to the provocative images displayed on CNN. And, there must be realistic expectations both on the part of politicians and the public concerning what the deployment of U.S. troops will actually accomplish. Confidence in their ability to restore peace is certainly warranted. However, faith in their ability to create a

⁴⁴³Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, "Beyond Fighting and Winning," in Chayes, 12.

⁴⁴⁴Gordon Sullivan, letter to Senator John McCain, 7 December 1994; quoted in George T. Raach, "Military Perspectives on Peace Operations," in Chayes, 92.

⁴⁴⁵Denis McLean, *Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, June 1996), ix.

⁴⁴⁶Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 23.

window of opportunity to resolve centuries-old animosities and build democratic institutions is simply unrealistic. As recognized by General Shalikashvili, a balance must be struck between circumspection and intervention:

The notion that we exist, first and foremost, to fight our nation's wars I subscribe to. But I also say "In this new world we cannot deny our government a very important tool to try to manage crises, bring stability to an area, deal with operations that overwhelm traditional humanitarian organizations." But you have to be selective - or you could fritter away resources and capabilities.⁴⁴⁷

C. U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: FRAGMENTED SUPPORT

The reason why the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.⁴⁴⁸

The U.S. intelligence community faces a problem that is quite similar to that of the armed forces: an era of increasing requirements and decreasing budgets. *Engagement and Enlargement* outlines, in general terms, what is expected of the U.S. intelligence community: "Strong intelligence capabilities are needed to protect our nation by providing warning of threats to U.S. national security, by providing support to the policy and military communities to prevail over these threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national interests through support to diplomacy."⁴⁴⁹

The specific tasks of this community begin with traditional, bread-and-butter intelligence missions. These include indications and warning of war or other forms of conflict, support for military operations, assessment of emerging situations and problems in support of decision-making

⁴⁴⁷John M. Shalikashvili, *New York Times Magazine*, 21 May 1995; quoted in McLean, 13.

⁴⁴⁸Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*; quoted in Binnendjik, 69.

⁴⁴⁹Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 24.

by national command authority (NCA) and other policymakers, monitoring emerging advanced technologies, providing protection against hostile foreign intelligence services (counterintelligence), and the ability to undertake covert action.

Support for military operations is an especially important function of the intelligence community, particularly "at a time when we have a smaller military that is being asked to take on a wider number of different challenges in remote and unfamiliar areas of the world."⁴⁵⁰ In turn, the fact that the intelligence support must match the broader scope of operations now borne by the military directly contributes to the difficulties that the intelligence community has in making ends meet. Indeed, Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense, once noted that, "Using the military to protect our values overseas...drives the intelligence community crazy because there is no way to anticipate where values issues might crop up next."⁴⁵¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a "New World Order," complete with novel opportunities and challenges. Not coincidentally, it brought with it a host of new intelligence missions. The first of these is derived from the recognition that future U.S. military action is more likely than not to be in concert with a multinational coalition:

No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot always secure [our] goals unilaterally.... [T]he threats and challenges we face frequently demand cooperative, multinational solutions.⁴⁵²

Intelligence support to coalition activities presents a unique set of problems. These include the sanitization of shared intelligence so that U.S. sources or methods are not revealed, devising timely

⁴⁵⁰John Deutch, speech to the graduating class of the National Defense University, 1995; quoted in Binnedijk, 69.

⁴⁵¹Les Aspin, quoted in Binnedijk, 65.

⁴⁵²Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 12.

but secure means of dissemination at multiple levels of security, and ensuring that there are provisions for the proper storage and protection of classified material once it has been relinquished to a coalition partner. Although these extra requirements are somewhat of a hindrance, it is generally accepted that, because it is "in our national interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain and restore peace,"⁴⁵³ the benefits accrued far outweigh any costs and inconveniences.

This is not necessarily the case with some of the other, less conventional tasks now assigned to the intelligence community. *Engagement and Enlargement* states that, "The collection and analysis of economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policymakers understand economic trends," and adds that, "Intelligence must also identify emerging threats that could affect the international economy and the stability of some nation states...."⁴⁵⁴ The fact that there are experts on Wall Street who do just this sort of thing for a living, at considerably higher salaries than most government employees, seems to have been ignored. If members of the intelligence community were able to perform this function as well the bankers and brokers that do it now, they would probably quickly trade their uniforms in for three-piece suits.

Other missions, such as the requirements to combat drug trafficking and track environmental damage, are extraneous, often futile tasks designed to provide the facade of political correctness. The size of the former problem exceeds the resources of the community and places intelligence organizations uncomfortably close to the realm of domestic spying. The latter requirement demands expertise that is more likely to be found in the halls of academe than in the

⁴⁵³Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 12.

⁴⁵⁴Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 25.

intelligence community. And both demand resources that, if applied elsewhere, would be more effective in obtaining the ultimate goal of national security.

Finally, there is the completely nebulous and impracticable: "Intelligence support is also required to develop and implement policies to promote democracy abroad."⁴⁵⁵ How, exactly, does one go about accomplishing this task? What concrete, practical steps can be taken by the intelligence community to further this objective?

The National Defense University's *Strategic Assessment 1996* sums up the dilemma currently facing America's intelligence organizations: "the post-Cold War poses unprecedented challenges for the U.S. intelligence community: it must function effectively, against a broad range of threats, in an environment of unparalleled openness and oversight, but with dwindling resources."⁴⁵⁶ The New World Order is, in fact, quite disorderly, with crises and conflicts erupting across the globe. While the intelligence community has tried to cope with these new challenges, it has not been able to dispense with any of its old concerns. Intelligence collection designed to provide indications and warning of war on the Korean peninsula continues today, as do attempts to track Russian naval combatants, or monitor Chinese nuclear weapons testing. The preceding discussion concerning the demands that are placed on the military also holds true for the intelligence community: increasing requirements while reducing resources is not a prudent way to conduct business. Hard choices must be made to determine exactly which intelligence activities will best serve this nation's security.

⁴⁵⁵Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 14.

⁴⁵⁶Binnendijk, 62.

VI. CONCLUSION

Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own....⁴⁵⁷

Current U.S. national security strategy, premised on democratic peace theory, delineates democracy as the key to this nation's well-being. As democratic states do not go to war with one another, democracy is deemed to be the single most important criterion by which we choose both our friends and our causes. It is the password to an exclusive club of fraternal states, as well as a clarion call for help that immediately summons American aid and intervention. Democracy is ultimately viewed as the means to achieve desired ends, namely, national interests and, of course, national security. But political scientist John L. Harper states this view is not only inaccurate, it is perilous: "the democratic peace hypothesis does more than misrepresent the way the world actually works: it is a dangerous and misleading recipe that, if followed will cause America's leaders to neglect the country's true security needs."⁴⁵⁸

The heart of the problem is that U.S. policymakers frequently confuse values with interests. Democracy is a value rather than a national interest. And, while it may be universally possible, democracy has proven to be exceedingly difficult to consolidate in states throughout the

⁴⁵⁷John Quincy Adams, speech, 4 July 1921, in Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); quoted in Summers, 32.

⁴⁵⁸John L. Harper, "The Dream of Democratic Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 118.

world. Indeed, the unrestrained promotion of democracy appears to be a vain pursuit that garners little in exchange for the time, energy, and resources that are expended.

Nor can the spread of democracy be viewed as an effective means to achieve sought-after ends. An expanded community of democratic states will not guarantee peace, stability, economic prosperity, or the nation's security. Indeed, in some instances, these interests directly conflict with the promotion of democracy:

The world...is a messy place. What happens...when the quest for democracy conflicts with other U.S. interests? A desire to support democratic change in China runs up against our economic interests. Strategic interest in the Middle East have led Washington to keep quiet about the lack of democracy in...Saudi Arabia.⁴⁵⁹

Democracies, like all states, pursue a course of action that is deemed to be in their best interests. In doing so, they may engage in many activities that threaten the security of other states, whether those states are fellow democracies or not. Harper concurs, noting that "a country may feel solidarity toward other countries with similar political values and institutions," but the "one indispensable factor in forming reliable partnerships is not democracy or the lack of it, but self-interest, and there is not the slightest reason to think that will change."⁴⁶⁰

If every other state in the international realm pursues a course of action dictated by national interest, the U.S. can hardly afford to abstain from this process. Indeed, "moral impulses are dangerous if not accompanied by a sense of pragmatic self-interest."⁴⁶¹ Certainly it makes sense to pursue national goals directly rather than hope that they will be realized incidentally through the

⁴⁵⁹Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy."

⁴⁶⁰Harper, 117, 120.

⁴⁶¹"Good Intentions," *The Economist*, 23 November 1996, p. 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 August 1997.

blessings of universal democracy. U.S. financial assistance to Russia is a prime example: aid designed to foster democratic institutions has not been particularly successful in contributing to "significant changes in Russia's political, legal, or social system"⁴⁶² and is generally deemed to be to be a less important than independent economic and political factors.⁴⁶³ In contrast, direct U.S. funding to destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction - a pursuit clearly in this nation's interest - has been an unqualified success. According to John Ruberto, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs for Defense Conversion, "the CTR [Cooperative Threat Reduction] program contributed to thousands of nuclear warheads being removed from their missiles and [safely] transported to storage areas for subsequent disposition, to hundreds of missiles, submarines, bombers and intercontinental ballistic missile silos being destroyed, and to the overall nuclear threat to the United States being greatly reduced."⁴⁶⁴

The key to national security is therefore quite apparent: the U.S. must clearly define tangible goals that are in this nation's interests, such as deterring regional adversaries, opening markets to U.S. trade, reducing weapons of mass destruction, and combating international organized crime. Then, appropriate resources must be allocated so that direct action can be taken to achieve these goals. This prescription for national security is not particularly novel, nor is it revolutionary. In fact, *A Strategy for a New Century* echoes these sentiments: "Our resources are finite...so we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect

⁴⁶²U.S. General Accounting Office, *Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to Russia*, February 1996, 2.

⁴⁶³*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁶⁴John Ruberto, "Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance programs in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the Other Newly Independent States," testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, 13 June 1996, 9.

our interests and engaging where we can make the most difference.”⁴⁶⁵ It is just that something has been lost somewhere between the proclamation of this policy and its practical implementation.

While defining national interests may seem to some to be a simple, almost self-evident task, it is, in fact, a difficult endeavor. Interests tend to be moving targets that are subject to both the particular perspectives of the leaders that invoke them and the vicissitudes of the international environment. Indeed, the concept of national interest itself has long been criticized as a meaningless term of convenience which can be used to justify any course of action in any circumstance. Despite the amorphous, unsatisfactory nature of this term, it cannot be denied that leaders and polities are compelled by some force, perhaps self-preservation or the simple desire to improve their lot in life, to pursue certain objectives. For the pursuit to be successful, U.S. policymakers must first adequately define what it is they are looking for and then set a course of action to attain it. If national interests can be successfully expressed in terms of definitive expectations and tangible results, it will help ensure that U.S. armed forces and the intelligence community that supports them are funded and deployed in a realistic and effective manner to pursue these objectives.

Finally, U.S. national security strategy should comply with truth-in-advertising restrictions. That is, not only should the U.S. reserve the right to take actions that it deems to be in its national interests, but it should state, straightforwardly, that it intends do to so in cases where interests conflict with a professed attachment to idealistic values. In doing so, the United States will alleviate a great source of consternation, frustration, and suspicion among allies, friends, and potential partners.

⁴⁶⁵Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 14.

A national security strategy grounded in self-interest should not be viewed as a dictate to “purge our foreign policy of all sentimentality”⁴⁶⁶ as Kissinger phrases it. Rather, it is a call to subject idealism to realistic, obtainable, practicable and profitable goals. If promoting a democratic leader in a particular state meets these criteria, then that course of action should be wholeheartedly pursued. But, as explained by Mead, caution must be exercised:

We should not bark at the moon. While furthering democracy in other countries can...play a role in U.S. diplomacy, we can’t base our global strategy on the illusion that the permanent victory of democracy is just around the corner.⁴⁶⁷

Muravchik concurs, noting that “at times we must choose lesser evils, that idealism must be expressed with due respect for reality, and that policies must be judged by their consequences, not by their nobility of intentions.”⁴⁶⁸

Current U.S. national security strategy is long on idealism and good intentions, but distressingly bereft of realistic and practical direction. Its simple prescription of democracy as the key to securing national interests relies on convoluted and fallacious logic. Ultimately, the pursuit of democracy at all costs expends valuable resources and leaves the U.S. unprepared to meet challenges to national security. Therefore, democratic peace theory is a perilous proposition upon which to gamble this nation’s security.

⁴⁶⁶“The Bloodhounds of History.”

⁴⁶⁷Mead, “The Delicate Birth of Democracy.”

⁴⁶⁸Muravchik, 36.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Afanasyev, Yuri N. "Russian Reform is Dead." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 21-26.

Allen, Thomas B. and Norman Polmar. *Merchants of Treason*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1988.

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment*. Garden City, NY.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981.

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. Compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

Andrew, Christopher. *For the President's Eyes Only*. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

"Attack in Phnom Penh Raises Spectre of Anarchy." *The Nation*, 31 March 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NATION. 30 May 1997.

Augustine, Norman R. "Economic Espionage." Prepared statement submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 32.

Aung San Suu Kyi, "Democracy, the Common Heritage of Humanity." Address written by Suu Kyi and delivered at her request by Corazon Aquino, UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development meeting, Manila, Philippines, 21 December 1994. Extracts published in *UNESCO Courier*, issue 3 (March 1995): 5-8.

Aung San Suu Kyi. "Freedom, Development, and Human Worth." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 2 (April 1995): 11-19.

Aung San Suu Kyi. Message to the International Convention for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, New Delhi, India, 4 January 1996. Published in BurmaNet News (Internet), 6 January 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 3 June 1997.

"Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Ethnic, Pro-Democracy Groups to Join Forces." *Agence France Presse*, 12 February 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: AFP. 27 May 1997.

Barber, Benjamin R. *Jihad vs. McWorld*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

Barnett, Frank R. "Preface." *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1985, vii-ix.

Bartlett, Bruce. "Misguided Spying for Economic Prizes?" *Washington Times*, 15 March 1997, p. C1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WTIMES. 15 August 1997.

Bilahari, Kausikan. "Governance That Works." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 24-34.

Binnedijk, Hans. *Strategic Assessment 1996*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.

Black, Ian and Benny Morris. *Israel's Secret Wars*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.

"The Bloodhounds of History," *The Economist*. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.economist.com/issue/12-04-97/sf0860.html>. 12 May 1997.

Blum, William. *The CIA: A Forgotten History*. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Blum, William. "Teaching Communist What Democracy is All About." *CovertAction*, no. 51 (Winter 1994-95): 28-32.

Brazeal, Aurelia E. "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia." Testimony before the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: HILLPR. 30 May 1997.

Bowen John R. "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (October 1996): 3-14.

Brown, Fredrick Z "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace." Prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 36-49.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Premature Partnership." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 67-82.

Callahan, Mary P. "Burma in 1995: Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi." *Asian Survey* xxxvi, no. 2 (February 1996): 158-164.

Callahan, Mary P. "Critique of Research Paper." *Memorandum*, 12 July 1997, 1-2.

Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Without Illusions." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 85-99.

Chandler, David. *A History of Modern Cambodia*. Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1996.

Chayes, Antonia Handler and George T. Raach. "Beyond Fighting and Winning." *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. Edited by Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995, 3-22.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington D.C.: The White House, February 1996.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington D.C.: The White House, May 1997.

Clinton, William J. *Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage*, July 1995. Online. Information supplier unknown. Available HTTP:<http://nsi.org/Library/Espionage/indust.htm>. No date.

Codevilla, Angelo. "Covert Action and Foreign Policy." *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1985, 79-104.

Cohen, Yvan. "Who Really Rules Cambodia? Rivals Square Off." *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 March 1997. Online. No date. Available HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com>. 26 May 1997.

"Commentary," Phnom Penh National Radio of Cambodia Network, 5 June 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997.

The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Compiled in *Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf*. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.

Craner, Lorne W. "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace." Prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 52-58.

Craner, Lorne W. "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace." Testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 14-15.

Crossette, Barbara. "Outsiders Gone, Cambodia Unravels." *New York Times*, 3 December 1995.

Del Rosso, Stephen J., Jr, "The Insecure State: What Future for the State?" *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (22 March 1995): 175. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

"Democracies and War: The Politics of Peace." *The Economist*, 1 April 1995, 18.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner. "Introduction." *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, ix-xxx.

Diamond, Larry. "Three Paradoxes of Democracy." *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 95-107.

Doyle, Michael W. "Michael Doyle on the Democratic Peace - Again." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 364-73.

Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 3-57.

Dreyfuss, Robert. "Spy vs. No-Spy." *New Republic* 215, no. 26 (23 December 1996): 9-10.

Dziak, John J. "Reflections on the Counterintelligence State." *In the Name of Intelligence*. Edited by Walter Pforzheimer, Hayden B. Peake, and Samuel Halpern, eds. Washington D.C.: NIBC Press, 1994, 261-275.

Emmerson, Donald K. "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 4 (October 1995): 95-105.

Esposito, John L. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

Esposito, John L. "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace." *Current History* 93, no. 579 (January 1994). Online. MSANEWS Ohio State University. Available HTTP: <http://www.mynet.net/~msanews>. 7 May 1997.

"Ethnic Groups with Cease-Fire Agreements." Burma Project. Online. Open Society Institute, November 1996. Available HTTP: <http://www.soros.org/burma/ethngrps.html>. 30 May 1997.

Evans, Joseph C. "U.S. Business Competitiveness and the Intelligence Community." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 353-361.

Falkenberg, Thomas G. Classroom discussion. Civil-Military Relations and Transitions to Democracy (NS4225), 14 May 1997.

Farsoun, Samih K. and Mehrdad Mashayekhi. "Introduction: Iran's Political Culture." *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic*. Edited by Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi. London: Routledge, 1992, 1-29.

Fialka, John J. *War By Other Means: Economic Espionage in America*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Ford, Peter. "Can an Islamic Government Foster Democratic Rights?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 April 1993, p. 10. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com>. 11 May 1997.

Forsythe, David P. "Democracy, War, and Covert Action." *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992), 385-395.

Fraumann, Edwin. "Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined." *Public Administration Review* 57, no. 4 (July/August 1997): 303-308.

Freeh, Louis. "Economic Espionage." Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 10-15.

Fukuyama, Francis. "Comments on Nationalism and Democracy." *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 23-28

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The Primacy of Culture." *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 7-14.

Gerber, Albert B. *Sex, Pornography, and Justice*. New York: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1965.

Ghosh, Amitav. "A Reporter at Large: Burma." *New Yorker*, 12 August 1996, 38-54.

Godson, Roy. "Covert Action in the 1990s: Neither Exceptional Tool nor Magic Bullet." *Covert Action in the 1990s*. Washington D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993, 1-57.

Godson, Roy. *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards*. Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1995.

Godson, Roy. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action*. Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1985.

Goldsmith, Arthur A. "Democracy, Property Rights, and Economic Growth." *Journal of Development Studies* 32, no. 2 (December, 1995). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 2 June 1997.

"Good Intentions," *The Economist*, 23 November 1996, p. 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 August 1997.

Greve, Frank. "Documents Reveal French Plans to Spy on 49 U.S. Companies." *Orange County Register* (Calif.), 18 April 1993, p. A12. Online LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: Not listed. 15 August 1997.

Hamdi, Mohamed Elachmi. "The Limits of the Western Model." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 81-85.

Harper, John L. "The Dream of Democratic Peace." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 117-121.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. *Paris or The Future of War*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1925.

Hathout, Gasser. "Perspective on Islam and Democracy," 26 September 1996. Online. Islamic Intellectual Forum. Available HTTP: <http://www.islamforum.org/democracy.html>. 8 May 1997.

Held, David. "Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order?" *Prospects for Democracy*. Edited by David Held. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993, 13-52.

Hitam, Musa. Interview in "The Rights Debate; It Would gain From Less Big-Power Politics and More Attention to Economics." *Asiaweek*, 1 December 1995, p. 55. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASIAWK. 27 May 1997.

Hobbes, Thomas. "Relations Among Sovereigns." *Classic Readings of International Relations*. Edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994, 28-30.

Holt, Pat M. *Secret Intelligence and Public Policy*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995.

Hugar, Wayne. Classroom discussion. Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, 11 June 1997.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (May/June 1993): 22. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Democracy's Third Wave." *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 3-25.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

"Indonesia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996." *Department of State Human Rights Country Reports*. February 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: unknown. 27 May 1997.

Immerman, Richard H. *The CIA in Guatemala*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.

Ippolito, Dennis S. *Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy*. Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

Jefferson, Thomas. Correspondence "To Hunter." *Democracy*. Edited by Saul K. Padover. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939.

Jeldres, Julio A. "Cambodia's Fading Hopes." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 148-157.

Jones, Sidney. "The Role of Commercial Diplomacy; Human Rights in Asia." *Current*, no. 390 (February 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.

Karabell, Zachary., "Fundamental Misconceptions: Islamic Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy*, no. 105 (December 1996): 76. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASPAII. 27 May 1997.

Kim Dae Jung. "Is Culture Destiny." *Foreign Affairs*, 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 189-194.

Kinzer, Stephen. "Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change." *New York Times*, 26 May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/world/iran-rdp.htm>. 26 May 1997.

Kinzer, Stephen. "Moderate Leader is Elected in Iran by a Wide Margin." *New York Times*, 25 May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/early/052iran-election.html>. 26 May 1997.

Kissinger, Henry A. *American Foreign Policy*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977.

Kissinger, Henry A. "United States Foreign Policy: The Future of International Relations Depends Largely On Ourselves." Address delivered at the 106th Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 29 April, 1996. Published in *Vital Speeches of the Day* 62, no. 16 (1 June 1996): 486-488.

Knight, Amy. *Spies Without Cloaks*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Kramer, Gudrun. "Islamist Notions of Democracy." *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report*. Edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 71-82.

Lancaster, John. "Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not New System." *Washington Post*, 26 May 1997, p. A01. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iran/iranlect.htm>. 26 May 1997.

Layne, Christopher. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of a Democratic Peace." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 157-201.

Leach, Edmund R. "The Frontiers of 'Burma'." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3, no. 1 (October 1960): 49-68.

Lewis, Bernard. "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 52-63.

Lieven, Anatoli. "Freedom and Anarchy: Russia Stumbles Toward the Twenty-First Century." *Washington Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WASHQR. 30 May 1997.

- Lincoln, Abraham. "Gettysburg Address." *Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*. Edited by E.D. Hirsch Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil. Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 1991.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Lippman, Thomas W. "State Dept. Human Rights Report Chastises Several U.S. Allies," *Washington Post*, 31 January 1997, p. A16. Online. Available HTTP: <http://wp4.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/searches/mainsrch.htm>. 17 August 1997.
- Lord, Winston. "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace." Testimony before House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 3-12.
- Lynn-Jones, Sean M. "Preface." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, ix-xxxiii.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. "Recommendations for the Prince." *Classic Readings of International Relations*. Edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994, 24-27.
- Madison, James. "No. 10." In Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Mentor Books, 1961.
- Malay, Ricardo. "Suharto losing His Cool." *Manila Chronicle*, 19 August 1996, p. 4. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997.
- Maynes, Charles W. "The New Pessimism: Wasn't the Cold War Better?" *Current*, no. 378 (December 1995). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.
- Mayor, Federico. "Commentary." *UNESCO Courier*, issue 4 (April 1996): 38-39.
- Mazarr, Michael J. "Culture and International Relations." *Current*, no. 382 (May 1996): 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.
- McAllister, David. Classroom discussion. Research Colloquium. Monterey, 6 June 1997.
- McDaniel, Tim. "Out of the Past." *The New Republic* 215, issue 20 (11 November 1996): 16-20.
- McLean, Denis. *Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, June 1996, ix.
- Mead, Walter Russell. "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy." *The National Times* (January/February 1997). Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nattimes.com/tntissues/i0297/delicate_birth.html. 19 July 1997.

Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War." *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*. Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993, 141-192.

Metzenbaum, Howard M. "Economic Intelligence." Comments before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 5 August 1993, 2-3.

Minihan, Kenneth A. *National Cryptologic Strategy for the 21st Century*. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1996.

"A 'Moderate' in Tehran," *Washington Post*, 26 May 1997, p. A18. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/wplate/1997-05/000L-052697-idx.html>. 26 May 1997.

Moody, Peter R., Jr. "Asian Values." *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 166-192.

Morgan, T. Clifton, and Sally Howard Campbell. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 187-211.

Morgenthau, Hans J. "Six Principles of Political Realism." *Classic Readings of International Relations*. Edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994, 34-38.

Muravchik, Joshua. *Exporting Democracy*. Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1992.

Naisbitt, John. *Megatrends Asia*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

"National Voter Registration Day," American Voter Coalition - Campaign '96. Online. Global Web Publishing, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.avc.org/camp'96/nvrd.htm>. 6 June 1997.

Neu, C. R., and Charles Wolf, Jr. *The Economic Dimensions of National Security*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994.

Nodia, Ghia. "Nationalism and Democracy." *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. , Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 3-22.

Nussbaum, Bruce. "Capital, Not Culture." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 165.

Owen, John M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 116-154.

Parekh, Bhikhu. "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy." *Prospects for Democracy*. Edited by David Held. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993, 156-175.

- Pinkney, Robert. *Democracy in the Third World*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
- Pipes, Daniel. "The Western Mind of Radical Islam." *First Things*, issue 58 (December 1995). Online. Christian Leadership Ministries, 9 June 1996. Available HTTP: <http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft912/pipes.html>. 25 May 1997.
- Porch, Douglas. *The French Secret Services*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 39-55.
- Przeworski, Adam. "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy." Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Volume III of IV. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 47-84.
- Raach, George T. "Military Perspectives on Peace Operations." in Chayes, 92. *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. Edited by Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 83-102.
- Remnick, David. "Can Russia Change?" *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 35-49.
- Richburg, Keith B. "After 30 Years, Is the Suharto Government Showing 'Regime Fatigue'?" *International Herald Tribune*, 26 May 1997, p. 4. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: IHT. 30 May 1997.
- Roy, Olivier. Translated by Carol Volk. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Ruberto, John Ruberto. "Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance Programs in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the Other Newly Independent States." Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, 13 June 1996, 9.
- Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Russett, Bruce. "The Fact of a Democratic Peace." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 58-81.
- Russett, Bruce. "Why Democratic Peace?" *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 82-115.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987.

Schmitter, Philippe C. "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 2 (April 1994): 57-73.

Schwarz, Adam. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.

Schweizer, Peter. *Friendly Spies*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993.

Schweizer, Peter. "The Future of Spying is Business." *Baltimore Sun*, 31 March 1996, p. 5E. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: BALSUN. 15 August 1997.

Sennott, Charles M. "New Cold War: Spies Target Corporations." *Boston Globe*, 19 January 1997, p. A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: BGLOBE. 15 August 1997.

Seri Klinchan Assawin Chumworatayee, "Burma's Minorities Sign Pledge to Fight Against Junta," *Thailand Times*, 26 February 1997. Online. The Burma Project, Open Society Institute, No date. Available HTTP: <http://www.soros.org/burma/signpldg.html>. 30 May 1997.

Shafritz, Jay M. *Words On War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1990.

Shalikashvili, John M. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996.

Shalikashvili, John M. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995*. Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1995.

Shawcross, William. *Cambodia's New Deal* (Contemporary Issues Paper no. 1). Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994.

Silverberg, David. "Spy Charges Fray Ties Between U.S., France." *Defense News*, 3 May 1993, p. 1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: DEFNEW. 15 August 1997.

Silverstein, Josef. "Civil War and Rebellion in Burma." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* xxi, no. 1 (March 1990): 114-134.

Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972.

Skocpol, Theda. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Smith, Martin J. *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*. London: Zed Books, 1991.

Specter, Arlen. "Economic Espionage." Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 1-4,10.

Soeharto. Transcript of Independence Day speech broadcast from the House of Representatives. Jakarta TVRI Television Network. 16 August 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 29 May 1997.

Spinney, Franklin C. "Quadrennial Defense Review: What Went Wrong? How to Fix It." Position paper, 20 June 1997 (version 2.3).

Spiro, David E. "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace." *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 202-238.

Steadman, Stephen J., "The New Interventionists." *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 1-16.

Steele, Jonathan. *Eternal Russia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Steinbruner, Maureen S. "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace." Prepared statement submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 60-63.

Stewart, James D and Neil G. Kacena. "Trapped by History: From Totalitarianism to Democracy." *Russia's Democratic Moment?* Edited by William C. Martel and Theodore C. Hailes. Montgomery, Ala.: Air War College Project on Russian Democratic Reform, 1995, 3-17.

Stromberg, Roland N. *Democracy: A Short, Analytical History*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996.

Sukarno. *Sukarno: An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams*. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965. In Schwarz, Adam. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.

Sukarno, "Political Manifesto." Speech delivered 17 August 1959. Published in Harry J. Benda and John A. Larkin, eds. *The World of Southeast Asia*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, 248-250.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. *The New World Strategy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Talbot, Strobe. "Democracy and the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 47-63.

Tin Maung Win. Interview. "Burma: Activist Said Confident Democracy to Prevail." *Sunday Post* (Bangkok), 12 June 1996, p. 18. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: <http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve>. 3 June 1997.

Tripp, Rhoda Thomas, ed. *International Thesaurus of Quotations*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987.

U.S. Department of State. *Iran Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*. Online. Available HTTP:http://www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iran.html. 26 May 1997.

U.S. General Accounting Office. "Economic Espionage." *Economic Espionage: Information on Threat From U.S. Allies*. Report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 16-22.

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, October 1995.

U.S. General Accounting Office. *Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States*. Briefing Report to the Chairman, House Committee on the Budget, May 1995.

U.S. General Accounting Office, *Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to Russia*, February 1996, 2.

Vaccaro, J. Matthew. "Peace Operations and Combat Readiness." *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. Edited by Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995, 67-82.

Vanden Heuvel, Katrina. "Yeltsin Survives; Will Democracy?" *The Nation* 260, issue 8 (27 February 1995): 270-273.

"Voter Turnout Lowest Since 1924," Associated Press. Online. Freedom Communications, Inc. Newspaper, no date. Available HTTP: <http://www.limanews.com/electionpkj/natvote.html>. 7 June 1997.

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1985.

Weir, Fred. "Boris's Big Bash." *The Nation* 260, issue 20 (22 May 1995): 708-709.

"Welcome to the Real Russia." *U.S. News & World Report*, 8 May 1995, 50-51.

Whitehead, Laurence. "The Imposition of Democracy." *Exploring Democracy: The United States and Latin America*. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 216-242.

Wolfowitz, Paul. "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia." Testimony before the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: FEDNEW. 30 May 1997.

Wright, Jeffrey W. "Intelligence and Economic Security." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 203-221.

Wright, Robin. "Democracies in Peril: Freedom's Excesses Reduce Democracy's Life Span," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 February 1997, p. A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: LAT. 30 May 1997.

Wright, Robin. "Democracies in Peril: Hope Turns to Frustration as Wave of Freedom Ebbs." *Los Angeles Times*. 19 February 1997: A13. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.

Wright, Robin. "Democracies in Peril: Oldest Cultures Pose Biggest Hurdles to Liberalization." *Los Angeles Times*. 18 February 1997: A1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.

Wright, Robin. "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 63-75.

Yates, Ronald E. "Corporate Cloak-and-Dagger." *Chicago Tribune*, 1 September 1996, p. C1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.

Zakaria, Fareed. "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994):109-126.

Zubaida, Sami. "Is Iran an Islamic State?" *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report*. Edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, 103-119.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218	2
2. Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School 411 Dyer Rd. Monterey, CA 93943-5101	2
3. LTC Terry Johnson, USA (ret.), Code NS/Jo National Security Affairs Department Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
4. Dr. Bertrand Patenaude, Code NS/Pa National Security Affairs Department Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
5. CAPT Frank C. Petho, Code NS/Pe Chairman, National Security Affairs Department Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
6. Dr. Mary Callahan, Code NS/Cm National Security Affairs Department Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
7. Mr. J. Lewis Rasmussen United States Institute of Peace 1550 M Street NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005-1708	1
8. Mr. Michael D. Mendenhall Office of Naval Intelligence, Code 222 4251 Suitland Road Washington, DC 20395-5270	1

9. Dr. Lee R. Schwartz 1
Office of the Geographer and Global Issues
U.S. Department of State INR/GGI
Room 8742
Washington, DC 20520
10. Dr. Scott Tollefson, Code NS/To 1
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
11. Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) 1
Pentagon, Room 5C600
Washington, DC 20350
12. LT Michael A. Brookes 2
5636 Pray Street
Bonita, CA 91902